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ABSTRACT 
This study aims at exploring thewidely applied principle of necessity 
( darnrah ) in Islamic law. Its main focus is to examine the legal definition 
and limitations of necessity. 
It has been divided into five chapters, an introduction and a conclusion. 
In the first chapter, special attention has been given to the definition of 
necessity in Islamic classical and modern jurisprudence. 
Since the maxims of necessity are an essential element of this topic, these 
have been explored in the second chapter. 
The causes of the state of necessity are dealt with in the third chapter. In 
this regard, compulsion, legitimate defence, illness, change in circumstances 
have been discussed insofar as they related to necessity. 
To give an accurate idea of the limitation of this principle, the conditions 
of necessity are the main concern of the fourth chapter. 
In the fifth chapter, the discussion is concerned with the relation between 
necessity and other Islamic legal concepts particularly those concepts which 
are regarded as sources of law. The link between public interest ( asm lahah 
iursalah , blocking the means ( sadd al-dharä'i') , 
istihsdn and concession 
( In khsah ), and necessity on the other hand was found to be strong. 
The conclusion, finally, summarizes the discussion previously made and 
presents the findings of this study. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Life in general is subject to change. It has never been in a static 
position. The dynamics of life may affect societies as well as individuals. 
And in either case, the law has to tackle the problems resulting from such a 
change. Legal rules are mainly enacted to organize people's lives in normal 
conditions. However, whenever a change happens, the law has to take 
account of such a change whether by enacting a new rule or by modifying 
an existing one. 
Islamic law as a comprehensive system takes accounts of the ever 
changing conditions as well as normal conditions. It has a set of principles 
and rules which are believed to tackle every aspect of life, whether 
devotional or secular. 
Having said that, the state of necessity is an abnormal situation into 
which a person might fall, where he has either to break an existing law or 
endanger his life or property. Such a state has been accommodated and 
recognized by Islamic law. Certain limits and conditions were stipulated for 
the recognition of necessity in order for it not to be taken as a free licence 
for permitting prohibited matters and in order, on the other hand, not to 
make the law too rigid so that no legal solution would be adopted during a 
time of constraint. 
I 
There is a great need to explain the extent of the recognition of the 
principle of necessity by Islamic law. 
This study is concerned with the definition, causes and limits of the 
principle of necessity within the boundaries of the science of the principles 
of Islamic law ( 'ilm u; ül al- figh ). This branch of Islamic knowledge is 
concerned with expounding the evidence and methods by which the rules of 
law ( fig) are deduced from their sources. To illustrate this, examples 
from the law (fish ) will be provided and expounded when appropriate. 
Necessity has never been tackled by classical Muslim jurists in an 
independent chapter in their writings, and they never allocated a separate 
work to necessity. However, it has been dealt with, mainly, by the scholars 
of the science of the principles of jurisprudence ( 'ilm usül al-filth ) under 
the heading of concessions ( rukhas ) and under the heading of public interest 
( maslahah) and it has also been discussed when scholars were talking about 
the proper attribute ( al-wasf al-munäsib ) of the effective cause ( al-'illah ) 
in analogy (4iß ). 
In addition, the principle of necessity has been dealt with in law (figh ) 
by the jurists. It has been mentioned and invoked possibly in every chapter 
of Islamic law, particularly in the chapter of food and drink. Jurists who 
have written on maxims gave considerable space to the maxims of necessity. 
2 
Moreover, the commentators on the Qur' än have tackled necessity 
when commenting on verses that allowed prohibited matters in the state of 
necessity. 
In the light of the texts of the Shari'ah and the observations of the 
classical jurists on necessity, contemporary Muslim jurists have dealt 
recently with the principle of necessity in separate writings allocated 
completely to necessity. The new attention paid to this principle was 
probably caused by the need to use it to justify legalizing a lot of matters 
which are associated with modern life. In this respect, necessity is regarded 
as a source of the law and a part of unrestricted interest ( al-maslaFah al- 
mursalah ). 
However, as a result of many people who are not expert in Islamic law 
or who tend to make a compromise in face of the secular tendency of current 
governments in the Islamic world using this principle, abuse may arise. The 
principle of necessity in this regard is similar to the principle of public 
interest ( asm lahah ) which has been used by many to permit matters which 
are not compatible with the Shari'ah texts. 
Three distinguished studies, which have been written on necessity by 
contemporary Muslims jurists and researchers, are noteworthy: 
The first one was a very brief but rich article compiled by the well- 
known jurist 'Abd al-Karim ZaydAn called " The State of Necessity in 
Islamic law " (Jiälat al-Darürah fi al-Shari'ah al-Islamiyyah ). The problem 
3 
with this study is that it was very brief and failed to cover all the aspects of 
necessity. 
The second one was a famous study by the famous jurists Wahbah al- 
Zuhayli called " The Theory of Necessity in Islamic Law "( Nazariyyat al- 
12arürah al-Shar`ixyah ). Great effort has been exerted in this pioneering 
study to collect the scattered materials related to necessity from all subjects 
and chapters in Islamic law. However, this study mixed cases related to 
different types of mitigations and concessions with those related to necessity. 
In another words, numerous cases of u. sah were regarded as cases of 
necessity when in fact they are not. It is well-known among Muslims jurists 
that although necessity causes mitigation, mitigation in Islamic law is caused 
by a lot of factors other than necessity and one will make a mistake if one 
mixes the different types with each others. 
The third study bears the title of " The Theory of Necessity in Islamic 
Law; Its Limitations and Conditions "( Nazrivyat al-Darürah al- 
Shar'iyyah: Hudüduhä wa Dawäbituhä) by Jamil Mubärak. This study is a 
very fine piece of work and it is in my judgment the best study which has 
been conducted so far. The problem with this study is that certain important 
aspects of necessity have been neglected such as the effect of necessity in 
contracts. In addition to that, although the role of the maxims of necessity 
was well-understood by the author, they have not been given sufficient 
treatment. 
4 
No work on necessity written in English by a Muslim scholar has 
been found. However, a general and brief writing (in 4 pages ) on necessity 
called ' Rule of Necessity and Need ' by Muhammad Muslehudin has 
highlighted the importance of the principle of necessity and need, but it did 
not sufficiently explain its definition, limitations and applications. I 
There is little treatment of the principle of necessity by Western 
scholars. There are only some brief words by Schacht on necessity. He 
viewed the principle of necessity as a means formulated by scholars to 
escape the ever-increasing corruption of contemporary conditions (fasäd 
al zamý. n ). It is a means, in his opinion, created for applying the regulations 
of governments which are not in conformity with ideal religious theory. 
Although, he did not give an example which may support such a claim, the 
foundations of the principle of necessity are mentioned in the Qur' än and the 
Sunnah of the Prophet which will help to ensure that no one tampers with 
this principle without violating its limits. 2 
Bernard Lewis was more precise when he mentioned the principle of 
necessity while talking about Muslims who live under the rule of non- 
Muslims. He said, " Necessity is a principle often invoked by Muslim jurists 
to justify the acceptance of situations which are in themselves 
unacceptable. " 3 Although his definition is too general, he is aware of the 
limitations of the principle of necessity and successfully distinguishes 
between necessity which relates to individuals in which limits are clear and 
unequivocal and necessity related to the exigencies of social life in which 
limits are more subtle, more debated and of course more relevant. 4 
5 
Although, this distinction has never been mentioned explicitly by 
Islamic jurists, they are aware of the differences between the nature of the 
constraints on individuals and the exigencies of the society while they may 
disagree as to whether a particular case would be deemed a case of necessity 
or not. They regarded the general need of the society as a state of necessity as 
the juristic maxim states " need, whether public or private is treated as a case 
of necessity. " 
In this study, references will be made to the Qur'än and the Tradition of 
the Prophet when it is required since they are the bedrock of Islam and they 
are the sources of legal and doctrinal principles. Consultation of these 
sources is encouraged by all Islamic jurists; however, they may disagree on 
the interpretation of particular verse or particular adit . 
This study is confined to the main four Sunni schools of law, and 
references will be made to the authoritative sources of every school, be 
these sources in law (fqh ) or in the principles of law (usu al-filth) or in the 
juristic maxims (-al-gawd`id al-fiqfiyygh ). References will be made also to 
the contemporary Muslim jurists who have tackled aspects of necessity. 
6 
1- see, Muhammad Muslehudin, Islamic Jurisprudence and the Rule of Necessity 
and Need, Chapter. 6. 
And: Philosophy of Islamic Law and the Orientalists, Chapter 17. 
2- Joseph Schacht, An Introduction to Islamic Law, P: 84. 
3- Bernard Lewis, The Political Language of Islam. P: 106. 
4- Bernard Lewis, " Legal And Historical Reflections on The Position of Muslim 
Populations under Non-Muslim Rule " in' Muslims in Europe ", p: 3. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
THE DEFINITION OF NECESSITY 
1. NECESSITY IN THE ARABIC LANGUAGE: 
When they define any legal term, Islamic jurists start with the 
linguistic definition. This is because there is in most cases a connection 
between terms and their linguistic meaning. Necessity (da tirah ) was so 
treated by Muslim jurists. 
Dw6rah in the Arabic language is derived from darar, which is an 
injury that cannot be avoided. Thus, the Arabs call any one who has lost his 
sight darir because of his obvious injury. It can be also said that rar is the 
opposite of benefit (ne) or it is the pain which has within it no element of 
goodness that can outweigh such pain. So a bitter or awful medicine, for 
instance, is not described as harmful (darr_). 1 arürah also is the state of 
hardship ( shiddat al_ &l ), or as the Arabs would say :' Necessity forces 
me to do such and such (hamalatni al-darürah a1ä kadhä wa ad ä'. 
Al-'dti - is the state of being in need of something ( -iht' ä' i al-shay, ) 
orb eing compelled to do something ( al-iljä' ). 2 Ibn al-'Arabi (d. 543 A. H ) 
said that al-mudtarr is the one who is forced and compelled to do something 
which he is able to do. So any one who is acting unwillingly ( as a result of a 
physical or mental impediment ) such as one who has trembling hands would 
not be described as" mud tarr " in the Arabic language. 3 
8 
Al-mudtarr in the Arabic language is a homonym. It can denote one who 
receives an injury which makes him act or one who avoids an injury. So the 
one who was compelled by force by a tyrant to do something is a mu to 
insofar as he was forced to do it as a result of the harm he would have 
received, and the one who is selling his property is a um diarr as well when 
he attempts to avoid an expected injury if he were to refrain from selling his 
house. Both meanings are recognised in a state where someone who was 
starving ate from a dead animal which was the only food available. So he 
was a mudtarr when he was suffering from the pain of the hunger. Also he 
will be called mudtarr when he decides to stop the hunger by eating such 
meat. 4 
In short, necessity (darnra) in the Arabic language means: 
1- Dire need for something (shiddat al-häjah). 
2- The state in which one is being forced to do some thing 
3- The intensity of liar which is injury or harm. 
This linguistic meaning is an essential part of the juristic technical 
definition of necessity as we will see later. 
2. NECESSITY AS A JURISTIC TECHNICAL TERM: 
A quick look into the writings of classical Muslim jurists and those 
of contemporary Muslim jurists, will give the impression that there is a clear 
division between the two groups in defining necessity. The classical jurists 
have given a very narrow definition while the contemporary jurists incline 
9 
to give a broader sense. Irrespective, however, of such a difference in the 
matter of the definition, they all apply the principle of necessity to the same 
situations and they understand it similarly. 
This matter shall be explained in the following order: Necessity as 
defined by classical Muslim jurists, the criticism by contemporary Muslim 
jurists of such a definition and lastly necessity as defined by contemporary 
jurists. 
A. NECESSITY AS DEFINED BY CLASSICAL JURISTS: 
Abü Bakr al-Jassäs (d. 370 A. H ) from the Hanafi school has defined 
necessity as follows :" The meaning of necessity, here, is the fear of injury 
(damn to one's life or some of one's organs if one refrained from eating. " 5 
Al-Zarkashi ( d. 794 A. H ), al-Siyüti ( d. 911 A. H ) and al-Hamawi al- 
Hanafi (d. 1098 A. H ) have defined necessity as follows: It is a situation in 
which one reaches a limit where if one does not take a prohibited thing, one 
will die or be about to die. 6 
Al-Dardir ( d. 1201 A. H ) from the Mäliki school said: Necessity is 
preserving lives from being lost or from being greatly injured. 7 
10 
Ibn Qudämah (d. 630 A. H ) has given a similar definition when he said: 
Permitting necessity is the state in which one fears losing one's life if one 
abstained from eating. 8 
All these definition have encompassed the following elements: 
1- There must be a fear of losing life or a fear of severe injury to one's 
organs. 
2- This fear is to be wiped out by eating a prohibited thing. 
B. THE CRITICISM OF THIS DEFINITION: 
Most contemporary jurists have criticized this definition by saying that 
it does not give a comprehensive definition of necessity; while classical 
jurists are fully aware of other causes of necessity which they have tackled 
extensively and explicitly included in the realm of necessity, they have 
limited the definition to preserving life by eating prohibited food. In their 
writings one can find a lot of examples in which they talked about preserving 
religious, financial and intellectual principles by committing an illegal act 
relying on necessity. 9 For instance, al-Zarkashi, in explaining the maxim 
" necessity permits prohibited matters ", has given examples for such a 
maxim pertaining to preserving property such as " ... 
Similar to that is 
taking back without his permission the property of a person who has refused 
to pay back his debt if that property is similar to what such a person has 
taken,  10 and he explained further and mentioned another case ".. it is 
allowed to destroy the vegetation and the buildings of the enemy if the need 
(äjah) of fighting requires that. " 11 He went on under the same heading ".. it 
11 
is allowed to exhume a dead person because of necessity in order to perform 
the major ritual ablution or to adjust his position towards the direction of the 
giblah or to change his grave because the corpse has been buried in usurped 
land. " 12 Also he mentioned the example that if a ruler appointed an 
incompetent judge, his decisions are to be carried out because of 
necessity. 13 
Al-Siyüg and Ibn Nujaym (d. 970 A. H ) have mentioned under the same 
heading cases related to compulsion, the legitimate defence and preservation 
of property and other cases in which preserving life was not involved and 
necessity was the legal basis for such cases. 14 
It has been mentioned in al-Mabsüt that: The testimony of women 
alone is acceptable in matters which men are not able to see, since necessity 
is realised in such matters. The rules relating to such matters need to be 
clarified in the court in the case of dispute and where it is impossible to take 
the testimony of men since they are not aware of such matters. So the 
testimony of women alone in such a situation is necessary. 15 
In the chapter on funerals, al-Buhüti ( d. 1051 A. H) mentioned the 
following case " It is prohibited for two dead bodies to be buried together in 
the same grave except in case of necessity or need such as when there is a 
large number of dead people. "16 
12 
One can see from the foregoing examples that necessity has been used by 
the classical jurists to justify a lot of cases in which concessions were made to 
remove a hardship by adopting compassionate rulings. These cases are not 
limited to the preservation of life but they include cases related to the 
preservation of the five fundamentals (al-darürivät al-khams) and also 
related to so-called need (a'ah ). 
One may speculate as to why the classical jurists' definition of necessity is 
not compatible with the examples which they give. It seems that it is 
definitely not because they did not conceive necessity precisely since they 
developed numerous legal rules relying on necessity as a legal proof. There 
are a number of reasons which may explain the way in which they define 
necessity. It can be said that they were explaining, but not defining, necessity 
in general when they explained the verses which deal with the necessity of a 
starving person to eat forbidden food. Consequently they had been defining 
and focusing on necessity which involved permission to eat prohibited food. 
It might be also because most of the texts of the Shari'ah have explicitly 
tackled only the necessity caused by starvation. 
Whatever the reason behind the difference between the classical 
definition of necessity and the wider usage of it, they were using necessity to 
justify the departure from the original rulings of certain cases in certain 
situations to easier rulings; and they formed a set of rules which regulate 
such a departure in order that it should not be a free licence for changing the 
law. 
13 
C. NECESSITY AS DEFINED BY CONTEMPORARY JURISTS: 
Taking these set of rules into account, contemporary jurists have tried 
to formulate a technical definition: 
'Abd al-Karim Zaydän, who has written an article about necessity, 
thinks the more comprehensive definition of necessity is that which was 
suggested by 'Ali Hayder in his famous book Durar al-kiukkim : Necessity, 
according to him, is a compelling situation where one has to commit an 
illegal act. 17 
M. al-Zargä' defined necessity as: The state which would, if not 
satisfied, result in real danger, such as a total compulsion or the fear of 
death in case of starvation. 18 
W. al-Zuhayli said, after criticising classical definitions of necessity 
for failing to cover all aspects of necessity: Necessity is a new state of 
danger and severe hardship which comes to face a person and as a result he 
fears an injury to his life, his organs, his offspring, his reason or his 
property. In such a situation, committing an illegal act or neglecting or 
delaying an obligation becomes obligatory or permissible. On the ground of 
strong probability, to commit such an act to ward off his injury is within the 
boundaries of the Sharl'ah. 19 Such an attempt is a sort of explanation 
rather than an accurate definition since the legal decisions concerning the 
various types of necessity has been included in it, such as obligation and 
permissibility which are normally to be avoided in forming definitions. 20 
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J Mubärak has suggested a definition which seems to be sound, in 
which he said: It is the fear of death or of severe injury to one of the five 
fundamentals of oneself or of others if one did not repel what would 
certainly or very probably cause death or injury. 21 
Irrespective of whether one adheres to strict rules in forming a 
definition, it appears that there was in every attempt which has been 
mentioned certain elements to be included in every definition of necessity. 
Those elements are: 
* There should be a compelling situation. 
* There should be a genuine fear of death or of severe injury. 
* Such an injury should be directed to one of the five fundamentals (al- 
darüriyat al-khams). 
* Committing an illegal act is the only way out of such a situation. 
To conclude the matter of definition, one can observe that 
contemporary Muslim jurists have widened the definition of necessity in two 
aspects: 
1- The fear of death is not the only state of necessity. The state of necessity 
can exist if there was a genuine fear of injury to one of the five 
fundamentals. 
2- The state of necessity is not caused only by starvation. It might be caused 
also by compulsion ( ik räh ), aggression (siyäl ), or change in 
circumstances in contracts ( 'awä'' ) etc.. 
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3. SOME TERMS ASSOCIATED WITH NECESSITY: 
There are some terms relating to necessity which are commonly used 
in discussing necessity. The meaning of such terms will be explained briefly 
in the following. 
A. REMOVING HARDSHIP (raf' al-h"): 
This is a very important principle in the religion of Islam. Its main 
concern is to remove an unusual hardship which has come to face Muslims 
during the implementation of some rulings in a particular situation. The 
principle of removing hardship encompasses the maxim which states 
" hardship begets facility " and the other maxim which states " necessity 
permits prohibited matters " as well as all varieties of legal concessions (.: 
rukhas al-shar'iyyah). 22 So acting according to necessity is part of the 
principle of raf' al-bim-j. Necessity is the highest degree of &4W, which 
means hardship. On the other hand, in the opinion of some Muslims writers, 
iaraj is equated with need ( 5jah ) since necessity is a stronger degree of 
hardship which would result in the loss of one of the five fundamentals, 
whereas Sara' and would cause a hardship without the resulting loss. 23 
However, since there is no legal definition of r '' , the scope of 
its linguistic 
meaning covers all different types of hardship including necessity. 24 
B. NEED ( äjah) : 
ä'a means whatever is needed to ease and remove an existing 
difficulty. It is one of the different types of benefit (masl hail ); it is in the 
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middle between necessary benefits (darüriyät ) and the luxurious benefits 
(tahsinivvät). Unlike necessary benefit, whose neglect leads to total 
disruption and chaos, the absence of ä'i ät would not cause such a collapse 
in people's lives but it would cause difficulty and hardship. 
Islamic jurists have widely used necessity (da bra ) and need ( häjah ) 
in an interchangeable way. They may use necessity to include the state of 
need which is, in fact, less than necessity; and they may use need to include 
the state of necessity which is harder than need. Such usage is a matter of 
tolerance in language and it does not denote their similarity in legal effects. 
If someone, for example, were starving but did not fear injury or death, he 
would not be allowed to take prohibited things. However, if one was afraid 
of the loss of his life or a severe injury, he would be legally allowed to take 
prohibited food. The first instance is a case of need and the other one a case 
of necessity. It is obvious, from the previous example, that if the state of 
need continues, it will lead to a state of necessity. 
C. FORCE MAJEURE (i'ihah : 
ä'ihah is a calamity which would destroy one's wealth. Certain types of 
i ih can cause the state of necessity. It has a wide implication in the realm 
of contract in Islamic law. And certain types of äý i, ah h may use a person to 
fall into a state of need ( ä'ah ) and then it may permit prohibited matters if 
the Shari'ah evidence allows that. For example, acquiring money by way of 
begging is forbidden. It is permitted, however, in the case of a need which 
has been specified in the following adith: 
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" one of the Companions of the prophet called Qabisah said: 
"I was in debt and I carne to the Prophet and asked him for 
help regarding it. He said: Wait till we receive Sadai, so 
that we may order that to be given to you. The Prophet again 
said: Qabisah, begging is not permissible except for one of 
three (classes) of people: one who has incurred debt, for him 
begging is permissible until he pays that off, after which he 
must stop; a man whose property has been destroyed by a 
calamity which has smitten him, for him begging is 
permissible until he receives enough sustenance, or reasonable 
subsistence; and a person who has been smitten by poverty, the 
genuineness of which is confirmed by three intelligent 
members of his people, for him begging is permissible till he 
receives that which will support him, or will provide him 
with subsistence. Qabisah, besides these three (every other 
reason) for begging is forbidden, and one who engages in such 
consumes that which is forbidden. "25 
D. COMPULSION ( kräh ): 
Compulsion has been defined as pressurizing a person without right to do 
something wrong to which he does not consent. 26 Some of the varieties of 
compulsion bring about a state of necessity and some of them do not. 
E. THE FIVE FUNDAMENTAL BENEFITS " al-]? arüriy st al 
khSmS" 
The major objective of the ari'ah has been analysed by Muslim 
jurists. It has been found that procuring benefits for and repelling injuries to 
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people, in this life and in the hereafter, is the greatest purpose of the 
Shari'ah. And there are significant indications, in the sources of the 
Shari'ah, which have shown that the Shari'ah has been sent down for 
people's interests, so we find a number of verses in the Qur'an which 
mention both the rules and their causes. 27 For instance, the following verse 
explained the purpose of sending prophets: 
" Apostles who gave good news as well as warning, that 
mankind after the apostles should have no plea against 
God"s: 4. v: 165. 
Likewise, the following verse has accounted for the purpose of creating 
life: 
" He who created death and life, that he may try which of 
you is best in deed" S. 67, v: 2. 
In addition to that, the causes of the detailed rules were clarified in 
numerous places, as, for example, where the Qur'an mentioned after the 
verse on ablutions (wudü' ): 
" God loth not wish to place you in difficulty, but to make 
you pure, and to complete his favour to you, that ye may be 
grateful " S. 5, v. 7 
And we find the objective of the fasting legislation in the following verse: 
" Ye who believe! fasting is prescribed for you as it was 
prescribed for those before you. That ye may learn self 
restraint " S. 11.183 
Thus, one can deduce the objective of many rules from the texts of the 
Qur'än and the Traditions of the Prophet. We find Islamic jurists have 
researched this theme in various sections such as the causes in analogy 
( gam) or in the aims of the Shari'ah (magäsid al-shari'ah ), as al-Shatibi 
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( d. 790 A. H ) did, or in the juristic maxims as Ibn `Abd al-Saläm ( d. 660 
A. H) did. 29 
Having said that, Islamic jurists have classified benefits (masalh ) in two 
ways: 
Firstly: The benefits according to the consideration of the texts of the 
Shari'ah. In this regard, they have been divided into three parts: 
1- Considered benefits ( mwilib mu'tabarah ) namely, the benefits 
which have been approved by legal evidence. 
2 -Canceled benefits (masalih mulghäh ) which mean the benefits that 
have been discarded by the texts of the Shad'ah. 
3- Unrestricted benefits ( masalib mursalah ) which mean whatever 
benefits have not been explicitly approved or discarded in the Shad'ah 
texts. 29 
Secondly: Classification according to the strength of the considered 
benefits themselves. In this respect, benefits have been divided into three 
categories 30: 
i-Necessary benefits (I)arüriyyitt ). These are the basics of human 
existence from the Islamic jurists' point of view. Human life cannot 
continue without these benefits. It would become chaotic in their absence; 
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without them human existence would not continue. Islamic jurists have 
considered the benefits related to preserving religion, life, reason, offspring 
and material wealth as necessary benefits. 31 
For the preservation of religion, the S ari' ah has, for example, 
legalized Jihiid to deter whoever wants to fight the believers, and punishes 
those who become apostates. In addition, the Shari'ah has forbidden 
innovation in religious rules as well as distortion. 32 
For the preservation of life, retaliation ( 'sä ), blood money ( diyh 
and expiation ( kaffArah ) have been imposed upon any one who impinges on 
another. Also committing suicide has been prohibited whatever the 
circumstance. 33 
For the preservation of mind, drinking wine or any kind of alcohol has 
been forbidden. 34 
For the preservation of offspring, punishment for adultery and false 
accusation of unchastity has been introduced. 35 
For the preservation of material wealth, the ar 'a has encouraged 
people to gain money by lawful means, and prohibited theft, deceit and 
taking or damaging others' possessions without cause. Moreover, usury has 
been prohibited. And the interdiction (hajr) upon the incompetent person, 
who are not capable of conducting his businesses has been allowed. On the 
21 
other hand, the Shari' has established a firm punishment against thieves, 
and guarantees in case of trespass on others' belongings. 36 
The preservation of benefits must be through two parallel ways 
according to al-Shatibi: 
1- supporting and ascertaining their principle. 
2-Preventing anything which would cause imbalance between them or 
disturb their existence. 37 
il-Complementary benefits (ää): The law recognises 
whatever benefits are needed for easing life and making it run smoothly, 
expanding people's activities and allowing them to live in reasonable 
conditions, absence of which, in contrast, would not make life become 
chaotic, as in the case of the absence of necessary benefits, but would cause 
hard and restricted conditions. They are needed to avoid inconvenient 
conditions. 38 
The Shari'ah has introduced many rules which would make people's life 
convenient in worship, transactions and punishment. In worship, for 
instance, there are the legitimate concessions ( rukhas ) which mitigate 
hardship during travel or illness. In transactions, the Shari'ah has permited 
many types of contracts and conducts such as a cropsharing contract over the 
lease of a plantation ( musägäh ), a sleeping partnership (muddrabah) and 
forward buying ( salam ) and the like. Divorce is allowed when it is 
needed. 39 
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In penal law, the demanding of blood money for unintentional 
homicide was imposed on the relatives of the killer ( 4ägilah ). Punishment is 
to be avoided in the presence of doubts (shubuhät ), while the avenger of 
blood is given the right to disclaim retaliation. 40 
Hi-Luxurious benefits (Tahsini, yyät ): These are benefits which 
embellish an already comfortable life. They are neither necessary nor 
important for the smooth running and prosperity of people's lives. They 
highlight how to behave in a good manner and how to adopt advanced 
customs and culture. Thus they are additional ornaments to normal life: for 
example, cleanliness of body, clothes and place; or volunteering to give the 
poor money out of charity. 41 
Complementing elements: Every category has been accompanied 
by complementary elements which do not, in their absence, affect the 
benefits, but they complete the benefits by their existence. Al-Shätibi, who 
researched this area extensively, gave examples such as, in the case of 
necessary benefits, the prohibition of a little wine which would not cause 
intoxication since it blocks the way leading to drinking much more. In the 
same manner, looking intentionally at unrelated women is forbidden as a 
complement to the preservation of offspring. 42 
In the case of complementary benefits, he gave examples such as joining 
two prayars together in travel as a rule complementary to shortening prayer 
during travel. 43 
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In the case of luxurious benefits he gave examples like the 
recommended methods of cleanliness, completing deeds which have already 
been started, even if they are not compulsory, and donating from the best 
quality of one material wealth. 44 
Al-Shätibi made a condition for consideration of the complementary 
elements. He believed that they must not abolish the original rules. So every 
complementary element which leads to the rejection of the original rule is 
null and void. Because if it led to rejecting the original rules, it clearly meant 
that it itself would be rejected for a greater reason. For instance, sale is 
necessary; preventing risk and uncertainty is a complementary element; 
however, if we stipulated avoiding risk completely, it would be hard to sell a 
lot of things, so a little risk is permissible. 45 
Certain points have to be mentioned here : 
i-The necessary benefits are prior to the others because they are the 
origin of the others. That means complementary and luxurious benefits are 
considered as branches of the necessary benefits. For instance, if we suppose 
that the Shari' prohibited sale, the consideration of the rules of risk or 
uncertainty would not make sense. 46 
ii-All these benefits are interdependent. That means each one of these 
categories must be preserved, as an imbalance in one of them would lead to 
an imbalance in the other. It is obvious that defect in the necessary benefits 
would be far stronger than defect in the complementary benefits. and defect 
in the latter would be stronger than defect in the luxurious benefits. 47 
iii- Such distinction and points are very important in order to 
recognise the principle of necessity in Islamic law . 
Necessity, in its narrow 
sense, is confined within the necessary benefits category. That means it does 
not work within the complementary and luxurious benefits. But they are 
included in its broad sense which is extended to include hardship and 
difficulty. 48 
Whatever matter affects one of the five fundamentals is considered a 
condition of necessity and must be removed. For instance, to preserve 
religion, prayer must be performed and whatever prevents it from being 
carried out in the proper way is regarded as a condition affecting necessity 
in which case it is performed according to capacity. Also eating is essential 
in order to preserve life: if someone cannot find lawful food, it is 
permissible to eat prohibited food to remove the condition of necessity and 
preserve life. 49 
In other respects, the five fundamentals are not equal but some of them 
take precedence over others according to the proportion of their benefits 
and injuries. Thus, according to the Shari'ah, the preservation of religion is 
prior to the other fundamentals, and preserving life follows that . 
But as to 
the others, the opinions of jurists vary. On the one hand we find al-Ghazäli 
( d. 505 A. H ) putting them in the following order: religion (dam ), life 
(a -h ), reason (, ), offspring ( ast ) and material wealth (x). 50 
25 
On the other hand we find al-Shätibi organized them as follows: religion, 
life, offspring, and material wealth, with reason coming last. So he 
deferred reason whereas al-Ghazäli put it in third place. 51 
The advantage of such ordering within the principle of necessity is to set 
the most important before the less important at a time when there may be 
conflicting claims of the different fundamentals. For example, if preserving 
religion conflicts with preserving life, the first must take priority over the 
latter. Thus, preserving life would not be accepted as an excuse for 
remaining behind in the case of jihad. Similar is a case where reason may be 
affected by a necessary step to preserve life. The jurists gave the example of 
someone choking when there was nothing available except wine to remove 
that choking. Therefore one would have the right to drink the prohibited 
wine to preserve one's life even if one became intoxticated; it is not 
acceptable to say avoiding wine is essential for the preservation of reason 
because preserving reason is null and void in the case of a conflict with 
preserving life. 
From another aspect, the principle of necessity may be applied within the 
branches of one of the five fundamentals. That is also in the case of conflict 
and according to the gauge of benefits and injuries which may come from 
either of them. For instance, preserving our own life is fundamental and 
preserving the lives of others is fundamental as well. But the life of others 
has a greater priority. So if someone thought he was compelled to kill other 
people or another person in order to save his own life, under no 
circumstances is this permissible. Such a man must refuse to kill because the 
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refusal to kill is , 
for the general public, a lesser evil than giving in to duress. 
If killing under duress was tolerated, it would be taken as a means to get rid 
of any person by forcing others to kill him, those persons claiming 
immunity on the grounds that the killing was done under compulsion. 52 
It is necessary to know the rank of the various benefits. Thus in the 
conflict between complementary benefits and necessary benefits, the latter 
will have priority; and the complemetary benefits have priority over 
luxurious benefits. In terms of this order we can understand why imbalance 
within necessary benefits is regarded as a condition of necessity, whereas 
imbalance within complemetary benefits is considered a condition of need 
(h1). 53 
The distinction between necessity and need is restricted to two points : 
i- Necessity legalizes the prohibitionwhether it affects individuals or 
groups. However, need does not legalize the prohibition unless it is 
concerned with the group, as the individual's needs are subject to change 
and variety and it is impossible to vary rules according to the private needs 
of individuals, whereas necessity is limited and restricted. 
ii-The exceptional rule of necessity is a temporary allowance of 
something otherwise prohibited by the texts of the Shari 'ah. This allowance 
will no longer exist after the condition is removed. But the rules which arise 
in the case of need do not conflict with the texts of the Shari 'a . However, 
they may be in conflict with general rules and giyäs, but nonetheless they 
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have taken their place in Islamic law as permanent rules and are not 
exclusive to unusual situations, and everyone benefits from them. 
4. NECESSITY IN THE OUR'AN AND THE TRADITIONS OF 
THE PROPHET (Sunnah) : 
There is a body of evidence in the Qur'dn and in the Traditions of the 
Prophet which lays down the foundations for the principle of necessity. 
Islamic jurists have relied on such evidence to elaborate the different aspects 
of necessity. 
In the Qur'än, there are numerous verses which explicitly or implicitly 
tackle this topic. The word injury ( darar ) has been mentioned, on different 
occasions and in different forms, seventy times in the Qur'An. 54 We shall 
confine ourselves to six verses which explicitly mention and tackle necessity. 
They are as follows according to their order in the Qur'än: 
1- " He hath only forbidden you dead meat, and blood, 
and the flesh of swine, and that on which any other name 
hath been invoked besides that of God. But if one is 
forced by necessity, without wilful disobedience, 
nor transgressing due limits, - then is one guiltless. 
For God is Oft-forgiving Most Merciful. " S: 2, v: 173. 
2- " Forbidden to you (for food) are: dead meat, 
blood, the flesh of swine, and that on which hath been 
invoked the name of other than God; that which bath been 
killed by strangling, or by a violent blow, or by a headlong 
fall, or by being gored to death; that which path been 
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(partly) eaten by a wild animal; unless ye are able to 
slaughter it (in due form); that which is sacrificed on stone 
(altars); (forbidden) also is the division (of meat) by 
raffling with arrows: that is impiety. This day have those 
who reject faith given up all hope of your religion: yet fear 
them not but fear Me. This day have I perfected your 
religion for you, completed My favour upon you, and have 
chosen for you Islam as your religion. But if any is 
forced by hunger, with no inclination to 
transgression, God is indeed Oft-forgiving, Most 
Merciful. " S: 5, v. 3. 
3- " Why should ye not eat of (meats) on which God's 
name bath been pronounced, when He bath explained 
to you in detail what is forbiddento you - except 
under compulsion of necessity? But many do mislead 
(men) by their appetites unchecked by knowledge. Thy 
Lord knoweth best those who transgress. " S. 6 v: 119. 
4- " Say: 'I find not in the message received by me 
by inspiration any (meat) forbidden to be eaten by one who 
wishes to eat it, unless it be dead meat, or blood poured 
forth, or the flesh of swine- for it is an abomination -, or, 
what is impious, (meat) on which a name has been invoked, 
other than God's '. But (even so), if a person is forced 
by necessity, without wilful disobedience, nor 
transgressing due limits, - thy Lord is Oft-forgiving, 
Most Merciful. " S: 6, v. 145. 
5- " Any one who, after accepting faith in God, utters 
Unbelief, - except under compulsion, his heart 
remaining firm in Faith - but such as open their breast to 
Unbelief, on them is Wrath from God, and theirs will be a 
dreadful Penalty. " s: 16, v: 106. 
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6- ' He has only forbidden you dead meat, and blood, and 
the flesh of swine, and any (food) over which the name of 
other than God has been invoked. But if one is forced 
by necessity, without wilful disobedience, nor 
transgressing due limits, - then God is Oft-Forgiving, Most 
Merciful. " S: 16, v: 115. 
A close observation of these verses will reveal that all of them except 
number five are to allow prohibited food in the case of necessity; the 
majority of these verses have repeated certain types of prohibited thing such 
as dead meat, blood, the flesh of swine and any food over which the name of 
other than Allah has been invoked, except verse number 3 where necessity 
was mentioned in the context of alluding to all prohibited food. Al-Jassäs 
said in his commentary on some of these verses, ' Allah has mentioned 
necessity in these verses, and He did not stipulate, in one verse, any 
conditions or attribute as to the permissibility of such food; that is in this 
verse , 
" when He hath explained to you in detail what is forbidden 
to you - except under compulsion of necessity? " 
that would entail the existence of permissibility wherever the necessity 
existed. ' 55 He said also in another place: ' The necessity which has been 
mentioned in the verse embodies all varieties of prohibited matters; as to its 
link with dead animal and the like, it does not prevent taking for granted the 
generality of the other verse. In another respect, if the meaning behind 
allowing these prohibited things is to save life, this meaning is present in all 
varieties of prohibited matters. So it must take the same ruling in the case of 
an existing necessity. ' 56 
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Verse number S tackled a matter other than eating what is prohibited; 
it tackles the state of one's being compelled to renounce one's belief. 
Islamic exegetes have discussed causes of necessity in their 
commentaries on some of the above verses, particularly the first one . 
Al- 
Qurtubi (d. 671 A. H ) said: ' being in a state of necessity is either because 
of a compulsion of an assailant or because of an extreme hunger. ' 57 A 
similar statement was given by al-Räzi (d. 606 A. H ). 58 Al-Jassäs also said 
' necessity could be caused by two things: if a person was in a place where 
nothing was available to him except a dead animal, or if there was lawful 
food but he was forced by another human being and was threatened with 
death or severe injury. ' 59 Ibn al-'Arabi for his part thought necessity 
could be caused by the compulsion of an aggressor or by an extreme hunger 
or by poverty in which one does not find lawful food. 60 
The classical jurists, as we mentioned before, were discussing the 
necessity which is removed by eating from prohibited things; as a result of 
that, they restricted the causes of necessity to hunger, duress to eat the 
prohibited and poverty that would result in hunger. Such a narrow sense is 
not accurate since they themselves have discussed other aspects of necessity 
without including them in the definition or the causes of necessity. 
The essence of necessity as understood from the jurists' elaboration of 
the different aspects of necessity is the state of being compelled to do 
something illegal; such a compulsion could be caused by an internal factor 
such as a pressing hunger or by an external factor such as duress, aggression, 
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changing circumstances etc.. In another respect, the reason for committing 
an illegal act is to save one's life, property or honour. And the illegal act 
which has to be committed in order to repel necessity could be eating or 
drinking, killing, committing adultery (i. e. rape ) or taking the property of 
others as well as neglect of a duty or an obligation. 
As to the Traditions of the Prophet, there are numerous traditions that 
have tackled the different aspects of necessity. They compose an important 
source for forming the principle of necessity. We shall mention some of 
these traditions. 
1- "A man alighted at Harrah with his wife and 
children. Another man said (to him): My she-camel has 
strayed; if you find it, detain it. He found it, but did not 
find its owner, and it fell ill. His wife said: Slaughter it. But 
he refused and it died. She said: Skin it so that we may dry 
its fat and flesh and then eat them. He said: Let me ask the 
Apostle of Allah. So he came to him (the Prophet) and 
asked him. He said: Have you sufficient for your needs? 
He replied: No. He then said: Then eat it. Then its owner 
came and he told him the story. He said: Why did you not 
slaughter it? He replied: I was ashamed (or afraid) of you. " 
Another version of this Hadith states that " It saved their 
lives for the rest of that winter ". 61 
2- Abü WAqid al-Laythi said: " I said to the Prophet: 
Messenger of Allah, we are living in a land where we are 
subjected to hunger: what is permissible for us from dead 
animals?. The Prophet said: If you did not drink milk in the 
morning and did not drink milk in the evening and did not 
store dates, then it is up to you to eat. " 62 
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3- The Prophet said: " He who is killed while protecting 
his property is a martyr, and he who is killed while 
defending his family, or his blood, or his religion is a 
martyr. " 63,64 
4- "A person came to the Messenger of Allah and asked: 
What do you think if a man comes to me in order to 
appropriate my possession? The Prophet said: Don't 
surrender your possession to him. The inquirer asked: If 
he fights me? The Prophet remarked: Then fight (with 
him). The inquirer then asked: What do you think if I am 
killed? The Prophet observed: You would be a martyr: The 
inquirer said: What do you think of him, Messenger of 
Allah, if I kill him. The Prophet said: He would be in the 
Fire. " 65 
5- " The Apostle of Allah was asked about hanging 
fruit. He replied: If a needy person takes some and does not 
take a supply away in his garment, he is not to be 
blamed.. " 66 
6- The Prophet is reported to have said " There shall be 
no injury nor reciprocating injury. " 67 
These verses and traditions of the Prophet as well as others have laid 
down the foundations of the principle of necessity. Islamic jurists have 
induced from this evidence a number of juristic maxims which gather 
together and give order to the various legal rulings regarding necessity. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
MAXIMS OF NECESSITY 
INTRODUCTION: 
A legal maxim ( al- gä'idah al-fighiyyah ) is defined as a general 
principle (liukm kulli ) which assists in recognising the legal decisions of 
its particulars 1. 
Its main concern is to give a general decision which would be applied 
to most of its related details which are scattered through a variety of legal 
subjects and chapters. 2 So, historically, most of these maxims have been 
composed after the details of the law became existent3. 
Islamic Jurists have paid considerable care to legal maxims. For they are 
a valuable means to group the legal rules in short eloquent phrases 
regardless of how broad or restricted those rules are. Such maxims are so 
designed to provide the u'tabid as well as the student of Islamic law with 
easily attainable tools to obtain sufficient knowledge of Islamic law and to 
help them in recognising the objectives of the Shaii'ah without being 
confused by the enormous details of law. They have dedicated to legal 
maxims certain types of books called ( al-ashbäh wa al-nazä'ir) and (l- 
gawii'id al-fighiyya. h ) 
In another respect, since legal maxims are applied to most but not all of 
their particulars, they cannot be used as a basis for giving a juristic decision 
fawa-) or issuing a judicial verdict. That is also because their original role 
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is to bring together details and not to be used as legal evidence. However 
certain maxims can be used as legal evidence and subsequently atäwä and 
judicial verdicts can be based on them. They are the maxims which are 
themselves legal evidence, i. e. they are either a part of the Qur'än or a 
saying of the Prophet such as " the burden of proof is on him who alleges; 
the oath on him who denies "( al-bayyinah 'ala al-mudda'i wa al-yamin 'ala 
man ankar ). And such as profits follows responsibility " (al-kharäj bi at - 
damän 4. 
There are five fundamental maxims which are accepted by all juristic 
schools and applied to a very wide range of subjects in Islamic law; they are: 
I- Matters are determined according to intention (al-umür bi magäsidihä ). 
2- Hardship begets facility ( al-mashaggah tajlib al-ta si ). 
3- Injury is to be repaired ( al-darar vuý. 
4- Custom is to be taken into account (al-'ädah muhakkamah ). 
5- Certainty is not affected by the occurrence of a new doubt (al-Xin - 
yuzäl bi al-shakk ). 
There are also numerous maxims covering all the branches of Islamic law. 
But since they are outside the scope of this study, we shall confine ourselves 
to the Maxims which are related to necessity. 
1- HARDSHIP BEGETS FACILITY ( AL-MASHAOOAH 
TAJLIBU AL-TAYSIR ): 
This maxim is one of the maxims with the widest application in Islamic 
law since it includes a wide range of Islamic legal principles and rules. All 
39 
Islamic jurists have agreed on its validity and importance and it has been 
regarded as a fundamental maxim. 5 
The bases of this maxim are in numerous Qur'dnic verses and many 
traditions of the Prophet. Thus it has been regarded as a principle which has 
definitely been incorporated in the Shaffah. 
The Qur'änic bases for this maxim may be found in many verses which 
explain the general principle of removing hardship ( raf ' al-, harm ) and 
which have established the rule of necessity such as the following verses: 
I- " God intends every facility for you; he does not want to 
put you to difficulties "s: 2. v: 185. 
2- " God doth wish to lighten your (difficulties) : for man was 
created weak (in flesh) ". S: 4. v: 28. 
3- "But if any is forced by hunger, with no inclination to 
transgression, God is indeed oft-forgiving, merciful " S: S. v. 4. 
4- "God doth not wish to place you in a difficulty, but to make 
you clean , and to complete 
his favour to you that ye may be 
grateful " S: 5. v. 7. 
S- " On no soul doth God place a burden greater than it can 
bear". S: 2. v. 286. 
The context of each of these verses varies from one to another and each 
one of them has dealt with a different subject. However, the implication of 
each one is identical, that is: to ease difficulty and hardship whenever it 
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exists, and to limit the legal liability of the people who are legally 
responsible according to their ability. That indicates there is nothing in the 
hari` which cannot be performed or which overreaches the limited 
capacity of the feeble human being. 6 
There are also in the tradition of the Prophet many ahädith which 
emphasize the same principle such as : 
1- It has been reported that the Prophet said " Religion is 
very easy and whoever overburdens himself in his religion will 
not be able to continue in that way. So you should not be 
extremists but try to be near to perfection.. * 7 
2- The adit that reads " the best of your religion is that 
which brings ease to the people. "8 
3- It has been reported by 'Aishah that: ' Once the Prophet 
came while a woman was sitting with me. He said: ' Who is she? ' 
I replied ' she is so and so ' and told him about her excessive 
praying. He said disapprovingly :' Do good deeds which are 
within your capacity (without being overtaxed) '. " 9 
4- The Prophet said " Religion is facility. The most beloved 
at- religion to God is tolerant orthodoxy ( al- ifi, , yeah 
§amhahij. 
w 10 
These bases and many others, though referring only to religion, cover 
the entire field of Islamic law, because this law as it is well-known embraces 
religious observances as well as what is understood as juridical rules in the 
west. 
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The general meaning of this maxim is that: Difficulty and hardship are 
regarded as a valid reason for facility and mitigation. And in the time of 
constraints and urgency, ease and latitude must be shown. It is understood 
that the normal rules of law have been designed to be general in nature and 
thus to consider all situations and all individuals and not merely particular 
situations or particular persons. However, in certain circumstances, the 
meticulous adherence to law turns into injury and injustice and it becomes 
necessary to mitigate people's difficulty and to disregard rules in certain 
exceptional circumstances if their application were to result in injury and 
hardship. 11 
HARDSHIP: 
Hardship is the prominent element in the condition of necessity. Thus, 
wherever there is a state of necessity, there will be a sort of hardship. We 
shall examine, in the following, the effect of hardship on the rules in Islamic 
law, and whether all kinds of hardship are considered as relieving factors. 
Hardship (mashaggah ) means in Arabic " all kinds of difficulties 
which range from inconvenient conditions to harsh conditions which may 
cause death or damage to some organs. " 12 
It is important to make clear that choosing to suffer by doing hard deeds 
with the purpose of being rewarded in the Hereafter is not an Islamic norm. 
So deliberately to aim to face hardship in deeds is strongly rejected in Islam. 
Al-Shätibi has pointed out that: it is not up to competent people to inflict on 
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themselves strenuous and harsh burdens by doing exhausting deeds. But they 
must aim to perform legitimate deeds in order to be rewarded. 13 
Ibn 'Abd al-Saläm has also stressed the same point and said: It is not right 
to choose hard and tiring deeds in order to be close to God in the Hereafter 
since the act of worship must be to glorify God and to praise him and 
onerous deeds are not a glorification or praise of God. 14 
This norm is based on a large number of traditions of the Prophet in 
which the Prophet has disapproved of inflicting any sort of torture on one's 
self for the purpose of worshipping God. Some of these traditions are the 
following : 
1- It has been reported that "A group of three men came to 
the houses of the wives of the Prophet asking how the Prophet 
worshipped Allah and when they were informed about that, they 
considered their worship insufficient and said: ' Where are we 
in relation to the Prophet as his past and future sins have been 
forgiven ?' Then one of them said: 'I will offer the prayer 
throughout the night for ever. ' The other said: 'I will observe a 
fast throughout the year and will not break my fast. ' The third 
said: 'I will keep away from women and will not marry 
forever. ' The Prophet came to them and said: 'Are you the same 
people who said so and so? By Allah, I am more submissive to 
Allah and more afraid of him than you; yet I observe the fast 
and also do not observe fast, I do pray and also do sleep, and -I 
also marry women. So he who does not follow my path in 
religion is not from me ( not one of my followers). ' " 15 
2- It is narrated that: " Once the Prophet came in and saw a 
rope hanging between two pillars. He said: ' What is this rope ?' 
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The people said: ' This rope is for Zainab who , when she 
feels 
tired, holds it to keep standing for the prayer. ' The Prophet 
said: ' Do not use it. Remove the rope. You should offer prayer 
as long as you feel active and when you get tired sit down. ' 0 16 
3- It has been narrated that: " The Prophet saw an old man 
holding on to his two sons. The Prophet asked: ' What is the 
matter with him? ' They said: ' he made an oath to walk and not 
to ride. ' The Prophet said: 'God is not in need of him torturing 
himself. ' And he asked him to ride. " 17 
4- In al-Muwatta' it is repotted that " The Messenger of Allah 
saw a man standing in the sun. The Messenger asked: ' What is 
wrong with him? ' The people said: 'He has vowed not to speak, 
not to seek shade from the sun, nor to sit and to fast. ' The 
Messenger of Allah said :' Go and tell him to speak, seek shade 
and sit, but let him complete his fast. ' " is 
It has been concluded from these tradition that the obligatory rules of the 
Shari'ah, as Muslims see them, are not difficult to perform. In other words, 
they are within the limit of the ability of a human being. 
Having said that, a sort of hardship would inevitably occur before or 
while doing legal obligations. This sort of hardship was the subject of 
discussion among Muslim jurists 
They have distinguished between two kinds of hardship: usual 
hardship and unusual hardship. In respect of usual hardship, no rule in 
Islamic law is devoid of hardship, not to mention Islam itself, with regard to 
the fact that Islam is against whims so that every Muslim cannot act 
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according to his own wishes but must act according to Islamic instructions. 
The commandments of the Sh=entail a commitment from believers to 
keep themselves from breaching them. Such a commitment demands from 
the believers efforts to confront their personal wishes that conflict with 
Islamic commandments; and it is hard to strive against your wishes. 19 
The Shg1jah has disregarded this kind of hardship because every deed 
in our life requires effort which, undoubtedly, contains some sort of 
hardship regardless of its level. Thus, this kind of hardship and our daily life 
naturally come together; it is unavoidable hardship. 20 Moreover, hardship 
in lawful conduct varies according to the nature of the deeds and the 
circumstances surrounding their place and time. Thus hardship is not the 
same in prayer, fasting, pilgrimage and 'iý häd; also hardship is different 
from time to time as in the dawn prayer and the noon prayer; or the ablution 
in the winter time and in the summer time. It is understandable that usual 
hardship, which does not require mitigation, has been joined with the nature 
of deeds so it is unacceptable, here, to say that hardship injihäd, for instance, 
is unusual hardship because the nature of war, at any where and any time, 
requires fighting which leads, inevitably, to killing or harm . 
21 
UNUSUAL HARDSHIP: 
Unusual hardship is caused by external factors, it does not come from 
the nature of rules . 
This kind of hardship has been divided into three types : 
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i- Excessive and significant hardship that causes fear of loss of life or 
damage to some organ; this type results in mitigation and allows the 
suspension of the legal prohibition. 
ü- Light hardship such as a pain in a finger or a modest headache or a 
bad mood and so on, this type has no consideration in Islamic law. 
iii-Intermediate hardship; this type takes account of the two previous 
rules, if the hardship was nearer to the excessive form, it would be 
considered as a mitigating factor; and if it was nearer to the easier one, it 
would not be regarded as a mitigating factor. 22 
It is very important to identify the criterion which determines 
precisely the type of hardship which causes mitigation. In this regard there 
are two kinds of hardship : 
i- Hardship which has been connected with specific causes, by the texts of 
the Shari'ah, insofar as the mitigation would have existed if the cause had 
existed and vice versa, such as linking mitigation with travel or compulsion 
or illness as we shall explain that later. 
ii- Hardship which has been left by the texts of the Shari'ah without 
restriction. About this type of hardship there is no consensus among Islamic 
jurists in determining the criterion which can confine hardship within an 
agreed definition. We find some of them have suggested custom ('ur ) as a 
criterion indicating this type of hardship, as Ibn Taymiyyah ( d. 728 A. H ) 
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has said " The reference for any thing which has no limitation in the Arabic 
language or in the Sharl'ah is custom . 
"23 But al- Qarirt ( d. 684 A. H. ) has 
criticized the consideration of custom in this matter and has preferred the 
opinion of Ibn Abd al-Saläm which suggested that Islamic jurists have to 
look at the general rules in Islam and bring the new events under the rule in 
which the Shari'ah texts have considered hardship within the same type of 
act of worship ('ibädAt ). For instance, the texts of the Shari'ah have 
considered the harm caused by lice as an excuse for a person cutting his hair 
after entering into the state of 'her i, for the jrnjj,. Accordingly, any excuse 
which may cause hardship in the 'hý räm is estimated within the limit of the 
hardship caused by lice; i. e. any harm caused in ihräm that is greater than 
that caused by lice will give a person an excuse to avoid it but if it is less, 
there will be no excuse. 24 
With regard to voluntary deeds, it is not acceptable to invent any 
illegitimate practice which may or may not cause hardship as Imam Mälik 
( d. 179 A. H ) pointed out in his comment on the previous mentioned ad- 
25 and said: The Prophet asked him to continue with what is an act of 
obedience to God, that is to fast, and the Prophet rejected what he was doing 
which were acts of disobedience when he asked him not to continue standing 
in the sun and asked him to speak and sit. 26 It is also disliked to exaggerate 
in such matters, particularly if such an exaggeration would result in either of 
the following: 27 
1- Getting bored with the act of worshipping which may result in 
disliking it or giving it up. This was indicated in the saying of the Prophet: 
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" Do those deeds which you can do easily, as Allah will not get 
tired (of giving rewards) till you get bored of performing 
religious deeds. " 28 
2- Being unable to make a balance between the various rights and 
obligations. Since competent people are asked to perform numerous 
obligations, it is not appropriate for someone to exaggerate in praying or 
fasting and consequently not able to do what he has to do in another aspect of 
life. This is indicated in the following badith which provides that : 
The Prophet made a bond of brotherhood between 
Salmän and Abi al-Dardä'. Salmän paid a visit to Abü al-Dardä' 
and found Umm al-Dardä' ( the mother of Dardä') dressed in 
shabby clothes and asked her why she was in that state. She 
replied :' Your brother Abi al-Dardä' is not interested in the 
luxuries of this world. ' In the meantime Abü al-Dardä' came 
and prepared a meal for Salmän. Salmän requested Abü al- 
Dardä' to eat with him but Abü al-Dardä' said: 'I am observing a 
fast. ' Salmän said: 'I am not going to eat unless you eat. ' So 
Abü al-Dardä' ate with Salmän. When it was night and a part of 
the night passed, Abt al-Dardä' got up to offer the voluntary 
night prayer but Salmän told him to sleep and Abü al-Dardä' 
slept. After some time he got up again but Salmiin told him to 
sleep. When it was the last hour of the night, Salmän told him to 
get up then and both of them offered the prayer. SalmAn told 
Abü al-Dardä': ' Your lord has a right on you, your own self has 
a right on you and your family has a right on you; so you should 
give the rights of all those who have a right on you. ' Abü al- 
Dardä' came to the Prophet and narrated the whole story. The 
Prophet said: ' Salmän has spoken the truth. ' " 29 
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So whenever exaggeration results in getting bored or neglecting an 
obligation, it is disapproved. 
In the same vein, if doing hard and unusual deeds would result in 
harming one's self, one must not do such a deed as it is reported that: 
' The Prophet was on a journey and saw a crowd of 
people and a man was being shaded by them. He asked, ' What is 
the matter with him?. ' They said: 'He is observing the fast. ' The 
Prophet said: 'It is not part of righteousness to observe fast on a 
journey. ' " 30 
Similarly if one was in a state where he can not act properly because of a 
psychological difficulty, he should not act, as is understood from the saying 
of the Prophet which states that " The judge who is in a state of anger shall 
not adjudicate. 031 The state of anger and any thing which resembles anger 
in its effect such as extreme hunger and depression make it hard mentally to 
concentrate so that the judge would not be able to adjudicate adequately. This 
hardship is the cause of prohibiting adjudicating in the state of anger. 32 
2- INJURY IS TO BE REPAIRED : (AL-DARAR YUZAL ) 
This maxim might also be formulated in the form of the saying of the 
Prophet which states that " no injury shall be inflicted or reciprocated" (j 
da a wM j di ä ). 33 The jurists who used the expression that injury is to 
be repaired (al-darar yuzäl) 34 have used the foregoing saying of the 
Prophet as an evidence which supports this maxim, whereas other jurists 
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who used the saying of the Prophet as a form for the maxim believe that it is 
more appropriate to use the saying of the Prophet here because it serves as 
an evidence and a maxim at the same time. 3S 
Notwithstanding the fact that this maxim in its two forms aims to 
disallow any sort of action causing harm, the meaning of the two forms is 
different, as al-Zargä' pointed out. 36 The form which states that " no injury 
shall be inflicted or reciprocated " deals with the prohibition of inflicting 
injury or paying back the injury, so its prime concern is the act of harm 
before it had happened. Whereas the form which states that " injury is to be 
repaired " deals with removing harm after it had become existent, so its 
primary concern is removing the harm which has already been inflicted. 
THE MEANING OF THIS MAXIM: 
This maxim is a fundamental maxim which deals with prohibiting and 
preventing injury. It has three major aspects in this regard: 
1- It negates the legitimacy of inflicting injury on any body. Thus, the 
meaning of aý darar , as 
Ibn al-Athir explains it, is that nobody shall harm 
anybody else or take any portion of his rights. 
37 This, of course, is qualified 
by the penal law in which the criminal would endure severe harm since it is 
legitimate punishment aiming to preclude greater harm from being inflicted 
on society. 38 
2- It bans any one from returning the injury which has already been 
received. Ibn al-Athir ( d. 606 A. H ) has explained the meaning of ( wa lä 
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diirdr ) and said: No one shall do harm in return to an earlier harm. 39 The 
aim of prohibiting an injury being reciprocated is to nullify the idea of 
personal retaliation (tha'r) which is, inevitably, to widen the injury to a 
greater extent, rather than to reduce it or remove it. Thus, if someone 
caused damage to another's property, the latter must not take revenge by 
destroying the property of the first person, since it would cause a wider 
damage with no benefit for any of the involved parties. Therefore it is wiser 
and better for the injured party to secure his rights by holding the other 
party liable for the damage he caused so that he would be obliged to pay 
compensation to the injured party. However, this is not the case in respect of 
injuries which are directed against the body, such as killing or causing 
damage to any part of the body. In such cases the law of ar s must be applied 
taking into account equality in the case of non-mortal injuries, for such a 
transgression, from the Islamic point of view, requires a similar and equal 
punishment ( unless the injured party is willing to forgo that ). 40 
3- It aims to remove any existing injury since such an injury is a 
transgression which should not be allowed or inflicted. 
This maxim is supported explicitly by the foregoing saying of the 
Prophet " (la darar wa la dirär ) no injury shall be inflicted or 
reciprocated. " Moreover, it has also been affirmed in many verses and 
other traditions of the Prophet. Al-Shätibi has made it clear that the 
implication of the previous badith is included in another fundamental 
principle in Islam, namely the prohibition of aggression in its various forms 
such as the prohibition on violating another's life, property or honour, and 
the forbidding of all sorts of oppression and transgression. 41 Such a 
prohibition has widespread application within the various branches of the 
Shari'ah. We shall provide some examples in which injuries were clearly 
prohibited: 
1- The Qur'an states as to the rights of a divorced woman: 
" Let the women live (in ''dý dah) in the same style as ye 
live according to your means: annoy them not, so as to 
restrict them " S: 65. V: 6. 
This ruling is to prevent a selfish man who has divorced his wife from 
treating her unjustly, and while giving her residence and maintenance, from 
so restrict them as to make her life miserable. 42 This is forbidden and he 
must provide for her with the same degree as he provides for himself 
according to his status in life. 
2- In the Qur'än it says also: 
' But do not take them back to injure them or to take undue 
advantage. If any one does that, he wrongs his own soul ". 
s: 2, v: 231. 
This verse tackles the bad custom of the Arabs before the advent of Islam 
when a husband after divorcing his wife would take her back, not to live 
with her an equitable life but to inflict on her a great deal of injury by 
putting her in a situation where she is neither a divorced woman nor a 
married woman. This is also directed to Muslims, especially in practicing 
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their rights in divorce when the divorce is revocable before the third time. 
This prohibition is to prevent and remove injury in this aspect of life. 43 
3- Another verse states: 
" No mother shall be treated unfairly on account of her child, 
nor father on account of his child. " s: 2. v 233. 
This verse requires divorced parents to treat their child fairly and with 
compassion and not to victimize it because of their disagreement. Al- 
Qurtubi commented: "The meaning of this verse is that a mother should not 
refuse to feed her child unless her husband pays her a high wage, or to ask 
his father to hire a wet-nurse when he cannot afford it. And the father should 
not prevent the mother from feeding her child when she wants to. "44 
4- It has been stated in the Qur'an: 
of To those weak of understanding make not over your 
property" s: 4. v. 5. 
The implication of this verse is to avoid the financial injury which is 
anticipated in the case of a person who is mentally incapable of dealing with 
his property. Anyone who has a limited mental capacity should be prevented 
from controlling his property so as to keep such property from being 
wasted, and it should be held in trust with an honest guardian. Such a 
measure is for the benefit of a person who is incapable. 45 
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5- As to the Traditions of the Prophet, it was reported: 
"A man had a tree in the land of someone else. The owner of the 
land was annoyed at the frequent visits and intrusions of the 
owner of the tree. He subsequently raised the matter before the 
Prophet. The Prophet asked the owner of the tree to take 
another tree nearer to his orchard instead of this tree. The man 
refused. The Prophet asked him to sell it to the landlord, but he 
refused again. Then the Prophet asked him to give it to the 
landlord and he refused that too. Then the Prophet said: ' What 
you are doing is to harm him. ' So he asked the owner of the land 
to give him another tree. "46 
All the previous cases and many others have been legislated to prevent 
harm from being inflicted even on a very small scale, which confirms, as al- 
Shatibi noticed, that preventing and removing injury is a fundamental 
principle in Islamic law. 
Al-Siyüti and Ibn Nujaym believe that countless legal subjects are built on 
this maxim such as the cancellation of a contract due to a defect in the subject 
matter of the contract, all the varieties of options in contract of sale 
( khiyar ), the different types of limitation on someone's legal competence 
( a'r ), preemption ( shuf, ah ), legitimate defence and many other legal 
rulings. 47 
We shall provide here some examples in detail which further illustrate the 
character of this maxim : 
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1- If someone rented his land to someone else to cultivate and the period of 
the lease was over before the harvest was due, he is obliged to wait until the 
tenant has harvested his produce, and he has no right to ask the tenant to 
terminate the contract and to leave the land. However, he is entitled to rent 
according to the current price. This is to prevent harm from being inflicted 
on the tenant if he was forced to leave the land before he could harvest his 
Crop. 48 
2- Jurists of various schools have validated the interdiction on the ignorant 
physician, irresponsible mufti and bankrupt travel agent on the grounds of 
preventing harm to the people. In these examples, the harm which is being 
prevented is a general harm affecting people in general and not confined to a 
particular person. So harm should be removed whether it is private or 
general. 49 
3- If someone concluded a contract of sale and the subject matter was 
something which could not be preserved for a long time, such as fresh fruit, 
without being ruined, the vendor has the right to cancel the contract if the 
buyer disappears without paying the price and he fears that his product 
would be spoiled. -50 
4- In the case of someone who has designed an egress from his home 
through which the water pours out to a passage where people pass so that 
they would be affected by such a spout, he would be asked to adjust it or 
remove it if necessary. sl 
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In a similar vein, if the branches of a tree cause a problem to someone's 
neighbor, they should be removed. Moreover, if someone has a window 
which overlooks his neighbours' private place so they can not move freely, 
he should alter or remove such a window. 52 
These instances affirm that the conduct of an individual with regard to his 
own possessions is permissible as long as he does not harm someone else. 
This maxim has been qualified by the maxim which states that " an 
injury cannot be removed by the commission of a similar injury nor, a 
fortion, by a greater injury. " It is not allowed, for instance, for a person 
who is compelled by starvation to take the food of another facing the same 
problem, since he would remove his injury by causing the same injury to 
another. 
Similarly, if someone was being forced to kill another, he is not allowed to 
do so, regardless of the extent of the compulsion, since his life is equal to the 
life of others and it is not preferred to another's life. 53 
In the realm of transactions, if the object of the contract of sale was 
discovered later to be defective, but, in addition, having left the possession 
of the seller, a new defect occurred while it was in the possession of the 
buyer, the buyer is not entitled to the option based on defect ( khi äy r al_ 
'b, which allows him to return the commodity to the seller and take his 
money back. This is due to the fact that new defect would be harmful to the 
seller if he was obliged to take his commodity back. The solution is to take 
due compensation from the seller vis-ä-vis the old defect, which would be 
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the difference between the value of the object when it was intact and its 
value when it was defective with the old defect. 54 
The maxim which states that "A private injury is to be endured to avoid a 
general injury " is a qualification to the foregoing maxim which states that 
" injury cannot be removed by the commission of a similar injury. " 55 
3- NECESSITY PERMITS PROHIBITED THINGS ( AL-IpARIDRAT 
TUBIH AL-MAHZURAT ): 
This is the central maxim of this study. Therefore here we shall neither 
explain the meaning of necessity nor provide evidence to supports the legal 
consideration of this maxim, nor we shall give examples since all these 
points are discussed extensively throughout this thesis. We shall instead 
concentrate here on the meaning of the permissibility of prohibited things. 
This maxim has a strong link with the two previous fundamental maxims, 
namely " hardship begets facility " and " injury is to be repaired. " Thus, we 
find that some jurists have regarded it as subordinate to the first one and 
have held that since it explicitly allows making a concession because of the 
state of necessity and it gives permission to ease hardship, it should, 
therefore, be subordinate to the maxim that deals with all the varieties of 
concessions and mitigation, that is " hardship begets facility. " 56 On the 
other hand other jurists made it subordinate to the latter, holding that the 
maxim of necessity aims to preclude an injury from being inflicted where a 
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necessity existed. Thus it is included in the maxim which deals with 
removing injury in its broad sense, that is " injury is to be repaired. "57 
The reality is that whether it follows one or the other, it makes no 
difference since it is a matter of form. 
This maxim states clearly that any prohibited matter is to be permitted 
during a state of necessity. However, this is not an absolute principle but has 
been qualified by some cases where necessity has no effect. 58 The effect of 
necessity on prohibited things can be divided into three types: 
Firstly: A concession which suggests the permissibility of prohibited 
things as long as the state of necessity is existent, such as what might be eaten 
or drunk in starvation or extreme thirst or under compulsion, such as the 
flesh of a dead animal or the meat of swine or an intoxicant drink. Such 
things are permissible in the state of necessity as stated in the Qur'än " except 
under compulsion of necessity ". s: 6- v: 119.59 
Secondly: A concession which has no effect on the prohibition of deeds 
but helps in removing blame or moral guilt ( 'tt hm ) from being attached to 
the doer. An example of this is the saying of the word of disbelief or causing 
damage to the property of others under complete compulsion. Such acts 
remain prohibited acts in the time of necessity. However, the effect of 
necessity is only to free the doer from being treated as culpable. 60 
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Thirdly. Deeds which are not susceptible to concession. Thus, necessity 
has no effect on the criminal act of killing or injuring any part of the body. 
A compelled person is not allowed under a threat of any sort to kill or injure 
anybody. As was explained previously, it is not allowed for a group on a 
boat to save themselves by throwing some of them into the sea in order to 
prevent the boat from sinking. 61 
4- NECESSITY IS ESTIMATED BY THE EXTENT THEREOF ( AL-- 
pARURAH TUOADDAR BI OADRIHA): 
This maxim means that where necessity permits prohibited things, its 
rules should be treated as exceptional rules that are limited to the period 
and the degree of an existing necessity. Thus, any licence that may be 
regarded as necessary should not be absolute but should be to the extent 
required to meet the hardship. 62 
Such a meaning has been reaffirmed in other maxims such as the maxim 
which provides that " whatever becomes permissible owing to some valid 
excuse ceases to be so with the disappearance of that excuse. "63 It should be 
noticed, here, that this maxim covers all varieties of concession (ks) 
whether it is due to a state of necessity or otherwise. Moreover, it 
emphasizes the limit of time in which the exceptional rule operates, i. e. as. 
long as necessity is existent, and it must cease as soon as the urgency is no 
longer existent. 64 
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Similarly, the maxim which states that " injury is to be removed as far as 
possible " states that injury should be prevented from being inflicted and it 
should be removed if it had been inflicted by the least means available; in 
other words, by using the lesser of two available means. If one is able to 
defend one's life, for instance, by pushing the aggressor using a stick, then 
one should not use a gun in defending oneself. 65 
The general meaning of these maxims has been supported by the Qur'änic 
verse which states that: 
of But if one is forced by necessity, without wilful disobedience 
nor transgressing due limits, then one is without guilt ". s: 2. 
v: 173. 
The Arabic expression for " without disobedience nor transgressing limits " 
is ( ghavr, bäghi wa la 'ädin) which has been interpreted as follows: 
Allowing oneself to eat from prohibited things more than is necessary. 
And eating from what has been prohibited when he is able to find something 
lawful to eat. 
Or having a desire and inclination to eat from what has been prohibited. And 
to overstep the limit by eating excessively from prohibited things. 66 
Necessity according to this interpretation must be confined to its limits. It 
should be borne in mind that the dispensation which is being made -vis-a-vis 
the state of necessity is to remove the hardship caused by such a situation. 
Thus it is not a free licence. For example, if the theft of a loaf of bread be 
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tolerated on a plea of extreme hunger, the theft of one ton of flour would not 
be so under any circumstances. 67 
5- NECESSITY DOES NOT INVALIDATE _ 
THE RIGHTS OF 
OTHERS (AL-DARORAH LA TUBIH HAOO AL-GHAYR ): 
Although a state of necessity renders prohibited things permissible, it 
does not override the rights of others. 68 Thus, if someone was forced, by an 
internal necessity such as starvation or by an external necessity such as 
compulsion, to infringe another persoII s property, such a person may not be 
legally blamed or punished. However, he should compensate the injured 
party for his loss. So necessity is a justification for committing an illegal act 
but it does not justify wasting the property of others without being 
responsible for making restitution. If no guarantee of restitution was 
imposed in such a situation, then the result would be removing an injury by 
the commission of a similar injury which is not acceptable. 69 
The basis for such a maxim is the saying of the Prophet: " It is unlawful 
to take the property of a Muslim without his express consent ", which 
indicates that compensation is required for damaging anyone's property 
except in the case where the owner of the property has shown his consent. 
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As a corollary, it should be noticed that the owner of property who is not 
in dire need of that property, i. e. food, is obliged in Islamic law to give it to 
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anyone who is in extreme need for it to save his life. In other words, 
refraining from providing a compelled person with what he desperately 
needs is an offensive act contradicted clearly by the Qur'änic command in 
this verse: 
" Help ye one another in righteousness and piety, but help ye not 
one another in sin and transgression ". s. 5. v 3.71 
In addition, a compelled person has the right to use force in order to save 
his life if the owner of the property refused to provide him with what he 
needed, whether it was food, shelter or otherwise. 72 In this circumstance, 
certain conditions must be met before force can be justified: 
1- There should be a refusal by the owner to give his property to the 
compelled person for the current market price or for free. 
2- Taking such property should immediately ward off the necessity; as 
in the case of food to be eaten or shelter for protection from freezing 
weather. So it is not acceptable for a compelled person to take property with 
the intention of selling it in order to buy food, since there is no urgent 
necessity in such situation. 
3- The owner of the property must not be in a similar situation. If this was 
the case, he is more entitled to his property than anybody else. 73 
Furthermore, anyone who was compelled to take the property of others 
because of extreme hunger is bound, according to this maxim, to pay its 
value to the owner. This view was held by the majority of jurists. Some 
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jurists have distinguished, in this regard, between a poor person who cannot 
afford to pay the value and a person who is able to pay it. They have held the 
latter liable to pay compensation but not the first. 74 
Ibn al-Qayyim (d. 751 A. H ) has held that such a person in such a 
situation is not liable to pay compensation, for it is the duty of Muslims to 
preserve such a person's life and to provide help and comfort in such 
circumstances where altruism should be shown. 75 
In the case of killing an attacking animal in self defence, the Hanafi 
school requires, according to this maxim, that the killer pay 
compensation. 76 The other schools, however, disagree with this decision 
holding that no compensation need be paid because it is self-defence. 77 This 
is in accordance with another maxim mentioned by Ibn Rajab (d. 895 A. H) 
which states that "A person who destroys property to prevent an impending 
injury which might have resulted from that property is not liable to pay 
compensation. But if he destroys it while using it to prevent an injury from 
elsewhere, then he is obliged to pay compensation. " 78 According to this 
maxim a person who kills an attacking animal in self-defence is not liable to 
pay any sort of compensation, yet a person who kills an animal to ward off 
extreme hunger is bound to compensate the owner of that animal. 79 
In a situation where the crew of a ship threw the passengers' property 
into the sea to avoid sinking, the crew should guarantee the restitution of the 
value of such property. $0 However, al-Qari fi has opined that compensation 
should be borne by all the people who were on board because such an action 
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was necessary to save the lives of all the people on board and was not for the 
benefit of a particular individual. 81 
6-THE LESSER OF TWO EVILS IS PREFERRED (YUKHTARU 
AHWANU AL-SHARRAYN 1: 82 
This maxim has different forms yet they have the same meaning. It may 
be formulated as "In the presence of two evils the one whose injury is 
greater is avoided by the commission of the lesser. " 83 And it might also be 
formulated as " severe injury is removed by lesser injury. " 84 The 
meanings of these maxims are identical; that is, if a Muslim was forced to 
commit either of two actions which are prohibited, he should choose to 
commit the lesser one, since committing a prohibited act is not allowed 
except in the case of necessity, and there is no necessity in committing the 
greater injury as it is conceivable to minimize injury by committing the 
lesser one. 85 
This maxim stems originally from the well-known principle which 
refers to securing interests and repelling injuries that sums up the objectives 
of the Shari'ah as a whole. Ibn Taymiyyah has explained such a principle and 
said " If injuries or benefits were in conflict, then we should incline toward 
the best for us. So if a command or a prohibition that is to secure benefit and 
to prevent injury respectively was opposed by a similar benefit or a similar 
injury, then the one which secures more benefits must be upheld as well as 
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the one which has lesser injuries. Nevertheless, the criterion of deciding the 
type and the degree of benefit and injury is the Shari'ah itself. So whenever a 
Muslim is able to apply the text of the Shar'ah, he is not allowed to 
disregard it, otherwise he is entitled to rely on his opinion to draw an 
analogy between similar cases. "86 Ibn 'Abd Al-Salim also further explained 
" If injuries and benefits come together, we have to secure benefits and repel 
injuries inasmuch as possible according to the Qur' änic verse that says ' So 
fear God as much as you can ' S: 64. v: 16. However, if securing benefit and 
repelling injury is hard to implement then repelling injury should be given 
precedence over securing benefit. In other words, securing benefit would be 
disregarded in order to repel an injury. " 87 
The notion of committing the lesser of two evils has been established 
clearly in the following verse 
They ask thee concerning fighting in the prohibited month. 
Say fighting therein is a grave offence; but graver is it in the 
sight of God to prevent access to the path of God, to deny him, to 
prevent access to the sacred Mosque and drive out its members. 
Tumult and oppression are worse than slaughter " s: 2. v. 217. 
This verse is to refute the claim of the pagans in Mecca that Muslims have 
violated the sacredness of the prohibited month by allowing themselves to 
fight in it. It explains that such a violation, which is an offence, is not as 
grave as what the pagans were doing, such as persecuting Muslims and their 
families, openly insulting and denying God, keeping out the Muslims from 
the sacred Mosque and exiling them. Such violence and intolerance are 
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deservedly deemed worse than slaughter. Thus, doing all that in the sacred 
month is worse than merely fighting in it which Muslims have to do so that 
they can defend themselves. In other words, Muslims have chosen the lesser 
of two evils, which is fighting in the sacred month, rather than being 
subjected to all types of persecution which might result in one becoming an 
unbeliever again. 88 
7- NEED. WHETHER PUBLIC OR PRIVATE. SHOULD BE 
TREATED AS A CASE OF NECESSITY - 
MANZILAT AL-DARURAH 'AMMATAN KANAT AW KHASSAH): 
Islamic jurists have distinguished between necessity and need. It has been 
held that necessity is a state where one must commit an illegal act otherwise 
one is in danger of losing one's life or any thing related to the five necessary 
benefits (darüriyyät ) on which the lives of people depend and whose neglect 
leads to total disruption and chaos. On the other hand, need is a state where 
one's life is not threatened but one would face hardship and inconvenience. 89 
What is meant by public need is the situation in which the whole 
community faces some sort of hardship due to certain social benefits being 
neglected. 
What is meant by private need is the situation where the interests of certain 
groups such as carpenters, physicians, etc. are being disregarded or 
unsatisfied. 90 
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Such a maxim does not deal with the need of individuals since it is 
inconceivable to tackle everybody's need, because such needs are subject to 
change and variety and it is impossible to enact rulings according to every 
individual's need. 91 
This maxim means that legally exceptional rulings are not confined to 
compelling necessity but are extended to needs of the community as well. 
Such needs require exceptional rulings to mitigate the hardship. 
To illustrate this maxim we shall provide a few examples: 
There are certain types of transactions which are exempted from the 
general rulings by the texts of the Shari'ah in order to fulfil an urgent need 
of the society such as : 
The validity of the contract of salam which involves selling a non- 
existent article which is generally prohibited by the Shari'ah. However, 
selling a non-existent article for an advanced price is permitted by the 
hari' in order to meet the need of many people, particularly peasants, to 
have money before the harvest of their crops is due. Thus it was narrated 
that " the Prophet forbade the sale of an object which does not exist at the 
time of sale but permitted salam as an exception "92 
The sale of `äri which is the sale of dates on the palm tree for their 
equivalent in dry dates was permitted despite the fact that it is in conflict 
with the rules of excess usury (ribä al-fad! ). However, such a transaction 
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was permitted in response to the people's need to have fresh dates. It was 
narrated that " The Prophet permitted the sale of 'arä ä ". 93 
The contract for the manufacture of goods ( is tisnä, )is allowed due to 
the need of people for such a transaction, and this is despite its being the sale 
of a non-existent article, for it is an order to a craftsman for certain goods to 
be made at a price which is determined at the time of the contract. 94 
Using public baths has been accepted despite the fact that there is no 
certain knowledge of how long the user is going to stay and how much water 
he is going to consume. However, it was allowed because of the need of the 
people. 95 
According to the Hanafi school, the sale of real property with the right 
of redemption ( bay' bi al-wafä' ) is allowed. This was well-known in areas 
like Bukhaz& and it was based on the need for such a transaction to avoid 
dealing with usury and to avoid the irrevocable sale of land. 96 
The distinction between necessity and need: 
There are some differences between necessity and need which can be 
summarized as follows: 
1- Necessity permits prohibited matters, whether they affect individuals 
or the community as a whole. On the other hand, need only permits 
prohibited matters that relate to the community or to particular groups such 
as physicians, etc. The need of each individual is not counted in this regard 
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since such needs vary and change from one individual to another and it is 
inconceivable to change the law according to the changing need of every 
individual. 97 
2- A state of necessity would result in permitting a forbidden act as an 
exceptional ruling. Such permission would cease to exist with the 
disappearance of the state of necessity and is confined to the compelled 
person alone, no one else having the privilege that has been given to the 
compelled person. However, need would result in most cases in permanent 
permissibility and is not confined to the people in need but is granted to the 
community as a whole. 98 
3- Necessity normally conflicts with an explicit text that prohibits certain 
matters, whereas need is in conflict with general rules or with analogy. 
Therefore, necessity would justify, for instance, taking the property of 
others but need would not. In this regard, al-Shafi'i has stated clearly that 
" need does not allow anybody to take the property of others ". 99 
Accordingly, we notice jurists on some occasions saying that need does not 
permit prohibited matters, which means need does not have a preference 
over the explicit text as in the case in necessity. 100 
Ibn al-Qayyim held the view that a matter prohibited as a preventive 
measure ( sadd al-dhard i' ) would be allowed in case of need. He cited some 
examples such as the contract of `. Accordingly, he thought that the 
sale of golden ornaments for a heavier weight of unbeaten gold is 
permissible since most people need such a transaction and there is no point in 
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binding them to sell it for its equivalent weight since beaten gold has the 
advantage of being formed as an article in a special form by special skill 
needed by people. And the prohibition of excessive usury was to prevent the 
means of the sale of the same species on credit ( riba al-nasa' ). 101 
Similarly, Ibn Taymiyyah has criticized the majority of jurists who have 
prohibited the lease of land which contains fruit trees such as palm , orange 
etc., because such a contract contains two transactions, planting barren land 
and watering the existing trees, and in the latter there is a great deal of risk 
which is the sale of fruit before it exists. So they allow only the lease of land 
without such trees, or land which contains only a small number of trees. 102 
Ibn Taymiyyah thought forbidding such a transaction caused great deal 
of difficulty and hardship to the community. Some people, consequently, 
have used illegal tricks ( liyal ghavr shar'iyyah ) to overcome such 
hardship. Some have resorted to such a contract due to their exigencies 
although they believed it was illegal . Others have avoided dealing with such 
transactions despite sustaining a great deal of injury. He thought that 
although it would be permissible for several people never to resort to such 
transactions, it would be impossible for the community as a whole to avoid 
such dealing without suffering a great loss which would never be accepted 
by the Shad' ah. Thus such a prohibition causes corruption that would not be 
accepted in Islam. Nothing needed by the community in their daily life be 
forbidden except if it was created originally as a result of an act of 
disobedience. It should be noticed here that Ibn Taymiyyah in his rejection 
of such an opinion has based his opinion on several Traditions of the Prophet 
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and the Companions and this indicates that legislation according to need 
should be supported by legal evidences. 103 
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CHAPTER THREE 
CAUSES OF NECESSITY 1 
1- COMPULSION 
A. DEFINITION OF COMPULSION IN ISLAMIC LAW: 
Compulsion has been defined as follows: Forcing a person to act or 
to say something without his consent and against his freedom of choice, 
meaning that he would not do such an act if he was left alone. 2 
There are other attempts to define compulsion more precisely, 3 yet 
there is no uniform legal definition of compulsion; suffice it here to 
mention the elements which have been intended to be included in the 
definition of compulsion : 
1- THE USE OF FORCE BY THE COMPELLER : The jurists mean by 
force the ability of the compeller to create a considerable fear in the mind of 
the compelled and the ability to execute his threat. It is not stipulated, 
however, that the compeller should have started actually executing his 
threat. 4 Such a state of fear can be created by the threat of death, damage to 
limb, excessive or light beating which causes grave injury or a long time of 
imprisonment in bad conditions. Islamic jurists disputed among themselves 
whether certain types of threats could cause a state of compulsion or not. 
For example, most jurists held that an act of public humiliation like a slap on 
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the face for a respected figure could be compulsion. 5 Muslim jurists also 
debated the threat of harm to a third party particularly if it was directed to 
relatives. 6 Additionally, in certain situations, a threat can exist without an 
explicit warning being uttered; it can be in a form of an order from those 
who are in authority as al-Sarakhsi explains " It is the habit of the 
oppressors, because of their arrogance, not to explicitly threaten to kill 
people. But in reality they issue orders, and then if they are not obeyed, they 
always punish by death those who disobey them. Therefore, if this is 
common practice, then a simple order might be considered an explicit 
threat... ". 7 As to whether every act would allow the compelled to give in to 
the threat will be explained later. 
2- THE ACT OF THE COMPELLED: It includes verbal acts such as 
recognition of rights or confession of guilt, and physical acts, such as killing, 
or destruction of property or signing a contract etc. 8 In another respect, the 
act of the compelled should be proportional to the threat of the compeller. 
In other words, the compelled cannot commit more damage than the 
situation requires, and he is held liable for excessive behaviour or over- 
reaction. Moreover, the compelled cannot commit a greater harm to avoid a 
lesser harm; he has to choose the lesser of the evils he encounters. Al- 
Sarakhsi ( d. 490 A. H) explained such a principle " And if it is said: ' an ill- 
treated person has a right to resist injustice in whatever way he can', we say- 
" yes, but an unjustly treated person cannot commit injustice against 
others '.. " 9 
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3- UNJUST COMPULSION: This element has been mentioned to 
distinguish between two kinds of compulsion: The legitimate, which is 
usually imposed by the authorities, and illegitimate compulsion 10. Thus the 
following cases, for instance, have not been considered as compulsion since 
they are legitimate compulsion: 
i- If a judge forces the debtor to sell his possessions to pay back the creditor. 
ii - If a judge forces the mortgagee to sell the mortgage . 
iii - If a judge forces the husband to divorce his wife in case of his sexual 
inadequacy. it 
4-WITHOUT CONSENT: Jurists mean by consent carrying out an act 
while one is satisfied with one's decision. Such an acceptance and 
satisfaction, nevertheless, is often absent even without duress or with 
minimal duress such as in the case of a person who might not be happy with 
his decision to divorce his beautiful wife but he does it because he thinks it is 
necessary. Therefore, any amount of compulsion is liable to negate 
consent. 12 
5- WITHOUT CHOICE: Jurists mean by choice the process of preferring 
doing something to not doing it or vice versa. So the compelled, who was 
forced to destroy the property of others otherwise he would be killed, would 
practice a kind of choice when he chose the act of destruction, but it is an 
invalid choice (ikhtivär farid ), because one can choose to die, for example, 
whether one is happy with the decision or not. But, if the compulsion is 
powerful enough then the choice, although is present, is spoiled. Although 
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choice always exists even if compulsion present, only serious compulsion 
will vitiate choice. 13 
The distinction between consent and choice is the view of the Hanafi school 
whereas the other schools do not differentiate between them. 14 
B. THE CONDITIONS FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF 
COMPULSION: 
1- The compeller must be able to execute his threat. For no compulsion in 
reality exists if the threatening person is unable to carry out his threat. 
2- The compelled must be aware of the fact that the compeller is likely to 
execute his threat if he does not do what has been demanded. 
3- The threat must be compelling, namely that which would result in killing 
or damaging an organ or causing great harm. In this regard, the lesser of 
two evils should be committed. 
4- There must not be any way, other than submission to the threat, which 
may help to avoid the threat. 1-5 
D. TYPES OF COMPULSION: 
Islamic jurists have taken two methods to examine the types of compulsion: 
Firstly , they 
have talked about the classification of compulsion 
according to its strength. 
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Secondly, they have talked about the different rules governing 
compelled deeds. 
In respect of the first classification, compulsion has been divided into 
two types according to the Hanafi school: a complete compulsion and an 
incomplete compulsion. 16 They mean by complete compulsion forcing a 
person to do something by threatening him with death or damage to one of 
his limbs or severe assault, so that he cannot escape from doing what he has 
been told to, namely he would choose to act according to the will of the 
compeller. However, such a choice remains an invalid choice. 17 
The incomplete compulsion has been expounded by the Hanafi school 
as the threat which would not cause loss of life or damage to one of the limbs 
such as the threat of being put in custody or of a light beating. 18 
Since the compelled is affected by the condition of his relatives, 
especially his parents and his children, some Hanafi jurists have attached the 
threat of harming one of the relatives such as father, mother etc., to the 
incomplete compulsion. This type is against the consent of the compelled but 
it does not vitiate the compelled's choice as he would be physically able to 
bear the consequences of the threat. 19 
In spite of the fact that the other schools have divided compulsion into 
two types taking the foregoing names, namely complete and incomplete 
compulsion, they have defined them in different ways. They mean by 
" complete ", the situation which will not be avoided in any case whatsoever. 
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For instance, if some one was pushed down from a high place to fall on 
another person . Or taking someone's thumb print by force as a sign of 
agreement to a contract etc.. Or tying up a woman to be raped. 20 
It is clear that the compelled in this type of compulsion has no consent 
and no choice whatsoever to accept or not the consequence of the 
compulsion. So all Islamic jurists agree that the full responsibility is on the 
compeller. 
Incomplete compulsion has been explained as follows: the condition 
which would not be avoided unless the compelled chose to bear what has 
been threatened. This type includes the threat of killing or damaging limbs 
or putting in custody, etc. 21 
It is obvious that the two types of compulsion which have been given by the 
Hanafi school are included in the incomplete compulsion type according to 
the classification of the majority of the 'u ä'. 
In order to determine the validity of the conduct of the compelled, 
Islamic jurists have held another classification that attempts to make clear 
the effect of compulsion on conduct. According to them, there are two types 
of conduct: verbal conduct and physical conduct. 2. 
The majority of the jurists have held the opinion that all the verbal 
conduct of the compelled is null and void since it requires consent to be taken 
as effective and there is no consent for the compelled party. So, whether the 
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compulsion is complete or incomplete, there are no legitimate effects for the 
verbal conduct of the compelled. Ibn al-Qayyim (d. 751 A. H ) stressed this 
point by saying ' whoever noticed carefully the Shari'ah evidences, would 
recognize that the Shari'ah has cancelled all utterances when the speaker 
does not intend their actual meaning since they come out without his 
intention as when asleep, forgetful, drunk, ignorant, compelled or 
mistaken' 23 
The following verse has been used as an evidence of the foregoing rule : 
" Any one who, after accepting faith in God, utters unbelief, 
except under compulsion, his heart remaining firm in faith , 
but 
such as open their breast to unbelief, on them is wrath from 
God, and theirs will be a dreadful penalty " S: 6, v: 106. 
Al-Qurtubi comments in this regard and explains that if God allows saying 
the word of unbelief under compulsion which is against the basis of the 
Shari'ah, all branches of the hari'ah will inevitably be included in this 
rule. 24 
The Hanafi school have a different approach, they distinguish between 
two kinds of verbal conduct according to the liability of revocation: 
1- If conduct liable to withdrawal, such as sale, lease etc., was 
established under compulsion, the agreement would be eventually up to the 
compelled to reject or accept. 
2- Conduct not liable to withdrawal, such as divorce , marriage and oath, 
would not be affected by compulsion. Accordingly, it would be regarded as 
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valid conduct. For they believe that the intent is not an essential element in 
such conduct, as such conduct is liable to be established by acting in jest as 
well as by uttering them seriously. Therefore, they have concluded that the 
absence of the compelled's intent does not invalidate such conduct25 as has 
been indicated in the saying of the prophet: 
" there are three things which whether undertaken seriously or 
in jest are treated as serious: marriage, divorce and taking back 
a wife after divorce which is not final. " 26 
The majority of Islamic jurists have totally rejected the Hanafi opinion, as 
there is no similarity between compulsion and joking. Accordingly, the 
foregoing saying of the prophet deals basically with the act of jest in specific 
cases which are very sensitive and have to be treated strictly. On the other 
hand, another Tradition of the Prophet narrated by 'A'ishah has indicated 
the rules of compulsion in divorce. He is reported to have said: 
" There is no divorce or emancipation in case of constraint or 
duress (ighlläq). " 27 
Abü Däwüd ( d. 275 A. H) thinks that ighlaq means anger, 28 but Ibn 
Qutaybah ( d. 276 A. H) said it means compulsion, whereas some of scholars 
said it comprises compulsion, anger and madness. 29 
The rules for the deeds of the compelled differ according to their variety. 
Some of them such as drinking wine and eating pork are permissible under 
complete compulsion since they are permissible in the case of necessity as it 
is clarified in this verse 
".. when he bath explained to you in detail what is forbidden to 
you except under compulsion of necessity " s. 6 v 119.30 
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In spite of the fact that committing such an act under an incomplete 
compulsion is considered as prohibited, the majority of the jurists have held 
that the (hadd) punishments would not be applied in such cases. 31 
There are other kind of conduct which would have remained prohibited. 
However, in in the case of such conduct, the state of compulsion would only 
remove the moral guilt. This conduct can be illustrated by the saying of the 
words of unbelief, which is against the very basis of Islam. However, it is 
permissible to make such an utterance under complete compulsion to avoid 
its consequences. 32 
In contrast with the forgoing rules which are affected by the degree of 
compulsion, certain conduct such as killing, damaging limbs, beating parents 
or committing adultery are sinful and would not be affected by the state of 
compulsion. 33 However, there are various opinions as to whether the 
punishment (add must be implemented in the case of complete compulsion 
that results in killing or committing adultery. 
In the case of killing, Abu Hanifah has held the view that the law of isäs 
does not apply to the compelled; however, he must receive a discretionary 
penalty ( tazir ) to be imposed by the judge. On the other hand, the law of 
gi s may be inflicted on the compeller as he is the actual doer, whereas the 
compelled is nothing but a tool. 34 
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The majority of the jurists have said that the law of ga must be 
implemented on both the compelled and the compeller since the compelled 
has himself committed killing, whereas the compeller is the cause of the 
Wig. 35 
In the case of adultery, if the compelled was a woman, the punishment 
(liadd) would not be applied in either complete or incomplete compulsion as 
the vast majority of jurists believe, since the following verse has indicated 
that no sin is incurred by the compelled woman and the add would not be 
inflicted as a result, 
" But force not your maids to prostitution when they desire 
chastity, in order that ye may make a gain in the goods of this 
life. But if any one compels them yet after such compulsion, is 
God oft-forgiving, most merciful " s: 24, v: 33.36 
On the other hand, if the compelled was a man and the compulsion was 
complete, the punishment would not be implemented according to Hanafi 
school because the udüd are not carried out in doubtful circumstances 
( shubuhät ) as the prophet is reported to have said: 
" Remit (d'-ii ) the budfid from Muslims as much as you can 
because that the judge (imäm) should commit mistakes in 
excusing the penalty is indeed far better than that he should 
commit a mistake in enforcing the penalty. " 37 
The Mäliki and the Hanbali schools have held the view that such an act would 
not have inherently occurred without choice and desire so the budfid should 
be applied in such a case. 38 
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In the case of vandalism, if some one was coerced to vandalize the 
property of others, such as by setting fire to it, compensation must be given 
to the aggrieved party. Either the compelled or the compeller must pay the 
compensation according to two different views in Islamic jurisprudence. 39 
As it has been already explained, the Hanafi school distinguished between 
two kinds of compulsion which are complete and incomplete compulsion, 
and the rules of the compulsion differ accordingly. On the other hand, no 
such division has been mentioned in other schools. They have talked about 
compulsion in general in which rules of all sorts of compulsion have been 
included as well as the fact that they observed the degrees of compulsion. 
Thus, when the majority of jurists talked about compulsion, they meant both 
types- 
Practically, the Hanafi school has made a distinction between complete 
and incomplete compulsion by restricting the understanding of incomplete 
compulsion to verbal conduct only, excluding physical conduct. 40 So if 
someone was threatened with imprisonment or beating unless he set fire to a 
property of another person and he did so, it would not be considered 
compulsion and he would be liable for any destruction resulting from his 
act. However the case will be different if he was threatened with death or 
damage to a limb, as that will be considered a state of complete compulsion, 
and in such a case the full responsibility is on the compeller. 41 
Unlike incomplete compulsion, complete compulsion is applicable in 
both verbal and physical conduct, 42 
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There is no fixed extent as to the minimum required for the act of 
compulsion to be regarded as a bringing about compulsion. However, 
Islamic jurists generalize this issue by considering every act resulting in 
harm to life or relatives or material wealth or in grief and sorrow as an act 
of compulsion, yet they have stressed that people are not identical in 
strength, patience, dignity and position and the judge must take these things 
into consideration. 43 
As a step towards explaining the link between necessity and compulsion, 
it is of great importance to shed light upon the rules of compelled deeds in 
respect of the religious point of view that concerns retribution in the 
hereafter and not about the legal point of view which has already been 
mentioned. In this regard the deeds that the compelled was forced to do are 
in three categories: 44 
1- Deeds which change under compulsion, namely their rules and merits 
will be different from their original rules and merits as long as the state of 
compulsion remains. Such deeds can be illustrated in the case of complete 
compulsion by eating pork or carrion or drinking wine; it is an obligation to 
do such deeds in such cases and it will be sinful to bear the threat since 
destruction of life is more grave as the Qur'än said: 
and make not your own hands contribute to your destruction" 
S: It. v: 195. 
However, the rules of such deeds are not affected by incomplete 
compulsion. 
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2- Deeds that remain prohibited which nevertheless can be committed 
under complete compulsion as a sort of legal concession ( khsah . 
These 
deeds can be illustrated by vandalism or by saying words of unbelief or 
defamation which are a sin although there is no moral guilt Q LW in such 
cases because of the complete compulsion. Thus the effect of compulsion is 
to eliminate moral guilt in such a state but not to legalize it. 
The distinction between the first category and the second category is that 
in the second category, the compelled can bear the threat and he will be 
rewarded for that. He can choose not to vandalize or not to say words of 
unbelief or not to slander. This is unlike the first category where doing these 
sorts of deeds is an obligation. 
It was narrated that two companions of the Prophet were 
captured by Musaylamah who asked one of them ' What do you 
think about Muhammad? 'The Companion said that ' He is the 
messenger of God. ' Musaylamah said ' What do you think about 
me? ' The Companion said ' And you too. ' Then Musaylamah 
asked the other companion ' What do you think about 
Muhammad? ' the Companion said ' He is the messenger of 
God. ' Musaylamah said ' What do you think about me? ' The 
Companion said ' I'm deaf, I can not hear you. ' The question and 
the answer were repeated three times, then Musaylamah killed 
the companion. When the Prophet Mohammed heard about that 
he said ' The first one took the concession v sah of God, and 
the second one declared the truth and it is all for the good. ' 45 
It is obvious from this tradition that to bear the threat in such case is 
permissible and it may be better to do so as it was understood from the 
commendation of the second companion by the Prophet. 
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Because `Ammar Ibn Yäsir had been under compulsion when he 
slandered the Prophet, the Prophet told him that he was allowed to do it 
again if the unbelievers Mecca repeated their behaviour. 46 
3- Deeds which under no circumstances are allowed whether compulsion 
was incomplete or complete, and remain prohibited and sinful even though 
they have been done under compulsion. These deeds, such as killing or 
damaging a limb or beating parents or adultery, 47 are considered of the 
highest degree of prohibition. 48 
From the foregoing explanation compulsion that causes the state of 
necessity is restricted within the first and the second categories. Nevertheless 
there is no state of necessity within the third category of the foregoing 
division. 
In addition, the state of necessity is confined to complete compulsion, 
although, some sorts of complete compulsion are not considered as a state of 
necessity as we have stated in the third category. 
Moreover, no state of necessity is caused by incomplete compulsion, since 
there is enough room for choice, which is in conflict with necessity. 
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2-LEGITIMATE DEFENCE: 
A. DEFINITION OF LEGITIMATE DEFENCE. 
Legitimate defence is a contemporary term which has been used by 
contemporary Muslim jurists. However, the classical Muslim jurists 
extensively studied the same area coverd by that term in what they called 
(daf' al-sä'il ) which literally means pushing aside the aggressor. They mean 
by si - aggression or attacking other people without legitimate right; by 
masnl `alarm the aggrieved party; and by daf' al-sä'il the act of defence 
against the aggressor. ' 
Aggression against innocent people is a grave offence. Therefore it is 
prohibited in Islam as the Qur'an mentions in the following verse 
" But do not transgress the limits. For God loveth not 
transgressors " s. 1 1. v: 190. 
And the prophet said: 
" The life, wealth and honour of the Muslim are prohibited to 
other Muslims. "2 
In addition, the Shari'ah gives anyone who has been subjected to 
aggression the right to deter the aggressor. That is what is now called 
legitimate defence. 
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The classical Muslim jurists have not defined the term ' legitimate 
defence ' as they did not employ it. Moreover, they paid little attention to 
the definition of ( daf' al-sä it ) as it is self-evident, and it was enough for 
them to explain what the meaning of sväl is in the Arabic language. 3 
Aggression (§i)l ) can be seditious armed rebellion (ba i) 4 or high 
way robbery ( ardba )s or any other sort of transgression whether it 
comes from people or animals. 
Contemporary Muslim jurists have defined legitimate defence as 
follows: 
The duty of the human being to defend his life or the life of others, and his 
right to defend his property or that of others, against any instant illegitimate 
aggression on the condition that there must be balance between the degree of 
the defence and of the aggression .6 
However , 
it has been found that the legitimate defence of life is not 
obligatory in all cases, as some traditionists have held the opinion that it is 
permissible and not obligatory to defend yourself in the case of tumult 
between two groups of Muslims where the right path is not known. 7 
It will have been understood from the aforesaid definition that legitimate 
defence is a precautionary right that enables people to repel instant danger. 
Since this right is not for retaliation or spite but repelling danger, the act of 
repelling must be in proportion to the degree of the danger. 
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Moreover, it has been understood that there is no liability on the 
defender. However, there will be a liability in case of exceeding the limits by 
the defender. 
B. CONDITIONS FOR LEGITIMATE DEFENCE: 
From the aforesaid definition it is clear that the essential elements of 
legitimate defence are danger and the actual act of defence. There are 
conditions which must be fulfilled in order to establish the right which 
entitles people to repel such danger, 8 
1- The danger must be illegitimate and threaten rights preserved by the 
hS ari, ah , namely 
life, honour and property. However, there are legitimate 
dangers such as disciplinary punishment inflicted on a son by his father, or 
the implementation of udnd. Illegitimate danger is realised regardless of 
where the danger comes from. It can come from a human being, whether a 
believer or an unbeliever, a woman or a man, an adult or a child, sane or 
insane, and it can come from an animal as well. 
No minimum limit has been established with regard to the danger that 
allows the act of defending. However, every illegitimate danger allows the 
act of defence even though it is an insignificant one, such as taking a small 
portion of money or threatening with a stick or kissing a woman to whom 
one is legally banned as she is not one's wife nor relative. 9 
98 
In addition to that, the defender has the right to repel the danger before it 
is inflicted on him, i. e. when the defender was scared that his life or honour 
or his property might be affected. Al-Shäfi'i has expressed that by saying: If 
it enters a person's mind that the aggressor will hit him, the defender has the 
right to hit him first. 10 
Moreover, the danger may come from committing an actual crime such as 
attempting to kill, theft and adultery as well as from abstaining from 
certain actions such as preventing somebody from having food and drink 
with the intention that he should be killed. 11 
2- The danger must be immediately likely. If the danger was merely 
potential or was tantamount to a threat, it would not open the way to 
legitimate defence unless the danger would proceed instantly. However, it is 
not a proviso that the danger must actually be inflicted on the defender to 
establish the right of legitimate defence. It suffices the defender to have a 
high expectation that the danger is about to proceed. For example, if the 
aggressor was loading his gun, or pulling out his sword, or picking up a 
knife and so on. 12 
The right of legitimate defence ceases when the danger is over. 
Similarly if the defender had controlled the aggressor, or the aggressor had 
failed in his intention for any reason, such as the fact that it was impossible 
for him to execute what he wanted because of, for instance, the existence of a 
river or a hole or a door being locked or the aggressor having broken his 
leg or hand as a result of falling to the ground and so on . 
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Additionally 
, the right of 
legitimate defence will not exist if the 
aggressor retreats because of conscience or fear, or in the case where he has 
already executed his intention and all is over. In such a case, the fixed 
punishment would be implemented if the crime was confirmed but there 
would be no right for the defender to pursue the aggressor after the crime 
was over and the aggressor had left, as legitimate defence is a deterrent 
measure which expires with the end of the danger. 
3- There must be no available way for the aggrieved party to escape 
the aggression except by repelling the aggressor. That means if there is no 
alternative solution, such as escaping or drawing the attention of other 
people by shouting or other means, or blocking the way by locking the door, 
the defence will be not only permissible but also obligatory in the case of 
aggression against life. 
There are different views among jurists on fleeing from an aggressor. 
The majority of them have held the opinion that if one is able to flee or to 
resort to a safe place or a group of people and so on, one must do so and has 
no right to fight because one is supposed to eliminate the danger in the easiest 
possible way. However, the Mälikis and the Shafi`is have held this opinion on 
condition that no hardship faces him in fleeing as well as stipulating the 
assurance of safety. Otherwise it is not obligatory to flee. 
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A second opinion has been held by some of the Shäfi'i and Hanbali jurists 
Who say that the attacked party has no obligation to flee even if he can do 
it. 13 
4- The actual act of defence must be in proportion to the degree of the 
danger. That means the following: 
i- repelling the danger must be by the least means available. 
Therefore, if the aggressor can be repelled away by admonition or 
shouting, beating is not permissible. Also if beating alone could end the 
aggression, damaging a limb or killing is prohibited. Moreover, if the 
aggressor was overpowered as a result of a severe blow, the defender must 
stop any further hitting immediately. 14 
The reason for imposing such gradual steps is that the act of defence has 
been legitimized only to repel the danger. So if using the least means 
available would be sufficient in this regard, using any stronger means would 
be unwarranted. Additionally, it would change the act of defence into an 
aggressive act. This point has been stressed by all Islamic juristic schools. 1s 
ii- Proportion between the act of defence and the degree of danger 
means precisely using the least means available. That means that the act of 
the aggressor, who wants to kill, does not necessitate killing as the only 
means of defence available to the defender. On the other hand, the act of an 
aggressor who wants to take a quantity of money does not prohibit the act of 
; ding as a means of defence. Similarly a great danger, such as the danger of 
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being killed, could be removed by a simple act of defence such as shouting 
and so on. Moreover, a minor danger, such as taking a small amount of 
money, may not be able to be repelled without resorting to strong force that 
may result in killing. 16 
iii- The criterion that assists in deciding which is the suitable action for 
defending a certain danger is what the defender thinks most likely to be 
sufficient to repel the danger according to the circumstances. 17 
iv- The gradual process of having recourse to the least means available 
in order to repel the danger is not taken into consideration in the case of 
fear of the aggressor's taking the initiative to inflict his aggression. 
Therefore, if the defender perceived that the aggressor is going to kill him 
unless he kills him first, there is no obligation to take into consideration 
such gradual steps. The defender may ignore such gradual steps if they 
engaged in battle and there is no chance of withholding oneself let alone 
controlling the aggressor. 18 
C. THE AREA OF LEGITIMATE DEFENCE 
Legitimate defence can be against aggression against life, property and 
the honour of a person as well as of others. 
THE RULE OF SELF DEFENCE: 
The views of Islamic jurists have differed on whether self defence is a 
permissible right, namely, whether the defender has the right to defend 
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himself as well as to give up defending himself; or whether it is an 
obligatory right that the defender must defend himself and it would be sinful 
to give up defending himself. In the case of someone being attacked with the 
intention that he should be killed or harmed, regardless of whether the 
attacker was a human being or an animal, there are three juristic views: 
1- The majority of jurists have viewed self defence as an obligatory matter 
and there is no permission to give up defending, because of the following 
legal proofs in the Qur'än : 
" And make not your own hands contribute to your 
destruction " s. 2, v. 195. 
In another verse : 
" Nor kill (or destroy ) yourselves " s. 4, v: 29. 
It is obvious that giving up defending against the aggression is a contribution 
to killing oneself. 19 In addition, the Prophet said 
" Anyone who was killed because of defending his life is a 
martyr. " 20 
2- Some of the jurists have held the opinion that it is permissible to 
defend oneself and not obligatory. 21 They depended on the saying of the 
Prophet : 
" Be like the two sons of Adam: the killer in hell and the 
murdered in paradise. " 22 
3- The Hanbali and Shafi'i schools have expressed detailed opinions on 
this. The Hanbali school have held that self defence is obligatory in normal 
conditions. However, it is permissible in the case of commotion because of 
the prophetic Traditions which have cautioned Muslims from taking part in 
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such a cicumstance. 23 The aforesaid proof, which is " Be like the two sons 
of Adam " was one such tradition. It refers to Abel who was killed by his 
brother Cain. Abel did not resist and was unjustly killed. The Prophet 
Muhammad means that it is better to avoid fighting during a period of civil 
commotion. This is clear when we look at the context because it was an 
answer to a question by a Companion about civil commotion. However, this 
does not apply in normal conditions where one should try to protect one's 
life and fight the enemy. This tradition refers to abnormal conditions where 
one may prefer to be killed rather than fight and kindle the fire of turmoil 
and general slaughter, as when 'Uthmän ibn 'Affän prevented the 
Companions from intervening in order to protect him. 24 
DEFENDING HONOUR: 
All Islamic jurists have agreed that women must defend 
themselves against any aggressor who wants to attack them and they have 
the right to defend themselves by killing if using lesser means available will 
not succeed. Moreover, a woman must be assisted by any one who has 
noticed the event and if killing the aggressor is the only means of defence the 
person assisting may do so. This ruling is supported by traditions of the 
Prophet and the Companions, such as the tradition that the Prophet had said 
" Anyone killed defending his honour is a martyr. "u And it was narrated 
that a man was a guest of the people of Hudhayl and he attacked a woman. 
She threw a stone at him and he died as a result. 'Umar Ibn al-Khattäb 
refused to give his family the blood money ( di ah ). In support of giving 
help to the aggrieved party, the jurists quote the badith from the Prophet 
which says " Support your brother whether he is unjust or ill-treated ". 26 It 
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is explained by the Prophet that while support of " your brother " while he is 
oppressed (mazl-m ) is clear, the support given to " your brother " 
when he is an oppressor ( zälim ) is to prevent him from doing wrong. 
The privacy of the home is protected in Islam against unsolicited 
inquisitiveness. Therefore, asking for permission when entering a private 
dwelling is essential, as is stated in these verses: 
"0 ye who believe: enter not houses other than your own until 
ye have asked permission and saluted those in them That is best 
for you .... If ye find no one in the house enter not until 
permission is given to you. If ye are asked to go back go back " 
s: 24. v: 27 - 28. 
The prophet has indicated the cause of this ruling in his saying : 
" permission is required because of ( the possibility of ) 
inquisitiveness. " 27 
Thus it is to prevent inquisitivness about the private life of others without 
their permission. 
As a result of what has already been stated, there arises a controversy 
between Islamic jurists on whether the defender is accountable if he gouges 
out the eye of someone who was peeping into his private home through a 
hole or crack in the door without his permission. The Shafi'i and the Hanbali 
schools have held the opinion that there is no civil or criminal liability on the 
one who defends his privacy in such a case, namely there is no aiisä or divan 
( blood money ). They have based their opinion on the dith which provides 
that 
" If a person were to cast a glance in your house without 
permission, and you had in your hand a staff and you thrust it 
in his eyes, there is no wrongdoing. " In another version of this 
105 
adith the Prophet is reported to have said " It is permissible to 
put out the eyes of him who peeps into the house of people 
without their consent. " 28 
The Hanafi and the Mäliki schools on the other hand, have opined that the 
defender has a civil and criminal liability because it has been mentioned in 
the Qur'än that the law ofqs_as_ demands " an eye for an eye " s: 5. v: 48. 
Also the Prophet has said: 
" Half of the di a is due in the case of damaging an eye. " 29 
They also said the wrongdoing should not be punished by another 
wrongdoing. 30 
As to the foregoing adi which permits throwing a stone at someone 
who looks intentionally and secretly into the privacy of others, they have 
said that the Prophet meant by this adith and its versions to warn 
emphatically against such conduct and to magnify the prohibition on doing 
so, not to legalize such an act of defence. The jurists have agreed that if 
someone came into the house through the open door and looked around 
without his permission, no such act of defence would be allowed. 31 
Ibn al-Qayyim refuted the preceding deduction of the Hanafis and said: 
an eye for an eye when there is a criminal act from the doer against the 
victim. However, in the immediately preceding case no criminal conduct 
has been committed by the doer. In contrast the criminal is the other party 
who commits a crime by looking into the privacy of others. Nevertheless, 
there is no similarity between the act of looking through an open door and 
the act of looking through a hole where doors and windows are closed. In 
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the former, leaving the door open is a sort of negligence from the dweller. 
However, this is not the case when looking through a hole where there is no 
negligence but there is deliberate aggression. 32 Moreover, as Ibn Qudi mah 
commented: Privacy can be restored once what is going on has been noticed 
( and the door is shut). However, one who looks through a hole would not 
usually be noticed. 33 
DEFENDING PROPERTY : 
The majority of jurists have viewed the defence of property against an 
aggressor as a permissible act whether the property is large or small, as the 
Prophet has said, 
" Whoever has been killed defending his property is a 
martyr. "34 Abu Hurayrah has narrated that "A person came to 
the Prophet and asked 'what do you think if a man comes to me 
in order to appropriate my possession? ' The Prophet said: ' 
Don't surrender your possession to him '. He (the inquirer) said: 
' If he fights me? ' The Prophet remarked: ' Then fight (with 
him) '. He again said: ' What do you think if I am killed? ' The 
Prophet observed: ' You would be a martyr. ' He said: ' What 
do you think of him (Messenger of Allah) if I kill him. ' The 
Prophet said: ' He would be in the Fire. ' " 35 
Al-Shawkäni ( d. 1250 A. H) has said these prophetic Traditions do not 
distinguish between a large or a small amount of property. 36 
The distinction between the obligation to defend life and the 
permissibility of defending property is , according to the view of the 
majority, because of the fact that property can be taken and given by the 
permission of its owner whereas there can be no such permission to give or 
take life. 
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The Shäfi`i school have held that it is obligatory to defend against the 
aggressor if the property was a trust or a mortgage ( rahn )or any sort of 
property that related to the rights of others. 37 
D. THE EFFECT OF LEGITIMATE DEFENCE: 
All Islamic jurists have agreed on the point that there is no civil or 
criminal responsibility on the defender as long as the least means available 
in repelling the aggressor has been observed. 38 
However, the Hanafi school have the view that if the aggressor is a minor 
or insane or an animal, the defender has a civil liability; namely, he would be 
asked to pay the blood money in case of killing a minor and a lunatic and 
would have to pay the value of the animal. The reason for holding such an 
opinion is that the act of a minor, a lunatic or an animal cannot be described 
as a crime because they are not legally responsible. The act that allows 
legitimate defence must, in their view, be a crime. However, they do not 
apply the law of giCas on this occasion , only divan, because of the necessity 
of repelling their aggression. 39 
The majority of jurists have said on that point that the act of defence on 
such occasions is a legitimate act and legitimacy cancels responsibility. 
Moreover, there is no state of necessity, in its narrow sense, because the 
victim here was the cause of the danger. This means that the danger in 
legitimate defence is initiated by another party and not by the defender, 
whereas the danger in the state of necessity, in its narrow sense, is intiated by 
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an internal factor coming from inside the person subject to compulsion, such 
as hunger. 40 
E. PROVING THE STATE OF LEGITIMATE DEFENCE : 
Islamic jurists are in agreement regarding thepoint that the 
defender is obliged to confirm his state of defence before the judge in order 
to avoid legal responsibility, by testimony of witnesses or by confession of 
the other party in the case of killing or injuries, otherwise he is subject to the 
law of "s . 
Therefore if someone was witnessed entering the home of the 
aggrieved party and carrying arms and he was killed or injured as a 
consequence, no iý säs would be applied. But if he was witnessed entering 
that home without arms, a. säs might not lapse because he may have entered 
that home for a permissible reason, and his entering alone is not sufficient to 
prove his aggression. 41 
F. EXCEEDING THE LIMIT OF DEFENCE: 
As we stated before, the defender has no right to use unnecessary 
measures to repel the aggressor. This means that he defender is legally 
responsible for conduct that does not conform to legitimate defence. So if 
the aggressor had been repelled by the act of beating but it was possible to 
repel him by warning, the defender is accountable for the act of beating. If 
beating was sufficient to terminate the aggression, causing greater damage to 
the aggressor than beating is exceeding the legitimate limits. Likewise if the 
aggression would have been ended by causing injury, but, nevertheless, the 
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aggressor was killed , the 
defender is held to be a murderer and subject to 
the law of gisäs. 42 
In conclusion, it will be observed that there is a firm link between the act 
of defence and the act of aggression as the legitimacy of the former is caused 
by the existence of the latter. The period of legitimate defence begins with 
the beginning of the aggression, and it is no longer legitimate after the 
aggression ends. However, the aggression is not deemed terminated if the 
aggressor escapes with property. In such a case, the defender has the right to 
pursue him to take back his property, even though that may result in killing 
as a necessary measure. 43 
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3- ILLNESS 
Illness is an apparent factor which leads to the possibility of reducing 
the rigour with which legal rulings are be implemented in Islamic law. It has 
been decided that " if a sick person is unable to commit himself to a certain 
ruling in Islamic law because doing it would cause severe pain or increase 
the illness or because of fear of delay in the recovery or damage to an 
organ, he is required to do it in a way that will not harm him as this has been 
granted by the rules of legal concession ( rukhsah ). " i 
A number of evidences from the Qur'än and the Sunnah have been 
quoted to support the foregoing such as the following verses: 2 
I- In the realm of fasting , the 
Qur'än has said: 
" every one of you who is present at his home during that 
month should spend it in fasting , 
but if any one is ill or on a 
journey the prescribed period should be made up by days 
later " S. 2, v. 185. 
2- In the realm of ha, it has been mentioned that : 
" And if any of you is ill or has an ailment in his scalp 
necessitating shaving he should in compensation either fast or 
feed the poor or offer sacrifice "S : 2, v: 196. 
3- Regarding ablution the Qur'an has mentioned: 
" If ye are ill or on a journey or one of you cometh from 
offices of nature or ye have been in contact with women and ye 
find no water then take for yourselves clean sand or earth and 
rub therewith your faces and hands " S: 4, v: 43. 
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The foregoing verses have indicated that illness is one of the factors that 
lead to mitigation. Such mitigation has various forms; it occasionally takes 
the form of delaying all the rules till the time in which the person who was ill 
can do it, as is understood from the first mentioned verse. In addition to 
that, mitigation can be through implementing another ruling instead of the 
original ruling, as is illustrated in the second and the third mentioned 
verses. 3 
Mitigation for ill persons is evident in the following hadith which 
provides that, 
Umrdn Ibn al-Husayn said "I was affected by hemorrhoids, 
and I asked the prophet what to do in prayer and he said: ' Pray 
standing but if you can not do so, pray sitting and if you can 
not do so, pray lying down on your side. ' 11 4 
However, not every sort of illness relieves one of implementing the 
existing rules. In the following, we will discuss what kind of illnesses cause 
the facilitation of legal injunctions: 
Sick persons can abandon existing rulings in favour of a ruling that is 
easier to do when illness has affected such a person and he cannot do what he 
has to do as it has been prescribed by legal texts, that is when he suffers from 
severe pain or he fears delay in recovering or spreading the illness to 
another part of the body. 5 
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A sick person is to judge whether his sickness will affect him or not in 
the performance of his duty, and that is by taking into account the signs and 
the experience which he has had on such occasions; or if a reliable doctor has 
decided that such illness would affect him if he did such an act. Imam Ahmad 
ibn Hanbal (d. 241 A. H) said, explaining when the ill person may pray 
sitting :" If his standing is weakening him, he is to pray sitting. "6 
Many rulings which have been mentioned in the texts of Islamic law 
have been legislated as alternatives where an excuse such as illness exists, 
particularly in the realm of devotional matters ( 'ibädät ). That can be 
illustrated in the following examples: 
1- Ablution with clean sand / earth ( tayammum) in the event that a 
sick person is afraid of becoming worse by using water. 
2- Prayer is to be performed according to the ability of a sick person to 
the extent that he may be allowed not to move any part of his body but only 
to recite. 
3- The fasting of Ramaddn can be delayed to a convenient time in case of 
illness. 7 
In another respect, illness may necessitate breaking the existing law in 
non-devotional matters. In the following, some cases which illustrate the 
state of necessity caused by illness will be expounded. 
These are : 
Fatal Illness ( marad al-mW. 
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Medication by unlawful substances. 
Organ transplantation. 
A. FATAL ILLNESS : 
Fatal illness has been defined as follows: It is a sickness in which a 
person will not be able to pursue his usual work and which results in death 
within one year with the level of pain either remaining the same or 
increasing. However, if the illness is continuously increasing in severity, it 
is also deemed a fatal illness, even if it continues for a long time. 8 
Two attributes must be ascertained in such an illness : 
1- The disease must be incurable and death is most likely to be the 
consequence of the disease. 
2- Death must be connected with the illness even if it is caused by another 
accident such as drowning, burning or killing during the period of illness. 
In other words, it will not be deemed a fatal illness if one died after 
recovering from such an illness. And likewise if the illness continues for 
more than one year without increasing: it would be regarded then as a long 
term illness which is legaly treated differently from fatal illness. 9 
During his final illness a sick person has the right to conclude bargains 
and make trade contracts. However, Islamic law takes into account the fact 
that such an illness is a pointer to the state of death in which legal capacity is 
finally terminated and new rulings would be applied such as the distribution 
of inheritance and the settlement of debts. That means in such an illness, the 
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rights of the debtors and heirs must be protected, which necessitates limiting 
the legal capacity of such an ill person in the area of voluntary expenditure 
such as entailment on a charitable institution ( wa ) and gift (l ibah ). 10 
To protect the rights of debtors, Islamic jurists have taken into 
consideration two different forms of debt : 
1- Where the wealth of the debtor is less than the amount of the debt. 
2- Where the wealth of the debtor is more than the amount of the debt. 
Regarding the first state, an ill person is banned from any sort of 
voluntary disbursements. If he does so, it is deemed invalid except in the case 
where the creditors give their approval. Thus, if he entails property on a 
charitable institution ( wa ), the creditors have the right to stop such Fqqf 
and they can sell it in order to get back their debt. Likewise if the debtor 
gave a gift to an heir of some of his property. 11 The same ruling has been 
applied in the case of discounting others' debt to him, and in the case of 
making a sale well below market price ( bay' bi al-muliäbäh ) in order to 
let someone else benefit from such a deal. 12 
On the other hand, if the property of the patient is more than his debt 
there is no restriction on his conduct unless such conduct affects the rights 
of the heirs. In this regard, two rules must be observed : 
1- A gift by the patient during his last illness is restricted within the 
limit of a third of his-property. Accordingly no voluntary disbursement is 
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allowed to exceed one third except where the consent of the heirs has been 
obtained. 
2- No gift is allowed to any one of the heirs whether it is from the third 
of the estate or not unless the rest of the heirs have agreed to it. That is in 
accordance with the saying of the prophet which states: 
" God has assigned a portion to all who are entitled. Hence 
there shall be no bequest to legal heirs. 11 13 
B. MEDICATION BY UNLAWFUL SUBSTANCES : 
Islamic jurists have studied medication by unlawful substances from the 
legal point of view. They have rarely talked about medication by prohibited 
substances other than medication by wine and any substance that contains 
alcohol among its ingredients. 14 
Certain texts attributed to the Prophet are the basis on which the rules of 
medication by unlawful cure in Islamic law are established. These ädi 
are: 
Abü al-Dardä' reported that the Prophet said " Allah has 
sent down both the disease and the cure, and he has appointed 
a cure for every disease, so treat yourselves medically but use 
nothing unlawful. " 15 
Täriq Ibn Suwayd asked the Prophet about wine but he 
forbade it. He again asked him but he forbade him. He said to 
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him: " Prophet of Allah, it is a medicine ". The Prophet said: " 
No it is a disease ". 16 
Abü Hurayrah said: the Apostle of Allah prohibited unclean 
(khabith ) medication 17 
The majority of Islamic jurists have relied on these Islamic legal 
evidences in prohibiting a cure that consists of pure alcohol. The Mäliki and 
the Hanbli schools have stressed the prohibition of medication by any sort of 
intoxicant drink even in the case of necessity. 18 However, some Mäliki 
jurists have excepted the case of necessity from such a prohibition, for 
example al-Qurtubi, who commented on these ahädith saying " This is likely 
to be qualified by the state of necessity. " 19 
In addition to these prophetic Traditions, the majority of jurists support 
their view by rational argument saying: The prohibition of wine is due to its 
bad effects on reason, and it is unsuitable to cure the body at the expense of 
reason. Moreover, the prohibition of wine entails avoiding direct contact 
with it, and curing by wine entails intimate contact with it, this contradicts 
the objective of the prohibition. 2° 
Some jurists, such as Ibn Haim and some prominent modern jurists such 
as Muhammed `Abduh and his disciple shaykh Rashid Ri4a, have held the 
opinion that it is permissible to use wine in medication because it is a state of 
necessity. Regarding the foregoing ahAdith which prohibit using wine in 
medication, they said it is confined to normal conditions where there is no 
necessity, yet in the state of necessity it is permissible to use it in medication 
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as it resembles the prohibition of wearing silk which, however, was allowed 
to 'Abd al-R*n5n Ibn 'Auf and al-Zubayr ibn al-'Awäm due to an itch 
they had. 21 
In addition, forbidding medication by unlawful substances is applicable 
when there is no evidence proving their effectiveness in recovery, and when 
it was proven effective but there is lawful medication available which can 
be used instead. 22 
The Sh 'i school has forbidden medication by pure wine or alcohol. 
However, they allow them if they have been mixed with a lawful medicine or 
substance. 23 
C. ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION: 
Islam pays great attention and respect to the dignity and sanctity of the 
human body whether alive or dead. the violation of a human body is a great 
sin, whether by taking life or by inflicting any sort of harm on it as well as 
defiling it when dead, unless a person has committed a crime which allows 
certain punishments that violate his sanctity, such as killing, otherwise no 
harm whatsoever is allowed to befall him as the Prophet said: 
" Your blood, property and honour must be regarded by you 
as sacred... " 24 He also said " Breaking a dead man's bone is 
like breaking it when he is alive . 
"25 
That is the fundamental rule on the basis of which any treatment of the 
body should be based and should be observed. However, there is another 
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fundamental rule which should always be taken into account, which is the 
balancing between the interest and harm of the human being, as well as its 
consequent rule, which is committing the lesser of two harmful acts to 
preclude the worse of them, or the sacrifice of the lesser of two interests to 
implement the greater one. 26 
Contemporary Islamic jurists have based their search for the Islamic 
legal rule concerning organ transplants on these two fundamental rules. 
It has not been found that the classical Islamic jurists have studied such a 
topic, namely the transferring of organs from one body to the other. The 
reason for such an attitude is very obvious, which is that the transplantation 
of body organs, which is associated with advancements in the field of 
medical science as it exists nowadays, was totally unknown to them27. 
However, some issues pertaining to actions concerning the human body have 
been discussed. 
Because of what we have already stated regarding the sanctity of the 
human body, Islamic scholars are very conservative with regard to 
permitting any acts concerning the human body, either in life or death. 
Thus, in their view it is forbidden to utilize parts of the human body whether 
such an act occurs through sale or otherwise. Al-KAsäni ( d. 587 A. H) says " 
Human bones and hair should not be permitted to be sold, not because of 
their uncleanliness, as such parts are deemed to be clean in the prophetic 
tradition, but out of respect for human organs; the degrading of such human 
organs through their sale is a form of humiliation. "28 And al-Mirghanäni 
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(d. 593 A. H ) says " It is not permitted to sell a human being's hair or utilize 
it in any way, because humans are highly dignified therefore no part of them 
should be undignified or degraded. "29 Al-Shirbini ( d. 1326 A. H ) says that 
" It is forbidden to exploit any part of the human body, because of its dignity 
and worth . 
"30 Ibn Qudämah stipulates that the sale of organs from the 
human body that have been cut out or amputated is forbidden because such 
organs can not be utilized. 31 
These and similar texts indicate that the fundamental rule AL-MI () is the 
prohibition of benefiting from or exploiting the parts of the human body, 
either because of its dignity and value, or because no beneficial use can be 
made of the parts. In spite of that, there are a few exceptions to such a rule 
in which jurists permit certain acts pertaining to the human body which lead 
to utilizing and exploiting some parts of the human body. However, all such 
acts are bound by the state of necessity. 32 
In the following, some of these issues will be mentioned : 
THE SALE OF MATERNAL MILK: 
This is a controversial matter; thus we find scholars belonging to the 
Mäliki, the Shäfi'i and the Hanbali schools who have allowed the trading in 
maternal milk, when that milk is not fed to the child by the process of 
breas-tfeeding. They support their argument for this ruling by saying that it 
is clean (tä 'r) and beneficial. Ibn Qudämah has summed up the arguments 
regarding this matter by saying that " as for the selling of maternal milk, it is 
hateful to Ahmad. Scholars have argued over this point; apparently, al- 
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Khiraqi (d. 334 A. H) permits it in his words ' everything that is beneficial 
' and so does al-ShAR'i. Other scholars, however, have forbidden its sale, 
particularly the Hanafi school, because it is a part of the human body, just 
like any other part. " 33 Ibn Qudämah, however, chooses to permit its sale 
just like the sale of the milk of sheep. He also permitted the receipt of 
compensation for it if used to satisfy a person's thirst. He, however, 
forbade the sale of dismembered parts of the body as these were of no 
benefit. 34 
After analyzing this text, Janiil Mubärak has concluded that : 
1- Everything which has a benefit which is countenanced by the Shari'ah 
is permitted to be sold. 
2- Maternal milk is permitted to be sold as it is beneficial. 
3- Other parts of the body, like maternal milk, are permitted to be 
sold. 35 
4- The dismembered parts of the body, nowadays, can be utilized 
therefore they can be sold. This can be understood from the explanation that 
Ibn Qudämah has given for forbidding the sale of the dismembered parts of 
the body when he said " as these were of no benefit ". It is clear that he was 
considering the extent of medical knowledge in his age. 36 
The Hanafi school, on the contrary, go so far as to forbid the sale of 
maternal milk separately from the mother. They support their argument by 
pointing out that maternal milk is part of the human body which is a 
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dignified and worthy entity and therefore no part of it should be demeaned 
and humiliated. 37 
CUTTING OPEN A DEAD PERSON'S ABDOMEN : 
The classical Islamic scholars have argued over cutting open the 
womb of a dead woman in order to extract a foetus that may be living The 
Hanafi and the Shafi'i schools and some of the Mäliki scholars have held the 
opinion that it is permissible to cut open a dead woman's abdomen to extract 
a foetus. They have relied on the argument that by doing so the foreseeable 
life of the foetus is being maintained athough the sanctity of the dead body is 
being disregarded. That means attaining the greater of two conflicting 
interests by rejecting the worse of two wrongs, and that resembles the state 
of someone who was compelled to eat a dead person's flesh . 
38 
On the other hand, the Hanbali school and some Mäliki scholars have 
opposed this. Ibn Qudämah has summarized their argument by saying: 
" Such a foetus does not usually live, hence it is not allowed to tamper with 
the sanctity of the dead for something that is illusory. The Prophet 
Muhammad said ' the breaking of the bones of a dead person is just like the 
breaking of the bones of the living, This is the mutilation ( muthlah ) which 
the Prophet has ordered us to desist from ." 
39 
In another respect, the majority of Islamic jurists have agreed on the 
point that it is allowed to cut open the abdomen of a dead person to extract 
money belonging to someone else that has been swallowed, on the condition 
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that it must be valuable and not negligible. Ibn 'Abd al-Saläm has supported 
this view relying on the argument that the sanctity of the money of the living 
being is greater than the sanctity of the dead. 40 
From the aforementioned debate, it becomes clear that the opinion which 
opposes cutting open a dead woman's womb in order to extract her foetus 
relies on two pretexts : 
1- Such an action is a disfigurement which is prohibited in Islam . 
2- The foetus is not going to live after being extracted from her abdomen. 
That means that its life is a mere illusory matter and such an illusion does 
not justify violating the dignity of the dead woman. That is clearly 
understood from Ibn Qudämah's words " Such a foetus does not usually 
live ", and it can be concluded that it is permissible to extract the foetus if it 
will usually live after being extracted, as Ibn Qudämah says: " it is likely to 
be permissible to cut open the womb if the foetus is likely going to live. 11 41 
It becomes clear now that the disagreement between jurists upon this 
matter is not a real one since they disagreed with each other over whether 
the foetus was going to live or not. Therefore, if it is likely to live, there is 
no disagreement between them, since all of them apply the legal principle 
that shows the sacrificing of the lesser of the two interests in order to bring 
about the greater of the two. Islamic jurists relied upon such a principle 
when they allowed cutting open the abdomen of the dead to extract valuable 
money that had been swallowed by him. One may make a hasty judgment by 
saying that the classical Islamic jurists have considered the priority of the 
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money over the dignity of the human being since we find them allowing 
cutting open the abdomen to extract money but not to extract the foetus. 
Deep thought indicates that in such a matter they looked to the sort of 
interests resulting from such an action, and therefore they found that such 
interest is materialized in the former but is illusory in the latter, as those 
who held such an opinion thought that the life of the foetus is not possible 
due to their medical knowledge in that age, and consequently they believed 
that such an operation is a sort of violation of the dignity of the human body 
without obtaining a benefit. 42 
When contemporary Islamic jurists discuss this matter, namely organ 
transplantation, they have been influenced by such debates. Moreover they 
have taken for granted the foregoing maxim which organizes the interests 
and the injuries in cases of conflict. Thus on several occasions they have 
decided the following : 
Firstly : Autopsy must be looked at in the light of the aforementioned 
maxims, namely committing the lesser of two harmful acts to preclude the 
worse of them, and sacrificing the lesser of two interests to implement the 
greater one. It is obvious that when the interest of keeping the dignity of a 
dead person is in conflict with the interest of his relatives, such as in the case 
of confirming the involvement of the accused in a crime, or in conflict with 
the interest of the community, such as in the case of discovering the cause of 
an epidemic which concerns the community, or in conflict with the accused's 
interest, such as in the case of confirming his innocence, it is clear that in 
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such circumstances the priority is for autopsy over keeping the dignity of the 
dead. However, contemporary Islamic jurists stipulated the following : 
1- Autopsy must be the only available means that performs the specified 
interest. 
2- The interest must be certain. 
3- Autopsy must be combined with a great deal of respect to the dead , so 
that it is not allowed, for example, to walk over or to tamper with his 
organs. 43 
Secondly : The donation of organs which are to be given to some one 
else who is in dire need of such organs, is permissible, whether such an 
organ is taken from a living or a dead person, as long as it is absolutely the 
only means for keeping away a greater harm from the recipient than that 
occurring to the donor because of the donation of his organ. This means 
rejecting a greater harm with respect to the right of Allah pertaining to the 
body of the would- be recipient by shouldering a somewhat lesser harm 
befalling the right of Allah in the body of the donor. 44 
Contemporary Islamic Jurists have stipulated certain conditions as to such 
a permission in order to confine such an act to the state of necessity and 
need. 45 
1- In order to weigh the interests and the harm resulting from the 
implementation of the transplant and those resulting from leaving things as 
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they are, scientists and doctors must determine a valid and reliable scientific 
measure for assessing the following : 
i-The harm befalling the recipient of the donated organ is in relation to 
the condition of his health. The effects of such an operation in the present 
and the future should be taken into consideration as well. 
ii-The interest occurring to the recipient as a result of transplantation of the 
donated organ to his body. 
iii -The results of the process of comparing the interests and harm resulting 
from the implementation of the transplant and those resulting from leaving 
things as they are. It should clearly show the superiority of donation to just 
leaving things as they are. Thus, if such an operation would harm the donor 
so that his normal life is largely affected, such an operation should not be 
performed since harm in Islamic law should not replaced by another 
similar or stronger harm as has been decided in juristic maxims. 
2- Operations for taking and transplanting an organ should have a 
reasonable expectation of success. 
3- The transplant of an organ must be the only way to save the recipient 
from his misery, and if there are any other means available, then 
transplantation should not be conducted. The reason is that in Islamic law the 
application of the rule urging the choice of the lesser of two harms is void if 
both harms can be avoided as was explained by Ibn 'Abd al-Saläm in his 
words " If we have two harms or more at the same time, we should avoid all 
of them if it is possible, but if it is not, then we should try to reject the 
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strongest one. This can be illustrated in the case of forcing someone to kill 
someone else, ( when )otherwise he is going to be killed. " 46 
4- The permission of the donor must be obtained and he must posses full 
mental capacity, so that an offer to donate an organ by a minor, an insane or 
mentally retarded person is not acceptable, even though it may come from 
their guardian. Also, with regard to the dead person, his permission must be 
obtained while he is alive. 47 
S- Although the donor is allowed to take compensation, the act of 
donation should not be used to demean human dignity. This is the case if the 
organ is donated to a party who probably conducts a trade in human organs 
and exploits the need of patients as a way of making profits, because human 
organs can not be evaluated in terms of financial gain. This area must be seen 
as a sort of human solidarity . 
48 
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135 
actions ... no one has the right to destroy any part of himself, as this is a joint right shared 
by the individual and his God .. 
" Oawä'id . p. 96. 
2- The right of the individual vis-ä-vis his body and organs appears clearly in 
the ruling that in the case of killing or causing bodily harm and injury in a deliberate and 
unjust way, the injured party or the heirs of the victim have the right to choose either of 
three things: retaliation " giä4 ". taking a payment of compensation "" or pardoning 
the perpetrator of the crime. It is noteworthy that giving the victim or his heirs the right to 
grant pardon signifies that the transgression occurred against an individual right. If this 
was not so, pardon would not be the right of the individual, since the rights of God cannot 
possibly be pardoned by a human being. 
45- Qararät Majma' al-filth al-Islami ( The resolutions of the Council of Islamic 
Jurisprudence ), round 8, resolution no: 1. 
Muhammad Naeem Yaseen, " The Rulings for the Donation of the Human 
Organs ", ALO, (1990, part. 5 ), p. 67. 
Mubärak, p. 455. 
Muhammad al-Shangiti, A käm al-Jirähah al-Tibiyyah, pp. 102-25. 
46 
- Oawä'id , vol. 
1, pp. 71-4. 
47 
- Qararät Majma' al-filth al-Islami ( The resolutions of the Council of Islamic 
Jurisprudence ), round 8, resolution no: 1. 
48- Muhammad Naeem Yaseen, " The Rulings for the Donation of the Human 
Organs ", ALO, (1990, part. 5), p. 67. 
Mubirak, p. 455. 
136 
4-CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES: 
A. INTRODUCTION: 
In the law of contract, the two contracting parties are bound to fulfil 
their agreement. Muslims are told through a Qur' änic injunction to keep 
their promises and obligations, 
"O you who believe, fulfil all obligations " S. 5, v: 1. 
A similar command has been stated in another verse in the Qur'än : 
" And fulfil every engagement, for every engagement will be 
inquired into (on the Day of Reckoning) " S. 17, v: 34. 
This is, as Muslims see it, an order from God to fulfil a promise, whether it 
be a contract ( 'aqd ) or an agreement or obligation created by any means. 
The traditions of the Prophet Muhammed also express the general precept 
that believers must observe their commitments. This has been embodied in 
the maxim, al-muslimün 'ala shurütihim " Muslims are bound by their 
stipulations. "1 The necessity of fulfilling a contract is also understood 
from the literal meaning of the Arabic word jag d which is knot, bond or tie; 
so 'aqd al-bay', for instance, means an act of putting a tie to a bargain. 2 
Contractual obligations can be terminated in several ways such as 
performance, when the object is accomplished; or by the expiry of the term, 
for example, in hire or lease contracts; or by ugh which means mutual 
agreement or reconciliation; or by the transfer of the obligation ( aw" ) 
in cases of debt; or by a fundamental breach which relieves the other party 
of his obligations under the contract. 
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Terminating or adjusting a contract may be necessitated by some events 
and changed circumstances which cannot be controlled by the parties. So the 
obligor is responsible for a breach of contract unless he can establish that his 
failure to perform was caused by external causes outside his control. 
The aim of the following pages is to cast light on the nature, scope and 
the legal consequences of such events which are known in classical Islamic 
jurisprudence as 'awä'' the plural of 'ä. 
B. DEFINITION OF JAWA'IH. 
A1 id'ihah literally means a calamity which eradicates the entire wealth 
of a person, whether it was a disaster caused by drought or diseases or 
caused by turmoil and civil riots. 3 
Muslim jurists have defined 'awä'ih as "a heavenly event which 
cannot be avoided or controlled. " 4 Al-Shäfi'i (d. 204 A. H ) has defined it 
as " every event which destroys all the fruit or part of it and which happens 
without any action by a human being. "5 Ibn Qudämah has defined it in a 
similar terms, that is " every calamity which no human being had any role 
in causing. "6 Ibn Taymiyyah also defined it as follows: " It is a heavenly 
disaster for which no human being can be held responsible. "7 Al-Mutt'i 
thinks that " ßjä 'ibah is the calamity which destroys the fruit. " 8 
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It is obvious that some of these definitions are as general as the literal 
meaning of 'aý wä'ih in the Arabic language; and some of them indicate that 
they are confined to the disasters which affected fruit, and some of them 
exclude an act by human beings who can not be held responsible such as the 
destruction caused by armies. Some of these definitions did not mention the 
case of causing defects but not destruction. All these things which have been 
omitted in these definitions are included in the commentaries written later 
by the same scholars. 
Dr. al Thunayyän thinks that these prominent scholars did not pay 
great attention to the technical definition of 'aý wä'ih because they relied on 
their explanation afterwards which determines the objective of such a 
definition. So he suggests the following definition " every event which 
cannot be avoided or controlled and for which no one can be held 
responsible if this event affected the exchange value ( 'iwad ) through 
destruction or defect before it has been fully delivered. " In this definition 
Dr. al-Thunayyän supports the opinion that theft, for instance, is not a 
'äý 'ihah because it can be avoided and the thief can be held responsible. Also 
the action of a human being which cannot be avoided but for which it is 
possible to hold him responsible such as the actions of gangs who can not be 
fought by individuals whereas the authorities are able to bring them to 
justice and force them to guarantee the loss. 
He thinks Jawft'ib include misfortune from heaven ( MAh 
samäwiyyah) and every action of human beings which can not be avoided or 
for which no one can be held responsible, such as the actions of armies. A 
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i'ä ihah could be considered to be every event which causes either destruction 
or defect to either the price or the merchandise provided that it happened 
before the full delivery; since if it happened after delivery, the general 
maxim which states that responsibility follows ownership would be applied. 
In other words, the contract would then be concluded and the burden of the 
loss would be borne by the owner of the property at the time the loss 
occurred. 9 
Afah samäwiyyah. ( calamity or misfortune from heaven) as well 
as amrun min allah ( act of God ) means events such as rain, cold, drought, 
wind or incurable diseases. They are part of 'awä'' . However, they are not 
the only part since the view of the majority within the Maliki school and the 
preferred of two opinions in the Hanbali school is to consider the activity of 
armies as a disastrous calamity ('äl 'ihah ) which is irresistible and resembles 
cold, rain, etc. Ibn Taymiyyah has explained the reason behind such an 
opinion and said: " The essence of the matter is the possibility of invoking 
liability and it is impossible to hold the army liable in such a matter. " 10 
C. THE EFFECT OF JAWAIH : 
The Mdliki and Hanbali schools have recognized the concept of 
'awä. 'ih. According to them if the sale of a crop or fruits on trees happened 
to be after they had started to ripen and an irresistible blight damaged or 
destroyed the fruits before they had been picked, the seller should bear the 
loss and give discount to the buyer. However, the concept of -jaw-'' is 
held to apply, according to the Mäliki view, only when at least one-third or 
more of the crop or fruit was affected when it would validate the buyer's 
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claim for reduction in price. In other words, if the damage to the crop is less 
than one-third, the buyer should bear the loss and the seller should not give 
him any discount. II In uwatta' :" Mälik had heard that 'Umar'ibn 'Abd 
al-'Aziz decided in a certain case to make a reduction for crop damage. 
Malik said: 'This is what we do in this situation. ' He added: ' Crop damage 
is whatever causes loss of a third or more for the purchaser, anything less is 
not counted as crop damage. ' " 12 
The Hanbali school and some other scholars did not set a minimum level 
above which a buyer may be entitled to a reduction in the price of crops or 
fruit destroyed by blight. They rely on the following hadith, 
" the Prophet said: If you sell fruit to your brother ( and Jäbir 
ibn 'Abd Allah reported through another chain of narrators: 
If you were to sell fruit to your brother) and these are stricken 
with calamity, it is not permissible for you to get anything 
from him. Why do you get the wealth of your brother without 
justification?. " Jabir b. 'Abd Allah said also: " The Prophet 
commanded that unforeseen loss be remitted in respect of what 
is affected by blight. " 
Ibn Qudämah commented on this matter and said: " These Traditions of the 
Prophet are general and not qualified by any percentage whether it was a 
third or a fifth or a quarter. However, the buyer shall bear the loss which is 
trivial as it is determined by custom. "13 
Islamic jurists have distinguished between several phases within the 
realm of contracts that consist of exchange of value ( mu'äwadät ) such as 
sale and hire. During these phases disastrous events may occur and 
accordingly a different ruling would be applied. These phases are: 
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1- If the object of the contract is damaged by calamity after 
concluding the contract but before taking possession of that subject matter. 
In such cases the contract would be rescinded and the buyer, for instance, 
would be released from his duty. In other words, the liability here is on the 
seller because it is still in his possession. 14 
2- If the object is damaged after concluding the contract and after 
taking possession of that object. The contract of sale would not be rescinded 
and the buyer would be liable for the damage as it is under his ownership. 
However, in the contract of hire, the contract would be terminated but the 
lessor should pay the rent for the period in which he takes advantage from 
the leased object. 15 
3- If the object was destroyed or damaged during a period in which it 
needed to be kept in the same place and in which the seller cut his relations 
with it. As we mentioned earlier this covers the sale of fruits and crops on 
trees after they have begun to ripen but which need to stay on the trees until 
their ripening is complete. 
In this situation we have mentioned above the opinions of the Maliki and 
Hanbali school. According to them the buyer has the right to claim a 
reduction of the price equivalent to what he has lost the fruit. Both schools 
accept that if all the crops were destroyed the sales contract would be 
terminated. 
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The Hanafi and Shafi'i schools are in disagreement with the others. They 
have held the opinion that in this situation the contract is completed and the 
liability is on the buyer as he is obliged, according to the Hanafi view, to 
harvest the fruit or the crop immediately after concluding the contract. 16 
They relied also on the following Traditions : 
1- It has been narrated in al-Muwatta that: A man bought 
the fruit of an enclosed orchard in the time of the Messenger 
of Allah and he tended it while staying on the land. It became 
clear to him that there was going to be some loss. He asked the 
owner of the orchard to reduce the price for him or to revoke 
the sale, but the owner made an oath that he would not do so. 
The mother of the buyer went to the Messenger of Allah and 
told him about it. The Messenger of Allah said: " By this oath, 
he has sworn not to do good. " The owner of the orchard heard 
about it and went to the Messenger of Allah and said, 
" Messenger of Allah, the choice is his. " 17 It is understood 
from the saying of the Prophet " by this oath he has sworn not 
to do good " that if the loss caused by disastrous events has to 
be remitted, the Prophet would force him to do so whether he 
made an oath or not because he would be bound to fullfil his 
obligations. 
2- It has been narrated in the $ahih Muslim that: In the 
time of Allah's Messenger a man suffered loss in fruits which 
he had bought and his debt increased; so Allah's Messenger 
told (the people) to give him charity and they gave him 
charity, but that was not enough to pay the debt in full, 
whereupon Allah's Messenger said to his creditors: "Take 
what you find, you will have nothing but alms. " In this case the 
prophet gave all the property of the man to his creditors 
without making any reduction with regard to his loss . 
18 
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The Mäliki and Hanbali schools have held that these two Traditions of the 
Prophet are not appropriate as a basis for such an opinion because of the 
following : 
I- There is no indication in the first Tradition which would confirm 
that the loss was because of 'äý ihah. All that has been said is that there was a 
loss which could have been caused by many causes, jiVibah or otherwise, 
and it is not acceptable to confine it to 'äy 'ihah without a proof confirming 
that it was. 19 In addition to that, this Tradition is a mursal (a disconnected 
adith at the level of the companions) and the disconnected adit is, as at- 
Shäfi`i said, not acceptable from the people of a it and from us as well. 20 
2- With regard to the second Tradition it does not indicate any sort 
ofd ah. All that has been said is that a man suffered loss in fruits he had 
bought and his debt increased and that could be owing to a low price or theft 
or something else. 21 
3- It is not appropriate to reject the clear text, as it is in the two 
Traditons of Jäbir, in favour of an unclear one as in the previous two 
traditions. A firm and unequivocal meaning in the two Traditions of Jäbir 
affirms the remission of the loss caused by disastrous events. 22 
As to the authenticity of the Traditions which prove the reduction 
of 'awä' i, al-Shawkäni said " It is not right to say they were not heard 
from the Prophet, they have been heard and transmitted through Jäbir and 
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Anas. " 23 Al Tahäwi ( d. 311 A. H ), from the Hanafi school, said: 'these 
Traditions are authentic and we do not reject them because of that but we 
have another interpretation. ' 24 Commenting on al-Shäfi'i's remark about 
the authenticity of the Traditions that established the rules of jawR'ib when 
al-Shaf'i said if the badith was authentic I would recognize jaw''' without 
regard to its level, which means he would not set a minimum level above 
which the reduction would be applied, Ibn Taymiyyah said these Traditions 
are recognized by all the people of the adi as authentic and no one of them 
has doubted their authenticity-2s 
D. AL-'UDHR (excuse): 
1-'udhr is the second manifestation of a change in circumstances 
which affects the sanctity of contracts in Islamic law. The concept of 'u dhr 
was held to apply exclusively to the contract of hire ( ij5rah ) which includes 
both the hiring of property and the contract for services. 
It should be made clear that Islamic jurists other than Hanaf jurists do 
not recognize 'udhr ( excuse ) unless it has prevented the use of the usufruct 
of the leased object or reduced it or damaged it. So it is a part of 'awä'' and 
therefore we find Ibn Rushd, for instance, discussing these matters under the 
heading of ta wäri' ( change in circumstances ). 26 And also Ibn Taymiyyah 
discussed them under the heading of jawä'ih al-ijärah 27 However, 
although the Hanafi school does not recognize jaw-''b, they exclusively 
recognized 'udhr and they extended it to mean any excuse which makes the 
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contracting party unable to conclude his contract unless he suffers 
unwarranted harm, which was not envisaged in the contract, whether it is 
inflicted on himself or his property. 28 
L GENERAL EXCUSES : 
General excuses are meant to be any sort of excuse which affects the 
entire people of a city or province etc., and which stop the lessor from 
making use of the leased object such as the siege of a village whereupon it is 
impossible to get to the rented land outside the village; or in the case of 
hiring a vehicle for travelling when the road has been cut by the enemy; or 
in the case of a general fear which prevents one from living in certain area. 
In such cases, the lease contract is cancelled in the view of the Hanafi, MEW 
and Hanbali schools because in such cases the problem affects the whole 
people and it is general. 29 Ibn Qud . mah made it clear that the generality of 
the excuse is the cause for cancellation. Therefore he did not see the fear of 
the individual as a valid excuse for termination of the contract since it is a 
private excuse which resembles his illness. 30 
The Shafi'i school have held the opinion that such excuses do not justify 
the termination of the lease contract because the leased object has not been 
affected by such events and as long as it is intact no cancellation is 
warranted. 31 
ii- PRIVATE EXCUSES : 
Privateexcuses mean events which render continuing performance 
of a contract harmful for one of the contracting parties without causing 
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harm to other people and which do not affect the object of the lease. 32 
Examples have been given such as the death of one of the contracting parties, 
or his bankruptcy, or his getting into heavy debt, or his goods in his leased 
shop being destroyed by fire or theft. Such excuses render the contract 
voidable in the opinion of the Hanafi school. They have argued that need 
requires the contract to be terminated because if the contract was binding in 
such cases, unjustified harm would be inflicted on the injured party. 33 
There are three kinds of excuse in the opinion of the Hanafi jurists. The 
first arises on the part of the lessee, for example his bankruptcy, or change 
of profession or craft such as changing his career as a farmer to work in a 
factory and the suchatike, or if he moved to another city. 
The second is that which might affect the lessor, for example he may 
revoke the contract because he incurs a debt which he can pay only by the 
sale of the leased object. However, if he decided, for instance, to leave his 
city, he may not revoke the contract because no harm would be inflicted on 
him from such a move. 
The third is that which might affect the object of the lease. If, for 
example, a person rents a bathhouse in a village for a stipulated period of 
time and a general exodus of people from the village takes place, the bath- 
house may be returned to the owner and there is no obligation to pay the 
rental. 34 
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Article 443 of al-Majallah provides that " if any event happens 
whereby the reason for the conclusion of the contract disappears, so that the 
contract cannot be performed, such a contract is voidable. " Examples are: A 
cook is hired for a wedding party then one of the spouses dies. The contract 
of hire is terminated. Also, a person suffering from a toothache makes a 
contract with a dentist to remove his tooth for a certain fee. However if the 
pain ceases , then the contract 
is voidable. 35 
The majority of the MOliki , 
Shafi i and Hanbali jurists have disagreed 
with the Hanafi school on the point that a private excuse which relates only to 
the contracting parties, such as the death of one of them or his bankruptcy 
and so on, allows either of them to revoke the contract. The only excuse 
which, in the view of the majority, constitutes a legitimate basis for 
cancelling the contract is that which affects the object of the lease contract 
such as damage which prevents the leased object being used, or a defect 
which reduces the usufruct of it; and no cancellation of the contract due to 
the excuse of the contracting parties is acceptable. A wide variety of 
examples have been mentioned such as which cultivated land has been hired, 
then it is flooded with water from a river or rain to the extent that it is 
impossible for the tenant to cultivate it; or when an animal or a vehicle has 
been hired but it dies or breakes down; or when a house is rented and it 
collapses. In the case of a person who is seeking a wet-nurse and dies, the 
contract of hire is not cancelled. But upon the death of the child or the wet- 
nurse, such a contract is canceled. 36 
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The main difference between the majority of jurists and the Hanafi 
school is that the excuses which relate to the contracting parties in respect of 
either their person or their property constitute a sufficient reason for 
rescission of the contract in the Hanafi jurists' opinion. However, it does not 
constitute a sufficient reason for rescission in the view of the majority of 
jurists. On the other hand, they all agree that any excuse which is related to 
the subject matter of the contract and makes the performance impossible or 
onerous for one of the contracting parties is a sufficient reason for 
rescission. An excellent example, in addition to the above, which has been 
mentioned in al- u ni and other texts demonstrates this case: 37 
"A contract of hire for the digging of a well is valid, but 
it is essential that the work to be done be defined in terms 
either of a period of time or of a specific job. If the employer 
defines the work by a period of time saying that 'I hire you 
for a month to dig a well for me ' the contractor does not need 
to know the amount of work to be done, but he does need to 
know the ground in which he is going to dig because the 
ground is different in'terms of how hard and easy it is which 
will affect the process of digging. Moreover, if the employer 
chooses to hire him to do a specific job of digging ( such as 
digging fifty meters ), it is absolutely necessary for the 
contractor to have knowledge of the site by inspection, to see 
whether it is easy or difficult, and furthermore, he must know 
the depth of the well in order to realise the volume of work 
involved. Should the contractor strike hard rock or mineral or 
any thing which makes normal digging impossible then he is 
not bound to continue the dig, because this is a situation 
different to that which was anticipated from his inspection of 
the terrain. The inspection of the terrain applies only to the 
obvious difference between sites. Should underground water 
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be encountered and render normal digging impossible, the 
situation is analogous to the striking of hard rock and is to be 
regulated upon the same principles. " 
E. MODERN CONTRACTS : 
Contemporary Islamic jurists have discussed the nature of contracts in 
modern times and its implications for contractual commitments. 
It is obvious that early Islamic society was simple and the transactions 
were generally not as complex as they are nowadays. Many of the contracts 
nowadays are subject to factors and events which often make fulfilling the 
obligations impossible or at least onerous. The ease of travelling around the 
world and communicating with people in any country in the world make it 
easy to conclude any type of contract whether it is in trade or in industry, or 
something else, or whether it is between individuals or between 
governments and irrespective of the differences between religions, 
government policies, and the customs and laws of the two contracting 
parties. Any change in these factors and others such as the transmission of 
the exchange values may result in inflicting injury on one or both of the 
contracting parties and make loss-making events likely to happen. 38 
In addition to that a large number of contracts in modern times are very 
complicated. They need equipment, capital and time for execution, i. e. the 
construction of airports, seaports, hospitals, factories, roads and so on. The 
nature of these contracts make it possible for disastrous events to happen. 
Some cases will be mentioned here to demonstrate what we have said : 
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1- In the case of Taskiroglon co. v. Noblee & Thort Gmb H. 39 The two 
parties had concluded a contract according to which the seller had to ship 
Sudanese ground nuts within three months to Hamburg in Germany. Both 
parties expected that the shipment would be made from Port Sudan and 
proceed via the Suez Canal as usual. While the seller did everything on time, 
the war between Egypt and Israel in 1956 lead to the closure of the Suez 
Canal to international shipping, which was something unexpected. 
Therefore, the seller failed to ship the nuts claiming that the closure of the 
Suez Canal frustrated the contract and so relieved him of his obligation to 
ship the ground nuts. Whereas the buyer claimed that the route was not part 
of the contract. So it was not terminated by the closure of the Suez Canal 
simply because there is an alternative route around the Cape of Good Hope 
even if it is more expensive, more dangerous and not a normal route for 
commercial shipping. 
2- This example is a case which came before the Syrian Court of 
cassation. 40 In this case, a seller concluded a contract with the Department 
of Foreign Trade whereby he agreed to supply the latter with rice imported 
from Taiwan. The contract was concluded the provision that the rice was 
required to be from the 1979 harvest. In March 1979, after the seller had 
deposited the required security, the Taiwanese Finance Ministry issued a 
decree prohibiting the export of rice abroad, whereupon the seller 
demanded the termination of the contract and the return of the security 
deposited. This request was refused by the Department of Foreign Trade . 
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3- In 1972 and 1973 a contracting company concluded a contract with 
the Ministry of Communications in Saudi Arabia whereby the company 
agreed to build and pave a road between two towns for the amount of S. R. 72 
millions. After the company had started the work, the prices of the 
materials, services and the wages of the workers began to increase sharply 
and continuously in an unprecedented manner which affected the company's 
production . Accordingly the company succeeded 
in finishing only 60% of 
the work and failed to finish the whole work on time. Both parties agreed 
that the gross increase of the prices affected all the phases of the project. As a 
result of that, the company brought the case to the court asking for the 
contract to be adjusted according to the new circumstances in order to 
survive and fulfil its obligation. 41 
Such circumstances which affect contracts which need time to be 
concluded, such as supply, tenders, hire etc., have been recognized by 
modern Arab codes. Two theories have dealt with the intervening 
circumstances: 
Firstly : Al-guwah al-gähirah ( force majeure ). According to the 
civil codes of many Arab countries force majeure justifies breaching the 
contract and no liability is then inflicted on the wrongdoer. Thus, articles in 
the Egyptian, Libyan, Yemeni, Algerian, Kuwaiti, Iraqi, Jordanian, Qatari 
and U. A. E. Civil Codes are identical and say :" In the absence of a 
provision of law or an agreement to the contrary, a person is not liable to 
make reparation, if he proves that the damage occurred from a cause beyond 
his control, such as cas fortuit ( al-hawädith al-istithnii'iyyah ), force 
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majeure (al-quwah al-gähirah ), the act of the injured party or of the third 
party. " 42 
Any event should acquire the following elements in order to be treated 
as guwah gähirah : 
1- The event must be unforeseeable. It must not be anticipated at the 
time of concluding the contract. 
2- The event also must be unavoidable. It must not be possible to avoid or 
prevent the occurrence of the event or its consequences by taking all the 
necessary steps to stop the event from occurring or to prevent its 
consequences. 
3- The event must make the conclusion of the contract impossible. 43 
The legal effect of al-quwah al-giihirah in the civil codes of many Arab 
countries is to terminate the affected contract. Identical Civil Codes say " An 
obligation is extinguished if the obligor proves that its performance has 
become impossible by reason of causes beyond his control. " 44 
Secondly: al-hawädith al-täri'ah. Articles in the Egyptian, Iraqi, 
Syrian, Sudanese, Jordanian, Kuwaiti, Qatari and Yemeni Civil Codes 
provide identical provisions which say: " However, due to exceptional, 
general and unforeseen events, the conclusion of the contractual obligation, 
without being impossible, becomes onerous on the obligor, with the result of 
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threatening him with exorbitant loss; the judge may, after taking into 
account the surrounding circumstances and the interests of both parties to 
the contract, adjust the onerous obligation to a reasonable level. Any 
agreement to the contrary is null and void. "45 
The essential elements necessary for applying the doctrine of j 
hawädith al-tAri'ah or al-zurüf al-istithnä'iyvah ( change in 
circumstances ), which has been provided in many Arab codes, are : 
1- The event should be exceptional. In other words, such an event 
should be rare and occur infrequently. The question of whether an event is 
exceptional or not is left to the surrounding circumstances of each case in the 
time of its occurrence. 
2- The event should be unforeseeable. That is, neither of the 
contracting parties could predict that such an event was going to happen. 
3- The event should be general in character. That is, it should affect not 
only the contracting parties but also a wide section of people . 
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The legal effects of al-hawädith al-täri'ah is to adjust the onerous 
obligations either by reducing the obligation of the injured party or by 
increasing the obligation of the other party. This adjustment would be made 
according to the interest of both parties and the circumstances around each 
case. 47 
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After discussing these theories which occur in modern Arab codes, a 
contemporary Muslim jurist Dr. Zuhayli, and the great legal author Dr. at- 
Sanhüri have concluded that there is no such theory in classical Islamic law. 
However, that does not mean such intervening circumstances have not been 
dealt with in the principles of Islamic law or in the work of the Islamic 
jurists. Change in circumstances has been taken into account when dealing 
with several matters and the foremost of them are the reduction of price 
because of 'aý wä'ih and the termination of the lease contract because of 
excuse ( 'udhr ). 48 Dr. al-Sanhnri believes there are two reasons which 
may explain why Islamic law has not established a complete theory dealing 
with such circumstances as is the case in the modem codes. 
1- General theories are not a manifestation of Islamic law, not only in 
change in circumstances ( the theories of force majeure and cas fortuit ) but 
with all other legal theories. The usual way of dealing with legal matters in 
Islamic law is to establish a legal ruling for every single matter by taking 
into account the principle of justice. However, there is a legal logic that 
brings similar matters together and the duty of the jurist is to look for such a 
logic. 
2- The theory of force majeure was established in western law, which 
influenced modern Arab laws, when the binding obligation of the contract 
had been exaggerated to the extent that justice was sought to mitigate the 
binding obligation of the contract. However, this is not the case in Islamic 
law where the principle of justice has a superior rank over the binding 
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obligation of the contract. For this reason, judges were able to adjust the 
contract without the need to establish such a theory. 49 
Dr. Mohammad Qabbäni believes that there is no difference between 
the theory of al-hawädith altäri' ah in modern Arab codes and the rulings of 
'aý wä'ih and general excuses (al-a'dhär al-4dmmah ) in Islamic law. 50 If we 
looked at the conditions for applying al-hawädith al-täri'ah in the modern 
Arab codes, we would find that these conditions are constitutive elements of 
'aý wä'ih and 'udhr. To confirm this he made a comparison between the 
conditions of 'awä'' and 'udhr on the one hand and these of al-hawädith 
tdri'ah on the other. So he reached the following conclusion: 
1- It is stipulated in the theory of al-hawädith al-täri'ah in modern 
Arab codes that the contract to which the theory would apply shall be 
relaxed, that is they need time for execution, such as the contract of supply. 
This condition is also stipulated in 'aý wä'ih and 'udhr where their application 
is confined only to the contracts of lease or of sharecropping or of the sale in 
which the subject matter of the contract needs time before delivery is due, 
such as the sale of the fruit on trees. These contracts could not be executed 
immediately after the conclusion of the contract but, by their nature, need 
more time "51 
2- The events which disturb the performance of the contract in 
modern Arab codes should be exceptional and general, such as earthquakes 
or strikes or a sudden and sharp increase in prices and such like. With regard 
to 'udhr and 'aý wä'ih in Islamic law, the generality of the event is recognized 
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by all schools. 52 The Hanafi school has recognized the private excuse as well 
as the general excuse whereas the other schools have not recognized the 
private excuse but have stipulated that the excuse should be general in order 
to be recognized. This is clearly understood from the examples that have 
been given by the jurists, such as what has been stated by Ibn Rushd (d. 595 
A. H) in Bidäyat al-Mujtahid where he said: The opinion of Mälik over the 
rent of cultivated land which is watered by rain, is that the contract of rent 
would be canceled if the rain had not fallen during the period of cultivation. 
And it would be canceled also if the land had been flooded with water so that 
it is impossible to be cultivated. 53 
Ibn Quddmah has stated that: " If there was a general fear which 
prevents people from living in the area where the leased object existed, the 
contract of lease would be voidable since it is a general excuse preventing the 
use of the leased object. " 54 
In the case of 'awä'' , 
it is stipulated by the Mäliki and Hanbali schools 
that the event which causes the loss shall be general. That it should be a 
general event is understood from the examples which have been given to 
illustrate 'awä'' , such as 
locusts, cold, flood, insects, drought and the as 
of armies and so on in which the event will not only affect the contracting 
parties. 55 
3- In modern Arab codes the events shall be unforseeable and 
unavoidable. This stipulation is not fully consistent with the norm of excuse 
in the Hanafi school, since an excuse may not be predictable, such as a debt 
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which may be incurred by the lessor, or may be predictable as in the case of 
hiring a boy through his guardian to do certain work and during the contract 
time the boy reaches the legal age and decides to quit. However, this 
condition is fully consistent with al-'awä'' as it is the nature of general 
disasters not to be predictable. 56 
4- It is stipulated in modern Arab codes that such events shall render the 
conclusion of the contract onerous but not impossible. This condition is an 
explicit element in the definition of excuse by the Hanau school, that is: any 
excuse which makes the contracting party unable to perform the contract 
unless he suffers unwarranted harm. Such an excuse would cause hardship 
for the contracting party but it does not make the performance of the 
contract impossible. And paying the value of the fruit which has been 
affected by 'aý wä, ih is onerous to the buyer since he would receive nothing 
for the money paid. 57 
Dr. Qabbäni has concluded that the theory of al-hawädith al-täri' ah in 
modern Arab codes resembles in many aspects the rulings of excuse and 
'al wii'ih in Islamic law. However, Islamic maxims and principles would 
shape their own rulings with regard to the intervening circumstances. 58 
The maxims and principles which are related to intervening 
circumstances in Islamic jurisprudence and which would shape the rulings of 
such events have been mentioned by Dr. al-Thunayyän and by the Assembly 
of Islamic Jurisprudence ( Majma` al-Figh al-Islämi ) as being as follows. 59 
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1- The Tradition of the Prophet which was narrated by Jäbir and which 
states that 
" The Prophet commanded that unforeseen loss be remitted in 
respect of what is affected by blight. " 
2- The saying of the Prophet which states 
" No injury shall be inflicted or reciprocated " (La darar wa 
a dirär ). 
Jurists have relied on this badith to establish uncountable rulings which aim 
to remove injuries. And it is deemed one of the major maxims in Islamic 
jurisprudence. 60 
3- The maxim which says " Hardship begets facility "( al-mashaggah 
tajlib al-taysir ), taking into account the fact that not every hardship is 
counted. 
4- The ruling that the leasing contract is terminated when the usufruct of 
the leased object is prevented or disappears. 
5- The object of the a am contract should be made available to the 
purchaser at a future date. However, a question arises as to the state in which 
the object of the salam contract can not be delivered because of its 
discontinuation or its destruction by calamity. In this matter, the majority of 
jurists have held the opinion that the purchaser has to choose either to wait 
until the objec of the contract is made available or to terminate the contract 
and take back the price which he had paid if it still existed or its value if it is 
no longer available. 61 
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6- The ruling that the creditor should wait until the insolvent debtor gets 
enough money and can pay the debt back. 
7- In the event of repaying the value of the currency instead of repaying 
the currency itself when the currency becomes obsolete or has been banned 
by order of the authorities. This can be illustrated as follows: 
i- The case of selling an object in exchange for a currency which had 
become disused after the conclusion of the contract but before the buyer 
received it. In such a case Abü Hanifah held the opinion that such a sale is 
revoked and the buyer should return the object of the sale to the seller if it is 
extant or, otherwise, the equivalent ( al-mith ). 62 However, his two 
disciples ( Muhammad and Abü Yüsuf ), al-Shäfi'i and Ibn Hanbal do not 
nullify the contract. They thought that the buyer should pay the value of the 
disused currency without needing to cancel the contract since the contract in 
y of the price becomes impracticable as result of itself is valid; but the deliver 
it being in disuse; as if fresh dates was the price of something else but it 
could not be obtained in its season, all jurists agreed that the buyer is entitled 
either to the value of the dates or to wait until the next season; and so also in 
the case under discussion. 63 
ii- The general ruling as to the repayment of a loan ( Bard ) is to give 
back the equivalent ( at- ith ). With regard to the borrowed article being 
currency which has become disused or banned by the authorities, there are 
two opinions: 
160 
The first is to give the like. It is held by Abü Hanifah and the Shäfi'i 
school, and it is the preferred opinion in the Mäliki school; for them the 
reason is that the loaned currency has not suffered a defect but a decrease in 
value. 
The second is to give the value of the loaned currency. It is held by the 
two distinguished disciples of Abü Hanifah ( Muhammad and AbU Yüsuf ) 
and the Hanbali school on the ground that the borrowed currency is deemed 
to have suffered a defect while it is in the possession of the borrower or 
according to the rule which says that the borrower should give back the like 
but if that is not possible then he should give back the value. 64 
As to whether the value should be assessed at the time the loan takes 
place or at the time the currency had become obsolete, it is a matter which is 
used differently by different scholars. 
****** 
On the ground of the previous legal maxims and principles, the 
Assembly of Islamic Jurisprudence reached the conclusion that: 65 
1- In ' relaxed ' contracts which need time for execution such as 
supplies, constructing works and undertakings etc., the judge has the right to 
adjust the contract in a way which would divide the amount of loss between 
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the contracting parties and he has the right to terminate the remaining part 
of the contract if he believes that termination is the equitable solution 
provided that he gives just compensation for the party who asks for the 
conclusion of the contract so as to mitigate the loss inflicted on him without 
causing hardship to the other party. The judge, moreover, should rely on the 
trustworthiness of experts to form a just balance. This ruling should apply 
only if the circumstances in which the contract was concluded have 
undergone a considerable change where general and unforeseeable events 
have caused exorbitant and unusual losses and made fulfilling the obligation 
extremely onerous, providing that such losses were not a result of 
negligence and shortcomings by either of the parties. 
2- It is the right of the judge to ignore the case if he finds that the 
intervening contingencies are going to disappear. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
CONDITIONS OF NECESSITY 
I. ACTING ACCORDING TO NECESSITY MUST BE COMPATIBLE 
WITH THE OBJECTIVES OF THE SHARI'AH: 
Consideration of necessity is an integral part of Islamic law. Such 
consideration bears the same merits and characteristics as the other parts of 
Islamic law. This principle, in reality, is a sort of compromise between an 
ideal legislation that, on the one hand, aims to uplift mankind morally, 
spiritually and socially in order to achieve success in this life and the 
hereafter, and that, on the other hand, acts to intervene in and attenuate 
circumstances which cannot be avoided. In other words, the principle of 
necessity contributes to preserving the objectives of the Shari'ah by making 
a balance between the two extremes without the law becoming to be too rigid 
or too loose. 1 It is to repel injury and to procure interest. Interest in Islamic 
law is the preservation of the objectives of the Shari'ah and injury is an 
action that would result in violating such objectives. 2 The state of necessity 
has been recognized by the texts of the Shari'ah as a justification for 
committing a prohibited act. It confirms the departure from a normal law in 
the cas of an exception where that does not go against the objectives of the 
Shari'ah. It acknowledges a departure from one text or evidence in a 
particular situation in order to act according to another text in the case of 
necessity 
" when He hach explained to you in detail what is forbidden to 
you except under compulsion of necessity" S: 6- V: 119 . 
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Such a departure is justified to preserve a vital interest which cannot be 
secured unless one leave the normal rulings. 3 Thus, necessity is not a free 
licence to commit prohibited actions. It must be in conformity with other 
proofs. For example, the punishment for theft according to the Shari'ah is 
the cutting off of the thief's hand. This has been stated clearly in the Qur'än 
which says 
" As to the thief, male or female, cut off his or her hands: a 
punishment by way of example, from God, for their crime 
s: 5 - v: 38. 
The Traditions of the Prophet confirmed this ruling in words and deeds. 
'Umar, however, did not apply this ruling in the year of famine because he 
thought that such a ruling is not applicable in such a situation since famine 
had forced people to do so, and a compelled person has the right to save his 
life even if he takes someone else's property without his permission. So 
'Umar has been reported as saying on one occasion when he did not apply 
this ruling " By God, if I had not known that you have used those boys and 
subjected them to hunger to the extent that if one of them had eaten what 
Allah has prohibited, it would be lawful for him, I would have cut off their 
hands. " 4 Such a decision is not an arbitrary decision. It is a decision which 
is consistent with the objectives of the Shari'ah and was based on other 
proofs such as the foregoing verse which says: 
" When He bath explained to you in detail what is forbidden to 
you except under compulsion of necessity " S: 6. V: 119. 
And such is the adith which states: 
" Remit the legal punishments (udüd) from Muslims as 
much as you can, because, verily, that the judge should commit 
mistakes in pardoning the punishment is indeed far better than 
that he should commit a mistake in enforcing the penalty ". 
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During years of famine there would be plenty of hungry and needy people 
and it is difficult in most cases to distinguish between them and real thieves. 
Because of such a possibility of doubt and such a necessity, 'Umar suspended 
the penalty for theft. 5 
Having said that, the right of acting according to necessity is not 
granted, in the view of the majority of jurists, to a disobedient person. 6 So 
if some one has set out on a journey to commit a prohibited act such as 
killing some one else or to rebel against the legitimate ruler etc., he is not 
entitled to any sort of concession during his travel. That means he is not 
allowed to take, for instance, the property of others to ward off his extreme 
hunger which would certainly lead to his death. And he is also not allowed to 
shorten his prayer or to enjoy any other dispensations. The basis for such an 
opinion is that concessions were granted for removing hardship, which is a 
sort of help, and a traveling person who intends to kill or to steal etc. does 
not deserve any help whatsoever since he is a transgressor and transgression 
does not give him the right to act according to necessity because it has been 
stipulated in the Qur'an " without wilful disobedience nor transgressing 
limits. " Thus to ward off his extreme hunger, he must repent first, then he 
will be granted dispensation. 7 
Other jurists held the opinion that acting according to necessity is a right 
granted to anyone who happens to face a condition of necessity, whether he 
was a traveller or not and whether he was a good or a bad person. 8 
Accordingly, the meaning of " without wilful disobedience and 
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transgressing due limit" is to have a vehement desire for doing what is 
forbidden or to overstep the limits of necessity. 9 
In addition to that, preventing such a person from eating something 
prohibited, would lead to the loss of his life, which is a sinful act greater than 
what he is intending to do. 10 
'Abd al-'Aziz al-Bukhäri ( d. 730 A. H ) from the Hanafi school 
criticized the first opinion and wrote: " This is a very empty fatwä because 
no highway robber or any one else who knows he is disobeying the law will 
take it seriously because at the time when such a person is able to stop 
transgression or highway robbery without being harmed and he does not do 
so, how can one imagine that such a person will obey the law in case of 
necessity when his life is in real danger. " ii 
A contemporary Muslim writer thought that the previous verse is not a 
proper proof in this case for either opinion since its main concern is to 
negate the sin from anyone who resorted to a prohibited act because of a 
necessity when such a person was not transgressing due limits. However, this 
verse does not prevent a person who transgresses due limits from removing 
his necessity. Thus, if the transgression mentioned in the verse was 
interpreted as rebelling against the legitimate ruler or against Muslims or as 
overstepping the limits of necessity, anyone who does so and falls into a state 
of necessity has the right to remove his necessity and save his life but he is 
committing a sin because of his transgression. 12 
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The prohibited things are prohibited because of the harm or evil 
( mafsadah _) which 
is expected from them. Such harm or injury, from the 
Islamic point of view, is always connected with such things. They cannot be 
separated from each other. 13 This will lead to the following points: 
1- Acting according to necessity is to secure a mere momentary 
interest and is never intended to be permanent, otherwise it would be the 
general rule but not the exception. So whenever such a momentary interest 
has been achieved and the ability to act according to the original ruling has 
been restored, such an exceptional interest will return to its previous ruling. 
It is no longer an interest but a mere harmful act. 
2- Such a connection would make a competent person very keen to get 
rid of such an exceptional rule and to return as soon as possible to the 
original ruling, since the nature of such an act is still evil but it was allowed 
and his sin was forgiven in order to preserve a more vital interest. 14 
That means taking preventive measures against a necessity before it 
comes into existence. 
2. NECESSITY MUST BE GENUINE : 
This condition contains three elements which are: 
1- Acting according to the original rulings would result in a situation 
where one's religion, life, offspring, reason, or property would be lost or 
partially damaged. In such a situation, one is faced with compelling 
171 
circumstances which entail taking exceptional rulings as indicated in the 
maxim which says 'injury must be repaired '. 15 
2- The loss of one of these five essential values must certainly or most 
likely be the result of a current attenuating circumstance, that is, in 
opposition to a mere suspicion or specious conjecture (tawahum) which is 
not a proper ground for taking the exceptional ruleing. 16 
To distinguish between a genuine necessity and an unreal one, there 
should be an obvious explanation of what is the meaning of certainty and 
strong probability on the one hand, and what is the meaning of specious 
conjecture on the other. 
In this regard, certainty means that a compelling state in which one is 
involved or enduring when there are no lawful means to help in escaping 
such necessity, such as an existing extreme hunger that is being endured and 
there is nothing lawful available to remove such hunger so that one is 
allowed, subsequently, to eat a prohibited thing. Or if someone is sick and he 
cannot observe the fast, when he is allowed not to observe it. 17 
Strong probability in this regard is the state in which the loss of one of 
the five essential values would most likely be the result of an intended action. 
For example, if someone knew, because of previous experience or according 
to the opinion of a reliable doctor, that if he observed fasting he would be 
subjected to a severe sickness, such a person would be entitled not to 
observe fasting and he is also not required to try fasting so that he would see 
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whether he would fall sick or not. Thus the meaning of strong probability is 
the existence of the signs of compelling conditions and not merely to the 
assumption of a coming difficulty. 18 
Specious conjecture is where there is no real sign that indicates a real 
danger. All that one has is a difficult situation which can be overcome by 
more effort and with firm faith. 19 This can be illustrated by the following 
verses which provide that , 
" When angels take the souls of those who die in sin against 
their souls, they say: ' In what (plight) were ye? ' They reply: 
' Weak and oppressed were we in the earth. ' They say: ' Was 
not the earth of God spacious enough for you to move 
yourselves away (from evil)? ' Such men will find their abode 
in Hell, - What an evil refuge! -Except those who are (really) 
weak and oppressed - men, women, and children - who have 
no means in their power, nor (a guide-post) to their way " S: 4- 
V: 97 - 98. 
The excuse of being weak and oppressed in the earth is rejected in this verse 
because it is possible for such oppressed people to migrate to another place 
where they can worship God safely without being persecuted. Although they 
find it hard to leave their lands or countries, this is deemed a normal 
hardship which does not constitute a valid excuse for staying where they face 
persecution. Al-Räzi commented "a person may think that he is not able to 
emigrate but the reality is the opposite, particularly in the emigration from 
one's beloved country. Since it is emotionally hard to leave the country,. one 
might think that one is not able to leave it but in reality one is able to do 
that. " 20 The real necessity is mentioned in the second verse where God has 
accepted the excuse of certain people, namely those who are really weak and 
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have, in addition, no means available to them whatsoever. Such people were 
forgiven for staying in a hostile environment. 
3- There must be no lawful means available which one can resort to. In 
other words, there must be an existing injury which could not be removed 
unless one breaks the existing law. Thus if a compelled person was able to 
remove injury by either of two methods one of which is lawful while the 
other is not, he does not face a state of necessity since he can act legally by 
choosing lawful means. 21 
We shall provide an example where necessity is not genuine: 
* INTEREST IN THE MODERN MONETARY SYSTEM : 
Interest as practiced in the modern banking system has been subjected 
to extensive research in the contemporary Muslim world in order to reach a 
conclusion as to its legality or illegality. The overwhelming majority of 
Muslim jurists have come to the conclusion that such interest is pure usury 
and it is prohibited in Islam. Nevertheless, some jurists, economists and 
politicians have thought that interest in a modem banking system is lawful 
either because it is not usury at all so it is not prohibited or because it is 
essentially prohibited as a type of usury but the general need of the society 
for such a system makes it lawful since the economic system of any country 
in the world nowadays would not meet even minimum success without 
interest being at the core of such an economy. This study shall confine itself 
to the latter opinion which has been based on necessity and need since the 
first opinion is outside the scope of this study. 
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'Abd al Razzäq al-Sanhbrl, the famous Egyptian legal writer, held the 
opinion that interest as known in the modern banking system is a type of 
usury, so it is clearly prohibited in Islam. However, it can be legalized on the 
ground of general need. He formed his opinion as follows: 
1- In principle all types of interest are prohibited whether compound 
interest such as pre-Islamic usury, a usury by way of deferment (rlbä al- 
asi'ah , usury 
by way of increase (ribä al-fad) or by lending with interest 
(ribä al-qazd). Usury is prohibited, as al-Sanhüri believes, for the following 
considerations: 
i- Preventing foodstuffs from being hoarded. 
ii- Protecting the value of the currency from being tampered with. 
iii- Ensuring injustice and exploitation is not being inflicted on people. 
2- The most indecent type of usury, as al-Sanhüri held, is compound 
interest (ribs al-jähilivah) which was commonly used by pre-Islamic Arabs, 
when the creditor will ask the debtor to repay his due debt or otherwise he 
will increase it. This type of usury is prohibited for its harmful nature 
which would financially destroy the debtor and sharply increase the wealth 
of the interest taker. Such interest cannot be justified by any means; even the 
state of necessity that would allow one to eat a dead animal cannot justify 
dealing in such usury. Not only that but necessity cannot be imagined at all 
on the part of the creditor. It can be imagined from the part of the debtor if 
it is supposed that one was in dire need of money to save one's life and one 
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could not acquire such money by any lawful means except by a loan on the 
condition of excessive interest. 
3- All other types of interest such as lending with light interest , usury 
by way of deferment and usury by way of excess are prohibited as a 
preventive measure so that dealing in them should not lead to dealing in 
compound interest. There is no question about their prohibition but they are 
to be allowed in the case of need whether it is a private or public need. 
`Abd al-Razzäq al-Sanhüri thought that in the prevailing capitalism, 
which is distinguished by capital being owned by individuals, establishments 
and banks but not owned by the state, general need requires saving money in 
order to generate a large amount of capital which will eventually be lent and 
invested. 22 
This opinion is takes full note of the usurious nature of interest as 
practiced in modern banks and never questioned such a nature. Thus it has 
been explicitly stated by Sanhüri that the need for such interest would cease 
to exist if capitalism was abandoned; then interest would become prohibited 
again. 23 
Such alleged need or necessity has not been accepted by the 
overwhelming majority of Muslim jurists. They think it is not a genuine 
necessity for the following reasons: 
i- The role of interest in economics has been severely criticized by a 
number of Muslim 24 and non-Muslim economists 25 alike. They think that 
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the great harmful effects of interest on the general economy cannot be 
compared with its trivial beneficial effects. Some of this harmful effect was 
put by a Muslim economist as follows " In the olden days, production could 
not be expanded owing to lack of capital. But now in a number of rich 
countries there is superabundance of savings and large sums of money are 
simply lying idle. We find simultaneously with this superabundance of 
capital a very large class of unemployed persons. People are unemployed 
because the capitalists do not find it worth their while to invest their funds in 
the fields where the rate of return is less than the current rate of interest. For 
instance, if the current rate is 4% and money is invested in irrigation works 
which directly yield only 3%, then according to the capitalistic view, 
irrigation is unproductive. The money will not be invested in irrigation 
works, however useful these may be for society. The result is that the capital 
remains idle on the one hand while the resources remain undeveloped on the 
other. All public works, however conducive they may be for the benefit of 
society, remain undone in an interest economy if the yield from such works 
is less than the current rate of interest. Had there been no predetermined 
notion of fixed rates of interest many more useful things would have been 
done. " 26 
ü- Muslim jurists and economists are not against the institution of 
banking. They argue that the present banks can be allowed Islamically to 
continue with two modifications: 
1- They should not pay any interest to their depositors. 
2-The banks should not charge any interest to their clients. 
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This can be achieved only if the banks instead of becoming the creditors of 
industry, trade, business and commerce, become their partners. Islam 
prohibits interest but allows profits and partnership. 27 If the banks instead 
of allowing loans to businessmen and businesswomen, become their partners 
and share the loss and profit with them, there is no objection against such 
banks in the Islamic system. 
iii- Acquiring capital can be satisfied by means other than interest. One 
of the most important alternatives, in addition to other varieties of 
partnership, is the sleeping partnership ( muddrabah), which is a contract 
based on the principle of profit sharing where one person gives his capital to 
another to do business and both parties share any profit or loss. It is thus a 
partnership between the supplier of capital, on the one hand, and its user 
who would provide the labour, entrepreneurial skill and managerial ability 
on the other. Contemporary Muslim authors and thinkers have argued that 
interest -free banks are an ideal alternative to the existing banking system. 
Their main objective is to mobilize funds from the public on the basis of a 
udärab partnership, as well as other kinds of partnership, and to provide 
funds to entrepreneurs. 28 
It is obvious from the previous discussion that governments or people 
who make the economic policies in Islamic countries have not given 
sufficient attention to the use of means other than the current interest system. 
As long as lawful means exist, there would be no case of necessity or need. 
Abü Zahrah said, in this regard, " Have the doors to lawful production been 
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closed? Or have we tried every lawful means possible so that we can resort 
to interest ? Obviously not. " 29 
Moreover, the state of necessity, which might be recognized in this 
regard, is that where the monetary system, which is Islamically acceptable, 
led to a situation where necessity or general need require dealing with 
interest. An obvious example of that is mentioned by Ibn al-Qayyim regard 
to selling golden ornaments for a heavier weight of unbeaten gold since the 
general need of the society at that time required such a transaction otherwise 
people would resort to legal tricks which are not acceptable since the rules 
of necessity and need encompass such a situation. 30 But in the case under 
discussion, the need for interest, if there is any, was caused by establishing a 
new banking system which is not recognized from the beginning by Islam 
since the interest of the people can be met without such a system. 31 
3. REMOVING NECESSITY SHOULD NOT RESULT IN A 
SIMILAR OR GREATER INJURY: 
Since removing acondition of necessity is intended to eliminate an 
injury, such an elimination must not inflict a similar or a greater injury on 
oneself or on any one else. Thus, the condition of committing a prohibited 
act in order to ward off a state of necessity is that such a commission must 
reduce the existing danger or harm so that people benefit from such an 
exceptional rule. 32 
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Such a condition implies the assumption that the benefits and 
injuries according to the rules of the Shari'ah have been classified in a 
hierarchical way. Such an assumption is absolutely accurate. Benefits 
according to the Shari'ah have different degrees. 33 Thus if we wanted to 
know the range of importance of the benefits involved, we have to take into 
consideration three aspects: 
1- The levels of interests in terms of their actual values. 
2- The consideration of their scope. 
3-The consideration of the possibility of their realisation. 34 
With regard to the actual values of interests, the Shad ah put preserving 
religion in the first place, preserving life in the second, then the 
preservation of intellect third, then in the fourth place the preservation of 
offspring and lastly the preservation of property. So in the case of conflict, 
rulings that support religion will take preference over rulings that preserve 
life, and rulings that aim to preserve life have priority over rulings that aim 
to preserve intellect in the case of conflict. Preserving the intellect also will 
come first if it conflicts with preserving offspring, which comes before 
preserving property if one has to choose between the two. 35 
In another regard, the preservation of every one of the previous five 
general benefits requires the distinction between various degrees within 
every one of the five benefits since there are three degrees in every general 
benefit. These are necessary benefits ( darnriyyAt ), complementary benefits 
(ß, iä" "t and luxurious benefits ( si '-. According to the rules of the 
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Shari'ah, necessary benefits precede complementary benefits in a case of 
conflict and complementary benefits have priority over luxurious benefits. 
Thus, for instance, if preserving life, which is necessary conflicts with a 
complementary benefit such as eating from lawful food, one had to 
disregard eating from lawful food to preserve one's life. So if a prohibited 
food was the only food available to one, one would not be obliged to refrain 
from eating the prohibited food if one's life was in real danger. One has to 
keep one's life free from danger by disregarding the rule which prohibits 
such food, since eating lawful food is a complementary benefit but 
preserving one's life is a necessary benefit which is a higher degree from 
the point of view of the Sharl'ah. 36 
If there is a conflict between two rulings concerning a general benefit 
such as religion or life or reason etc., then the aspect of the scope of the 
benefit should be taken into account. For instance, if the public interest 
requires widening a road or a mosque or a graveyard, such an interest takes 
precedence over private ownership; that means, for example, that private 
land, for example will be confiscated for a public interest provided that the 
owner receives fair compensation. Another example is that Muslim 
prisoners of war may be killed to protect the Muslim community if such 
prisoners have been used as a shield to protect the enemy in their advance, 
and there is no alternative. 37 
In addition there must be certainty or a strong probability with regard 
to the realization of the benefits. So a benefit that might not materialize or 
about whose realization there was reasonable doubt must not take priority 
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over another benefit which certainly, or very probably, is going to 
materialize. 
Similarly, removing one's necessity should not be through inflicting a 
similar necessity on others. It is not allowed for a compelled person to kill 
another one so that his life would be saved. And it is not allowed for a 
starving person to take the food of another starving person. 38 
4. WHAT BECOMES PERMISSIBLE BY NECESSITY MUST BE 
LIMITED TO THE EXTENT OF SUCH NECESSITY: 
Since the purpose of the exceptional rules of necessity is to remove 
hardship and mitigate difficulties, such exceptional rules are to operate as 
long as hardship is existent and cease to operate once the hardship is over. 39 
To illustrate this condition, we shall give the following example: 
In the case of extreme starvation which will, if not satisfied, certainly 
cause death, and where no lawful food is available, one is allowed to eat 
from prohibited food such as a dead animal; but one should only eat, in the 
view of the majority of jurists, from such food the amount which enables 
one to stay alive until one finds lawful food and one is not allowed to eat 
excessively. 40 This is because prohibited food was allowed in such a case to 
ward off necessity and there is no necessity after eating such an amount since 
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the fear of death no longer exists. The Mäliki school, however, held the 
opinion that one is allowed to- eat until one feels full. 41 They argue that 
necessity makes prohibited things permissible, which indicates that it is like 
lawful food which one can eat in small or large amount. However, what is 
meant by the extent of necessity, in this regard, which must be taken into 
account, is that it starts from the moment when there was no lawful food 
available until the moment in which one finds lawful food. 42 Ibn Qudämah 
chose to distinguish between two cases. In his opinion, if the state of 
necessity is a continuing state which is going to affect one for a long time, 
one is allowed to eat freely because in such a situation if one was restricted to 
eating a small amount of prohibited food necessity would affect again such a 
person a short time later since it is a continuing necessity. However, if it is 
thought the state of necessity will be over in a short time, one is only allowed 
to eat what will help one to stay alive till one find slawful food. 43 
Similar to continuing necessity, which has been discussed is the 
hypothetical case, by several jurists, is the prevalence of illegal marketing 
and dealings and the dominance of prohibited businesses in certain areas 
where no one can live without being involved in such prohibited acts and no 
lawful dealings are accessible. In such a situation, people are allowed, if they 
cannot leave such an area for a better place or cannot change the situation, to 
deal with such an illegal dealing to ward off their necessity. Not only that but 
they are permitted to extend further the conduct of their businesses so that 
they can satisfy their needs (ä'ät because their life would not be secure and 
they would continue to suffer hardship if they limited themselves only to the 
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extent of necessity. However, they are not allowed to exceed the limits of 
need (äät to luxurious and extravagant dealings. 44 
Furthermore, a Muslim is asked to exert all his effort to get rid of the 
state of necessity sooner rather than later. This has been illustrated by Ibn 
Taymiyyah as follows: ` even though an incompetent ruler may be 
recognized as a legitimate ruler, as 
, -a 
matter of necessity, if he is the best 
candidate available, society must work hard to restore conditions to their 
best so that everything needed is made right, particularly matters related to 
power and authority. In the same vein, an insolvent person must work hard 
to repay his debt even though he is not accountable beyond his ability. ' 45 
184 
Questions lead a competent person to perceive the state of necessity so 
that he can avoid misjudging his situation: 
a 
Is the legal evidence which prohibits a certain 
matter existent, explicit and must it be obeyed? 
If yes... then 
1 
Does it cause injury releating to the five principles if 
one has acted according to such evidence? 
If yes... then 
l 
Is such harm certainly or very probabley going to 
materialize ? 
If yes... then 
l 
Is there any lawful means available which can prevent 
such harm from being inflicted without breaching the 
law? If no... then 
1 
Does ignoring the existing rulings lead to a similar or 
bigger harm ? 
If no... then 
+ Acmpetent person has the right to commit the 
prohibited act, provided that he limits himself to the 
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NECESSITY IN CONNECTION WITH OTHER 
ISLAMIC JURIDICAL CONCEPTS . 
1. THE LINK BETWEEN AL-MASLAHAH AL-MURSALAH 
AND NECESSITY. 
A. INTRODUCTION. 
Before discussing al-maslahah al-mursalah, we shall give a brief 
explanation about the objectives of the Shari, ah as seen by Islamic jurists . 
In 
chapter one under the heading of the five fundamentals, we have elaborated 
this topic. Suffice it here to bring back the crux of that topic as a preliminary 
to expounding al-muslahah al-mursalah. 
The majority of Islamic jurists have held the opInion that the Shari'ah 
aims, in its various rulings, to secure the welfare of the people by enacting 
rulings which promote their interests or protect them against harm. I As in 
any law in this world , the goal of the Shari'ah is to preserve the belief, life, 
reason, offspring and material wealth of the people. So we find scholars like 
al-Ghazäli, Ibn al-Qayyim and al-Shätibi giving statements confirming this 
matter. Al-Ghazäli said in this regard: " Mastabah in its literal meaning is 
procuring benefit and repelling harm. However, that is not meant here since 
procuring benefit and repelling harm is the goal of human beings; and the 
interest of human beings is in achieving their goals. Maslahah means here 
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preserving the objectives of the Shari'ah with regard to man which are five: 
It preserves their religion, life, reason, offspring and their property . 
Everything which partakes in keeping these five principles is a benefit and 
everything which disturbs their existence is an injury and to drive away 
such a disturbing thing is also a benefit. " 2 
Ibn al-Qayyim made the same observation and held that preserving 
benefits should be by the adoption of a Shari'ah oriented policy since he 
observed that " siväsý ah shar'iyy comprises all steps that lead people to be 
dose to well-being (sal h) and move them away from corruption ( asäd ) 
even if no authority is found for them in the Qur'än and the Sunn of the 
Prophet. "3 He quoted the saying of Ibn 'Agil ( d. 513 A. H ) that " Policy is 
whatever action brings people close to welfare and distances them from 
corruption even if it has not been mentioned clearly in the revelation. It is 
not right to say that no policy should be adopted except those policies which 
have been mentioned clearly by the revelation since it is a mistake and leads 
to describing as mistaken the Companions who legislated many rulings 
relying on the public interests, such as burning the various manuscripts of 
the Qur'än ( tahrig al-masähif ). However, it is essential to say that policy 
must not contradict what has been revealed in the Qur'än and the Sunnah of 
the Prophet. " 4 
Al-Shätibi has confirmed this meaning throughout the second volume of 
al-Muwäfagät in which he begins by stating that: " Before starting our 
discussion, we shall state the axiom that the Shari'ah has been established to 
preserve the interests of the people in both this life and the hereafter. " 5 
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Beyond this, Islamic jurists have divided masalih, in terms of its 
validation by the Shari'ah texts, into three types: 6 
1- The first type is recognized interest ( migälih mu'tabarah ). They are 
the interests which have been accredited by the texts of the Shari'ah, such as 
the interests of preserving the essential and necessary fundamentals of life, 
religion, offspring, reason and material wealth. Also such other interests 
which are not necessary but complementary (bajiyy5t ) or luxurious 
( Y. XLt )- 
2- The second type is abolished interest ( maslatah mulghäh ). They are 
the interests which have been nullified directly or indirectly by the Shaffah. 
This can be illustrated by the following instance: To attempt to legalize 
giving the son and the daughter an equal share in inheritance on the pretext 
that such a legislation is securing a public interest is discredited since it is in 
direct conflict with a clear evidence in the Qur'än, 
" God directs you as regards your children's inheritance: to 
the male, a portion equal to that of two females. " s: 4, v 11. 
which gives the son double the share of that of the daughter. 7 
3- The third type is unrestricted interest (ma§lahah mursalah ). It is 
understood from the word mursalah that such interests are not covered by 
any text of the Shad'ah since mursal means to set loose from such texts. 
aslahah mursalah has been defined by scholars who recognise it as 
every interest which falls within the objectives of the Shari'ah and which has 
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not been regulated by the texts of the Shari`ah. In other words there is no 
specific evidence in the texts which can confirm or deny its validity. 8 
Maslahah mursalah is not the only title for such a principle. Some 
scholars call it 'stir "släh. others call it istidläl mursal and others call it 
munäsib mursal. 9 Every term focuses on a certain aspect of the same thing. 
Those who use the term maslahah mursalah have focused on the interest 
itself which is not regulated by the texts. And those who call it isti; lah or 
istidläl mursal have focused on the process of the legislation of such an 
undefined interest, namely taking into consideration such an interest. And 
those who call it munäsib mursal have been concentrating on the proper and 
harmonious meaning which qualifies such an interest as falling within the 
scope of the Shari a. 10 
B. THE VALIDITY OF AL-MASALIH AL-MURSALAH : 
The Maliki and the Hanbali schools recognise al-ma; la al- 
ursal as a source of law. They believe that life brings new events every 
day. Such events are uncountable, evolving and absolutely unlimited. In 
addition to that, social life, culture and the interests themselves vary from 
place to place and time to time. It is unrealistic to expect that every single 
event in any time has been regulated specifically by the Shari'ah texts. Such 
an attitude would lead to making the Shariah 4 unable to organise and protect 
people interests and it would be, in the end, a burden which stands against 
people's interests. This is against the flexibility of the Shari'ah which is well- 
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known and against the purpose of the Shad'-ah which has been described in 
many texts such as the verse in sprat al-Anbivä' where the purpose of the 
prophethood of Muhammed is described in the following terms, 
" We sent thee not, but as a Mercy for all creatures. " S: 21, 
v: 107. 
In this context the saying of the Prophet which provides that N No harm shall 
be inflicted or reciprocated in Islam " is of great relevance here. II 
Furthermore, looking at the rulings which have been legislated by the 
Companions of the Prophet and the righteous predecessors of the Muslims, 
we find that a great number of them was legalised according to mas5lib 
alone. So al-Qari said: The Companions of the Prophet have done things 
according to interest alone and not according to an existing text. The Caliph 
Abü Bakr, for example, collected and compiled the scattered records of the 
Qur'än in a single volume. Similarly, 'Umar ibn al-Khattäb regarded his 
officials as accountable for the wealth they had collected during their office 
in abuse thereof and expropriated such wealth. 12 
Other jurists do not consider maslahah mursalah as proper grounds 
for legislation. The reason for such an opinion is that they fear that the 
Sharl'ah rulings would be changed according to the whim and arbitrary 
desire of rulers and scholars who have weak faith. Moreover, they held that 
the Shari'ah is capable of handling new events which require legislation 
without recourse to masälih mursalah. The generality of the Shari'ah 
evidences, maxims and analogy based on them will cover all the aspects of 
life. 13 
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The reality, in this regard, is that all leading jurists such as Abü 
Hanifah and al-Shäfi`i have resorted to masälih mursalah in one way or 
another as long as it falls within the objectives and the intent of the Shat-'ah. 
They do not regard it as an independent proof in its own right. Abü Hanifah 
approves maslahah mursalah as a variety of Isti san. Al-Shäfi'i also 
validated it only within the general scope of giyas. Al-Qaräfi, from the 
Maliki school, was aware of this fact when he explained " In respect of 
maslahah mursalah other schools deny its validity. However, we find them 
justifying a solution for new matters through m ha ah only and they do not 
specify the textual proof for such a consideration when they weigh the 
similarities and differences between two matters, but rather they are content 
with mere suitability which is none other than mlabah mursalah. 
C. THE CONDITIONS OF THE CONSIDERATION OF AL- 
MASALIH AL-MURSALAH : 
"14 
The following conditions must be fulfilled so that muslahah mursalah 
does not become a means for arbitrary legislation and in order to ensure that 
every ruling, based on a consideration of interest, is compatible with the 
objectives of the Sharl`ah : 
1- The interest must be in harmony with the spirit of the Shad ah and 
must not be in conflict with any one of its sources whether it is the Qur' än 
or the Tradition Of the Prophet or consensus or analogy (giyass ). 
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2- The interest should be rational a' nlah) and acceptable to people 
of sound intellect. It is meant here that the interest should be pertaining to 
matters such as transactions so that the interest related to them would be 
based on reason. The case under review should not be one relating to 
devotional matters 'ibäddt ). 
3- The interest under review must be genuine ( iagigiyyab ), as 
opposed to specious (wahmixyah). In other words, such interest must not be 
in conflict with another superior interest, and its benefit must outweigh the 
harms that might accrue from it. 
4- The interest must be general (ul ia . 
That means it should 
secure benefit or prevent harm to the people as a whole, and not to a 
particular class or to a few individuals. 
5- The interest should be necessary ( maslahah darvriyyah ) or it should 
remove hardship ( baraj from the people. 15 
These conditions are measures which, in theory, prevent using such a 
principle for legalising things which are not included within the objectives 
of the Shari`ah, and keep the rulings of the Shari'ah free from being tamper. 
Examples will be provided here to illustrate this source of Islamic law. 
First: During the lifetime of the Prophet, the text of the Qur'an was not 
compiled in a single volume. It was written on the then available materials 
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such as flat stones, wood, palm-branches and bones, and it was preserved in 
the memories of the Companions as well. Soon after the battle of al- 
Yamamah, the Caliph Abn Bakr on the advice of 'Umar, had asked Zayd to 
collect the Qur'än in a single volume, which he did. The reason which was 
given and repeated by Abn Bakr and 'Umar when they were asked how they 
could do what the Prophet had never done was that it was a good act. Being a 
good act is the basis on which such an act was carried out and it is 
strengthened by later consensus. Such an act is nothing but a consideration of 
maslahah mursalah which is preserving the Qur'An from being lost, 
especially after a significant number of the memorizers had been killed in 
battles. 16 
Second: In the law of gisäs, the Companions approved the execution 
of a group of culprits who took part in killing someone because the interest 
of the society required such a decision, which was to say if the victim had 
been killed intentionally a by group and they were not held responsible for 
such a killing, it would be a means for any one who intended to kill another 
one to escape the iq säs without being harmed, and the right of the victim and 
his family to retaliation would vanish. In this case the public interest has 
clearly been taken into consideration. Furthermore, although such an 
interest has not been stated clearly in the Qur'än and the Sunnah of the 
Prophet, it is not in conflict with the law of isäs and it is included within the 
objective of the legislation of isäs. '7 
Third: The Caliphs have held the craftsmen and traders accountable 
for compensation for the repair of loss or damage to goods that have been 
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entrusted to them by ordinary people. This ruling was based on the interest 
of the public since it encourages craftsmen to look after the goods in their 
custody and take greater care in safeguarding them, otherwise they would 
lack the motive to take care of the property of the people. 'Ali ibn Abi Tälib 
considered this to be for the interest of the people, for he said " This is the 
only way to preserve the interest of the people. "18 
D. THE LINK BETWEEN NECESSITY AND MAS A AH 
MURSALAH : 
The relation between necessity and ma lahah mursalah is a very 
strong relation so that scholars have given identical examples for each. 
However, there is a certain degree of difference between the two principles. 
Removing the state of necessity is undoubtedly a benefit (maslahah ) in its 
broad sense but is not necessarily a aslah us. Maslahah mursalah, 
on the other hand, is not in every case a state of necessity. It might fall also 
into the category of need. 
To clarify this link between the two norms, certain points have to be 
mentioned: 
Firstly : It is well known that interest ( ma§ljbah ) in its broad sense, 
namely whether it is a recognized interest or an unrestricted interest, is 
divided in terms of strength into three types: Essential and necessary 
interests (daruý t ), the complementary interests ( bjjiWt ) and 
luxurious and embellishing interests ( si ' at ). Any interest which falls 
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within the first type of this division and happens to be an unrestricted 
interest (maslahah mursalah) is a sort of necessity as well as as aa 
mursalah. 19 
Secondly, necessity is also of three types. 2D 
i- The first is the necessity which has been stated in the texts of the 
hSad'ah such as eating the flesh of a dead animal. This type has no 
connection with maslahah mursalah, but it is linked to the general interest 
(maslahah 'ämmah). 
ii- The second type is that in which the case of necessity was legislated 
by recourse to analogy ( giyäs ) with another case which was covered by the 
texts of the Shari'ah, such as cutting down harmful thistles in the sacred area 
of Mecca which is analogous to the permissible killing of mice and snakes in 
the same area, since all are cause harm. This type has no connection with at - 
maslahah al-mursalah. 
iii- The third type is that in which the state of necessity has not been 
specified by the texts of the Shaari_alil nor has it been included by giyäs. 
This type of necessity is part of al-maslahah al-mursalah. 
Thirdly, with regard to this last type of necessity, all Islamic jurists are 
in agreement on accepting it as a valid evidence for legislation. So it is not 
included in the controversy over al-maslatiah al-mursalah despite the fact 
that it is part of it. 21 Al-Ghazäli, in al-Mustasfä, stipulated three conditions 
which must be fulfilled so that as a mursalah will be validated. The 
first of which is that maslahah mursalah must be of the necessary and 
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essential type of interest. The second is that it must be general and not 
limited to a particular group or individuals. The third is that it must be 
materialized or definite (at'i ah . 
22 
Many Muslim scholars have imitated al-Ghazäli in this opinion. 
Accordingly, they rejected al-maslahah al-mursalah as an evidence of 
legitimate rulings except in cases where such conditions are fulfilled. 23 
Other scholars have held that in stipulating these conditions al-Ghazäli 
did not intend to set conditions for the recognition of all sorts of gL- 
maslahah al-mursalah, but was rather trying to clarify the part of AL- 
maslahah al-mursalah which all Islamic jurists have accepted. This can be 
understood from other parts al-Ghazäli's discussion where he stated that 
interest is preserving the objectives and intent of the Shari'ah and stated also 
that every interest which aims to uphold the objectives of the ari' which 
are mentioned specifically by the Qur'an, Sunna and consensus is called 
maslahah mursalah. The implication of these statements, nevertheless, is that 
the objectives of the Shari'ah might fall into the necessary type of interest or 
into the complementary type or the luxurious. Therefore, aslta ab ah 
mursalah is not confined to the necessary type of interest but can fall into the 
other two types as well. Such thought could be confirmed by the fact that in 
two other books al-Ghazäli clearly recognised al-maslahah al-mursalah 
which falls within types other than the necessary type. 24 
Other scholars have thought that al-Ghazäli's opinion on maslgbab 
urn salah. evolved through his three treatises namely, al-Mus _, ShifR' al- 
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Ghalil and al-Mankhn1.25 In his ustasfä he did not recognise 
complementary and luxurious interests. However, he stipulated the previous 
conditions for recognising the necessary type of interest. 
In his later book Shift' al-Ghalil, he took a further step and accepted 
complementary interests, but not luxurious ones, as a basis for legislation. 
He said " We have previously categorized the suitable meaning (al-muntsib) 
into three categories. They are necessity, need or complements and luxuries 
or embellishments. Any interest of the last category can in no way be a basis 
for legislation except if it is supported by a specific evidence ... With regard 
to interests either necessary or complementary, our view of them is that 
they are valid as a basis for legislation if they are consistent with the 
objectives of the Shari, ah. However, they are invalid if they are inconsistent 
with its objectives. " 26 
In his last compilation, al-Mankhül, al-Ghazäli took yet a further step 
and validated every interest which has a suitable meaning ( ma'nä munäsib) 
that exists in the Shari'ah rulings and does not contradict a valid evidence. 
He stated that " Every meaning, which is suitable as the basis for a 
legitimate ruling and which has constantly existed in the Shari ah rulings and 
is not overruled by a recognised evidence such as the Qur'än, Sunnah or 
consensus, is accepted even if no specific evidence supports it. " 27 
As far as necessity is concerned, it is, according to al-Ghazäli's view in his 
nstasfä, and according to al-Amidi ( d. 631 A. H ) and al-Baydäwi ( d. 685 
A. H) , one of three conditions for recognising al-maslahah al-mursalah. If 
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the case under consideration is not a pressing necessity, then it cannot be 
legislated by means of al-maslahah al-mursalah. 
Another view is that, although necessity may be an important part of 
al-maslahah al-mursalah, it is not a condition for recognizing al-maslahah 
mursalah, since the latter may or may not be a necessity. 
Fourthly : This sort of necessity, which is part of al-ma; l ah al- 
u Sala , 
is a legislative sort. That means that, new rulings may be 
legislated according to it. In order for this sort to be recognised, it must not 
conflict with a superior proof, rather it should be set loose from Shari'ah 
evidence so that it comes within the sphere of mastabah us. Its 
purpose is not to justify a departure from existing legal rulings, which is 
another sort of necessity relating to legitimate allowance ( sah). 28 
EXAMPLES OF THIS TYPE OF NECESSITY: 
1- Al-Ghazäli illustrated this type of necessity when he gave the 
famous example of Muslim prisoners who are used as human shields by an 
enemy in their advance in battle. In such a situation Muslim fighters can not 
give up fighting when their enemy is advancing to a victory over them. They 
have to combat the advancing enemy even if the result was killing the shield 
of Muslim prisoners alongside their enemy in order not to let them defeat 
Muslim army. Such a defeat would put the safety of the whole Muslim 
community in jeopardy including these prisoners if they had survived. 29 
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Al-Ghazäli believed that this interest is a recognised interesteven 
though no specific text from the Qur'an and the Traditions of the Prophet 
testify to its validity, since it is a general, definite and necessary interest, 
and it is included in the objectives of the Shari'ah which are to preserve the 
Muslims' unity and religion and to avoid more killing, which is superior to 
the preservation of an individual's life, particularly when there is no 
certainty of staying alive afterward. Taking the life of innocents, in this case, 
does not resemble the situation where prisoners are taken hostages in a 
castle which is used to bombard the Muslim army. In such a case Muslim 
fighters must not bombard the castle and kill the hostages since no necessity 
exists in this case where Muslims can fight from another location. 30 
He also thought that this case of necessity is not similar to the case 
where a group of individuals are on ship, and when a rough and high sea 
necessitates lightening the load of the ship by throwing some of the 
individuals into the sea in order for others to escape. And it is also not 
similar to the case that where a group of starving persons are on the verge of 
death, but if they eat one of them they will survive. In such cases the interest 
is not general and is confined to a number of individuals. This interest is not 
counted since it is a killing of innocents, which is prohibited. 31 
2- A Muslim ruler may exact certain money as a tax from wealthy 
people in case of emergency. In the event that the public treasury runs out of 
funds, a ruler may levy additional taxes on the wealthy in order to meet the 
costs of the army and to protect the society from becoming unsettled. 32 
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Islamic jurists have stipulated certain conditions in order to keep such a 
ruling from being abused by rulers. 
*The first condition is that the ruler must be renowned for serving 
justice. 
*The second is that the amount of tax must be reasonable and just, and 
people can pay it without great difficulty and without becoming hostile to the 
government. 
*The third is that it is the only way available to meet the urgent need, 
that is to say, funds can not be obtained from any other resource such as 
borrowing. 
*The fourth condition is that such taxation must be confined to the limit 
of necessity, namely, the tax must be estimated by the extent of necessity and 
must be stopped with the disappearance of such necessity. 33 
3- In the event of an unqualified ruler gaining power over a Muslim 
community by force, the leadership of such a ruler should be recognised by 
Muslims even if he is not the most meritorious candidate, otherwise 
disorder and chaos will afflict the life of the community. 
Al-Ghazäli gave this example when talking about maslabah u sal 
and he explained the reason for validating such authority by stating that " if 
we do not say so, it will cause a great corruption . 
"34 
Ibn `Abd al-Saläm has recognised such leadership and validated its 
conduct and authority while in office because of necessity. 
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4- In the event that all means for lawful trading and earning a living are 
inaccessible, trading in such an environment becomes permissible not just 
for earning the necessary means of livelihood but also in order to include the 
general needs, because life cannot go smoothly without including needs 
which would ease the life of people in general. To allow, in such situation, 
only the necessary requirements for living, would cause hardship and would 
paralyze the markets. 35 
5- Islamic jurists have agreed on prohibiting price fixing in normal 
circumastances as it is incompatible with the free nature of consent in 
commercial dealings as approved by the Qur'än in the following verse, 
"0 ye who believe eat not up your property among 
yourselves in vanities, but let there be among you traffic and 
trade by mutual good will "S: 4, v: 29. 
Forbidding price fixing has also been sanctioned by the Tradition of the 
Prophet where it has been reported: 
At the time of the Messenger of God, the market price rose in 
Madinah. The people said, " 0 Messenger of God, fix the 
price. " He replied" God is the taker and the disposer, the 
provider and the controller of prices. I hope that when I meet 
him none of you will have a claim against me for an injury 
concerning life and property. ". 36 
This hadith_was seen by many jurists as clear evidence which prohibits price 
fixing, since the Prophet's response was clearly negative and he viewed price 
controls as an unjust policy that violates the seller's consent by forcing him 
to sell at a given price. 37 
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Some jurists have commented on this hadith and drawn a different 
conclusion. They thought that this adi does not prohibit price fixing, 
rather it addresses the circumstances which prevailed in Madinah at that 
time. The conditions in Madinah at that time made a compulsory ruling 
unjust even when the price was high because the increase in prices was due 
to natural causes. Thus the Prophet refused to fix the price for them because 
it would be unjust to the vendors who had done nothing to inflate the price. 38 
On that basis, in a situation where the price of essential commodities has 
exorbitantly increased because of an injustice by the vendors, the authority 
has the right to intervene and fix the price. This is on the grounds of 
necessity or urgent need. Nonetheless, such intervention by the public 
authorities must be made after a careful examination of each case. 
According to many jurists, price fixing should be of an equivalent price 
(thaman al-mithl ). 39 
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I- The Zähiri school regard transactions as well as devotional matters as without rational 
connotation so that no muitahid can base his Ldhk on ma3labah since it can not be, ia their 
view, recognised by human beings. However, they beleive that the Shad'ah as a whole is 
for the merest of the people. 
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2. NECESSITY AND BLOCKING MEANS ( SADD AL- 
DHARA' I') : 
A. INTRODUCTION. 
The literal meaning of dhari'ah is whatever is used to acquire another 
thing or to lead to a certain end. It is synonymous with wasilah. 1 
Al-Shätibi has defined dhara'i' as whatever is used to obtain a 
prohibited matter which contains injuries. 2 This definition confines -''' 
to those which are subject to being blocked, but this is not true since dharR'i' 
are to be blocked if they are lawful but they lead to a prohibited act, or to be 
opened if they are prohibited but they lead to gaining a accepted interest. Ibn 
al-Qayyim has defined it as whatever means are used to obtain a matter , so 
if 
the means led to interest ( maslabah ) it would be then accepted, but if it led 
to injury ( mafsadah ) it would not be accepted. 3 Al-Qaräfi confirmed this 
when he wrote: " dharl'ah can be opened as well as blocked and can also be 
recommended or permitted or disapproved or forbidden since the meaning 
of dhariah, is means (wa - ah ), so the means to a prohibited matter is 
prohibited just like the means to a lawful matter is lawful. " 4 
The Mäliki and the Hanbali schools accepted d ard'i' as an independent 
source of law whereas the Hanafi and the Shafi'i schools did not. Al-Qarwi 
has written that " Dhara'i' are of three types. The first must be blocked by a 
unanimous agreement between all jurists, such as in the case of the ban on 
210 
insulting idol-worshippers lest God be insulted in return, as a retaliation. The 
second is that which must not be blocked by a unanimous agreement between 
all jurists, such as in the case of the growing of grapes lest it be fermented 
into wine. The third is that which jurists have disagreed on, such as deferred 
sales (buu, 4' al-äjäl ). It is said that dharä, i, are accepted only by the Maliki 
school, but this and it is not true since some of them is accepted by all ."5 
Jurists who accepted dhari'ah as a source of law have quoted much 
evidence to affirm its validity. Ibn al-Qayyim has mentioned ninety-nine 
cases in which the principle of opening and blocking the means was one of the 
sources of legal rulings. The Qur'an and the traditions of the Prophet have 
established a lot of rulings in order to block the means to evil such as : 
I- In the following verse 
" Revile not ye those whom they call upon besides God, lest 
they out of spite revile God in their ignorance. " s: 6, v: 108. 
Muslims are told not to insult idols in order to block the way to insulting God 
in return by the idol-worshippers, notwithstanding the fact that rejecting and 
insulting idols might be otherwise praiseworthy, as it would mean a 
denunciation of falsehood and a firmness of belief on the part of believers. 
Such permissible conduct has come to be prohibited since it would be a means 
which might lead to an evil result. 6 
2- In the following verse : 
a0 ye of Faith! Say not (to the Apostle) words of ambiguous 
import riVina, , but words of respect " s: 
2, v: 104. 
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Allah has told Muslims to address the Prophet respectfully and not to address 
him by the word äc , ina _ 
because the word äc `ina has two meaning, one of 
which is " please look at us or attend to us " and the other meaning is 
" clumsy " or " our shepherd ". The Jews used to use this word when 
addressing the Prophet with the intention of insulting him. So Allah forbids 
Muslims from using this word, despite their good intention, in order to 
prevent the abusive use of it. 7 
3- 'A'ishah said : 
"I heard the Apostle of Allah say: Every intoxicant is 
forbidden; if a large quantity of anything causes 
intoxication, a handful of it is forbidden ". 8 
According to this adith a little of any sort of alcohol is forbidden even 
thought it does not cause intoxication in order to block the way to drinking 
more and more and getting drunk in the end. 9 
4- The Prophet prohibited killing hypocrites who were known to have 
betrayed the Muslim community during battles. That was to block the way to 
rumours such as " Muhammad kills his own Companions " which may 
provide the enemy with an excuse to misrepresent Islam and which may 
affect Muslims themselves. 10 
The above evidences and others show the validity of dharä'i' as a 
source of law because the Lawgiver has taken account of the method of 
blocking means and has established several legal rulings according to it. 
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The purpose behind the doctrine of sadd al-dharä'i' is to prevent injuries 
before they actually materialise. In other words, it is not concerned with 
looking at the intention of the perpetrator or the actual realisation of the 
result, but with looking at the expected result and end of such means 
regardless of whether it was the result of a good or a bad intention and 
irrespective of the actual realization of the expected result. Illicit privacy, for 
example, between members of opposite sexes (aw) is unlawful because 
it may be a dhari`ah to adultery. So it is unlawful whether it has led to 
adultery or not. The same is the case with trading during the time of the 
Friday prayer, which is unlawful whether it leads to missing the Friday 
prayer or not . 
11 
B. TYPES OF MEANS : 
Islamic jurists have divided means in terms of their probability of 
leading to expected result , into four types. 
12 
1- The first type is that in which a means definitely leads to its result, 
such as in the case of digging a pit in front of a door which is used by the 
public so that any one who comes through that door is very likely to fall into 
it and although many might escape others would be trapped. Or such as in the 
case of digging a will in one's own garden but so close to the wall of a 
neighbour that it might fall as a result. 
All jurists have agreed on the prohibition of the act in the first example. 
However, they have disagreed over the question of responsibility in the 
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second example because of the fact that the act of digging in one's own 
property is lawful. 13 Al-Shätibi has expounded this point saying that if a 
lawful act definitely led to a harm (mafsadah), jurists should look at it from 
two angles. The first one is the permissibility of such an act when it is not 
accompanied by the intention to inflict harm on any body. It is obvious, from 
this angle, that doing so is permissible. However, the second angle from 
which the jurists should look at this matter is the harm which is certain to be 
inflicted as a result of such an act. According to this angle, any act which 
results in harm should be banned. The perpetrator is liable for any damage 
which results from his act. Since the harm definitely results from such an 
act, the norm which says " repelling an evil is preferable to securing a benefit 
" is applied here. Such a norm was used by the Hanau school to prevent the 
abuse of rights, which means that a person might be denied the exercise of 
his right if such exercise might result in excessive injury to others. 14 
2- A means which most likely leads to a prohibited end. That can be 
illustrated by two examples: selling weapons during the time of turmoil or 
civil war, and selling grapes to a wine maker. 
3- A means which frequently leads to a prohibited end, yet there is no 
certainty, nor even a high probability of such an end. In this type, the 
perpetrator has exploited lawful means and used it to achieve an unlawful 
result, which is opposed to the purpose of using such a means. An example of 
this would be a sale transaction which is used to get usury ( at the end. 
This kind of transaction, generally known as buy2' al-Ajäl ( deferred sale) or 
bay' al-'inah, in which the payment is delayed to a later date is regarded by 
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the Mdlki and the Hanbali schools as a means for procuring prohibited 
interest. If, for example, A sells an object for twenty pounds to B provided 
that the payment is due at the end of three months, and B sells the same object 
again to A for fifteen pounds with the payment being payable immediately, 
this transaction is , 
in reality, a loan of fifteen pounds to B on which he pays 
an interest of five pounds after three months. 15 
4- The fourth type of means is that in which the means rarely leads to 
injury and most likely leads to benefit. The possibility of it resulting in 
injury, is overlooked by a unanimous agreement between Muslim scholars as 
the benefit is most likely to be the result. 16 Examples of this type would be to 
grow grapes or to speak a word of truth to a tyrannical ruler. Such matters 
are lawful since the possibility of using them as a means to a prohibited result 
is very rare. In these cases , as 
in many other cases, there is a possibility that 
an injury (mafsadah might be caused as a result. Grapes, for instance, might 
be fermented into wine; also speaking truthfully to a tyrannical ruler might 
cause serious trouble for the one who giving the advice. However, a mere 
possibility of this sort is neglected in comparison with the stronger likelihood 
of the benefit that would be procured from growing grapes and speaking 
truthfully to a tyrant 17 
Islamic jurists have disagreed over the second and the third types. The 
Mälikis and the Hanbalis held the opinion that in such situations means may 
be blocked or opened. So both schools are in agreement on prohibiting 
selling weapons in a time of turmoil (fitnah ), selling grapes to a wine maker 
and deferred sales ( bivü al-äiä1 ). On the other hand, the Hanafi and the 
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Shäfi'i schools have held that such means should not be blocked since the 
original ruling is to permit such conduct. 18 
C. THE LINK BETWEEN NECESSITY AND DHARA'I' : 
Resorting to blocking or opening means may be based on necessity as 
well as public interest. In this regard necessity leads to three different sorts of 
rulings in order to prevent injuries before they materialise. It would lead to 
the lawful act being prohibited, or to the unlawful act being permitted, or to 
release from fulfilling one's legal obligations ( tark al-wäjib ). 
i. PROHIBITING A LAWFUL ACT : 
A lawful act may result in harm in the end so that it is turned into a 
prohibited act. In addition to the previous examples of selling weapons in a 
civil war or selling grapes to a wine maker, there is also the ruling in which a 
divorced woman whose husband had irrevocably divorced her during his 
terminal illness in order to exclude her from inheritance becomes entitled, 
nevertheless, to her share from the inheritance. Giving her the right to 
inherit prevents divorce being a means for such abuse. 19 
Another example is that the judge should not, in the view of the 
majority of jurists, adjudicate a dispute according to his personal knowledge 
of the facts without looking of the evidence of the case. 20 The reason is to 
prevent judges from relying on such personal knowledge to take sides with 
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one of the parties against the other claiming that it was based on personal 
knowledge. 
It was reported, in another example, that 'Umar ibn al-Khattäb wrote to 
Hudhayfah asking him to divorce his new Jewish wife. Hudhayfah responded 
first by asking 'Umar if the marriage was unlawful. 'Umar in his response 
made it clear that such a marriage was lawful. However, he did not want 
people to follow the examples of Hudhayfah in this matter lest people would 
seek to marry non-Muslim women ( ahl al-kitäb ) and leave Muslim women 
unmarried. 21 Also in another version 'Umar feared that Muslims would 
marry non-Muslim prostitutes. 22 In this example, the interest of Islamic 
society, in 'Umar's opinion, necessitated forbidding at that time such an act 
despite the fact that such a matter is permissible according to the Qur' än and 
that 'Umar himself knew this rule. 
The previous examples have been mentioned by some contemporary 
Muslim jurists as examples of necessity which leads to blocking means. 23 
Nevertheless, these examples show clearly the consideration of blocking the 
means to prohibited acts which underpins the consideration of public interest, 
since preventing injuries before they materialise is to preserve the interest 
of the public. However, the state of necessity is not obvious in these examples 
unless it is meant here in the broad sense of necessity. Necessity in its essence, 
as Mubarak pointed out, is a conflict between two interests in which the 
greater interest has to be secured and given a priority over the other one. 24 
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H. PERMITTING UNLAWFUL ACTS : 
An unlawful act may, as a result of a state of necessity arising, be 
). turned into a lawful act in order to repel the expected injury ( mufsadah 
This can be illustrated by the following examples: 
1- To give any financial support to the enemy fighting against Muslims 
is a. prohibited act as it contributes to their strength which would result in 
harming Muslims. However, such an act would become permissible in the 
case of Muslims in a very weak situation when they do not have the power to 
enable them to protect themselves and their land. In this situation, they may 
give money to the enemy to stop their aggression. In this example the 
unlawful act, which was prohibited to preserve the interest of Muslim 
society, was legalised to prevent a greater harm from being inflicted on 
Muslims. 25 
2- All Islamic jurists have held the opinion that to give bribes is a great 
sin and prohibited. However the M liki and the Hanbali jurists have held that 
giving bribes to an oppressor is permissible if it is the only way to prevent 
his oppression, that is if one is unable to defend himself or to obtain one's 
rights by other means, provided that one's rights are undisputed, that is they 
must be his proven rights, and provided also that the harm which is inflicted 
on one as a result of the oppression or from the loss of rights is greater than 
that resulting from giving a bribe. 26 
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iii. RELEASE OBLIGATION: 
The fulfilment of one's religious or legal obligations may not be 
binding. Failing to fulfill one's obligations might be permissible or 
obligatory on certain occasions so as to block a greater evil. Since it is 
permissible to permit unlawful acts where the necessity of blocking the 
means to evil arises, it may also be permissible, a fortion, not to do one's 
duty, since the Shari `ah has paid more attention to avoiding forbidden acts 
than it has to doing what is commanded. This was explicitly mentioned in the 
saying of the Prophet: 
" When I command you to do something, do it to the extent 
that you can, and avoid what I have forbidden. "27 
In this hadith, the Prophet asked Muslims to do whatever he demanded in 
accordance with their ability. On the other hand he asked Muslims to avoid 
whatever he forbade without restriction as to their ability, since abstaining 
from doing a thing is not beyond one's capacity. 
As to abstaining from doing one's duty so as to hinder a greater evil 
( mafsadah ), the jurists have provided some examples. 
1- Penalties ( ud-d ) should be applied and this is the duty of Muslim 
leaders. However, in the case of the commission of a crime such as theft 
during battles, penalties should be suspended in accordance with the tradition 
of the Prophet, who said, 
a Hands are not to be cut off during a warlike 
expedition. "28 
The reason for this is to avoid defection to the enemy. 29 
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2- Promoting good and preventing evil ( amr bil-ma`rüf wa nahy 'an al:. 
munkar ) is an obligation on every Muslim as the Prophet said: 
" He who sees something abominable amongst you should 
modify it with the help of his hand; and if he has not strength 
enough to do it, then he should do it with his tongue; and if he 
has not strength enough to do it, (even) then he should ( abhor 
it) from his heart and that is the least of faith. " 30 
Islamic jurists are in agreement that if promoting good or preventing evil 
would make the situation worse rather than better one should not do it, as the 
objective of enacting such a principle is to reduce the amount of evil not to 
increase it. According to this principle, jurists have ruled that fighting unjust 
rulers for the cause of promoting good and preventing evil is not permissible 
as long as they allow Muslims to perform the prayer. The reason for that is to 
prevent the turmoil and unrest which are usually associated with such 
fighting and which endanger the life and property of Muslims. However, this 
does not exempt Muslims from promoting good and preventing evil by 
means other than fighting. 31 
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3. THE LINK BETWEEN NECESSITY AND CONCESSIONARY 
LAW (RUKHSAH). 
A. INTRODUCTION. 
Before coming to the definitions of concessionary law ( rukh; ah ), a 
brief explanation about the nature of a legal decision ( hukm shar'i) as seen 
by Islamic jurists shall be given. 
A legal decision has been defined as the statement of the Lawgiver which 
concerns the conduct of people who are legally responsible ( mukallafin ). 
As such it encompasses i- demand (talab or gtidä' )-i. e. the law comes 
within the five qualifications, ü- option ( taa. khvir) i. e. fulfilling the demand 
of the law may be done in two or more ways, iii- legal situation (wa(V ) -i. e. 
the law is subject to an outside condition in order that it may be fulfilled or 
not. I 
The jurists then go on to group these three aspects of legal decision into 
two classifications. 
1- A legal decision which arises out of the nature of the obligation of the 
demand or option (bukm taklifi ). 
2- A legal decision which is subject to an outside condition in order that it 
may be fulfilled or not ( hukm wad'i ). 
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1. HUKM TAKLIFI : 
Hukm taklifi comprises demand and option. And it is, according to 
the majority of jurists, composed of the five qualifications (al-ahkä. m al- 
amsah ), namely obligatory ( wäjib recommended ( mandüb 1 
permissible ( mubAh ), disapproved ( makriih ) and forbidden 
(muharram)? These types of legal decision vary because the implications 
of the legal statements do not convey their meaning in a unique way. Thus, 
the demand which is understood from the meaning of a statement may be 
either in the form of a command which requires something to be done, or in 
the form of a prohibition which requires something not to be done. If the 
command is in a definitive form legal decision is obligatory, and if the 
command is not definitive, the legal decision is recommended. The legal 
decision is a forbidding if the prohibition is in a definitive form, and it is 
disapproved if it is in an undefinitive form. If , on the other hand, the 
statement of the Lawgiver gives the individual an option to do or not to do 
something, it is deemed permissible. 3 
2. HMKM WAD'I: 
iukm wadi is defined as the statement of the Lawgiver which 
identifies something as a cause (sabab) or as a condition (shaft) for a certain 
legal decision, or which sets up something as a hindrance ( mäni' ) to the 
application of a certain rule, or which identifies a legal decision as a strict 
law ('azimah ) or as a concessionary law ( tukhsah ), 4 or which make a 
law valid (i ) or invalid ( äsid .5 
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For instance, according to the saying of the Prophet " There is no 
marriage without the permission of a guardian ", 6 the permission of a 
guardian is regarded by the majority of jurists as a condition for a valid 
marriage. 7 
In the case of a similar example, the Prophet said " The killer shall not 
inherit. " 8 In this adit , the Prophet regarded killing someone as a 
hindrance (mani, ) to inheriting from him. 9 
B. CONCESSIONARY LAW (RUKHSAH ): 
Strict law (azimah )and concessionary law ( rukhsah ) are regarded as 
varietyiesof ukm wad'i by some scholars since the normal condition of life 
is seen as the cause for applying the original rules, and an abnormal 
condition of life is seen as the cause for mitigation and for applying easier 
rules. 10 
Rukhsahwould not exist in Islamic law without the existence of 
'azimah. That means there must be an azimah in the first place, then there 
should be a rukhsah in the case of hardship so as to mitigate the rigidity of 
the law. 
The literal meaning of azimah in Arabic is the act of determining or 
intending to do something. 11 In law, it means the rule in its primary state 
where the duty of competent people is to perform it. In other words, it is the 
law in its initial state when there is no conflicting evidence and no 
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intervening circumstances. It encompasses the general rules, in normal 
circumstances, which are directed to all people who are legally responsible 
without taking into consideration any person's excuse. Such a term can only 
be used alongside rukhsah. 12 
ukhsa in Arabic means relaxation and facility ( al vussr wa al- 
suhnlah ). 13 It has been defined in Islamic law as whatever prohibited 
matter has been made lawful for the purpose of easing hardship even though 
a legal proof still indicates its prohibition . 
14 Some scholars wanted to be 
more precise so as to include all sorts of rukhsah in the definition, and they 
said that rukhsah is rules that have been facilitated for competent people 
(mukallafin) who have valid excuse but which remain unlawful for those 
who have no such excuse, and matters whose non-performance has been 
allowed when normally they would be obligatory without the existence of a 
valid excuse. 15 
All the definitions of concessionary law (_rukhsah ) are intended to 
include all the elements which must exist to form a khsa . 
These elements 
are: 
1- There must be evidence to validate such a concession. 
2- A competent person ( mukallaf ) has valid excuse allowin him - to 
abandon the original ruling in favour of the concessionary law. 
3- The rules of is are not the fundamental rules; they are alternative 
rules that are enacted to replace them for the purpose of removing hardship 
and bringing ease. Thus, facility and ease are the crux of the matter as to 
226 
khsa . Accordingly, some scholars 
have defined rukhsah as the legal 
rulings that have changed difficulty to ease and facility as the result of a valid 
excuse in spite of the existence of the evidence of the original rulings. 16 
C. TYPES OF RUKHSAH ACCORDING TO THE HANAFI 
SCHOOL: 
Scholars from the Hanafi school have divided concessionary law 
( khs into two main categories: literal concession (rukhaah hagigiyyah), 
and figurative concession (rukhsah majäziyvah ). 17 
i. LITERAL CONCESSION: 
Literal concession is thus termed because in this type strict law 
(`azimah) still operates where there is no excuse, since the evidence which 
legalizes it still exists. This means that whenever a strict law ('azimah) is 
present alongside a concessionary law, the concessionary law ( khsa ) will 
be real and literal. 18 
This literal type is also subdivided into two: 
The first is that in which the action becomes permissible due to an 
existing excuse, yet the cause of its prohibition and the ruling of prohibition 
are simultaneously present with it being permissible. The permissibility in 
this case has no other effect than absolving the agent from sin. 19 
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This type can be illustrated by two examples as follow: 
1- The saying of words of disbelief by a person under compulsion 
is a special concession ( khs ) when his life, were he not to do so, would 
be in real danger provided that his heart remains firm in his faith. Such an 
utterance is a permissible dispensation ( khsa ) in the case of compulsion 
so as to save the life of the compelled person. Furthermore, such an 
utterance does not mean disbelief since faith has its root in the heart. 
Nevertheless, saying such words in such circumstances is not obligatory 
since the evidence which indicates the obligation of belief and the 
prohibition of disbelief is present. Acting according to strict law ('azimah ) 
in this case is preferred. 20 This means that to refuse to say such words and 
to show respect for the commandment of God is better, and this is 
confirmed by several examples set by the Companions such as the case in 
which two of the Companions were threatened by killing if they did not 
believe in the prophethood of Musaylamah the liar. One of them refused to 
express this belief and was kill ed as result; while the other did express it and 
he was released. When the Prophet heard about them he said, 
" As to the first one, God has granted him a reward twice. As 
to the latter, he took the dispensation that has been granted to 
him by God and he committed no sin. " 21 
2- Enjoining good and preventing evil (al-amr bi-al-ma'rnf wa al- 
nahy an al-munkar ) is an obligation on every Muslim. However, if a 
Muslim fears that doing so is likely to lead to his being killed or being 
tortured, he is allowed to abandon enjoining good or preventing evil so that 
his life may be saved. 22 If , nevertheless, he 
decides to take the risk and to 
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adhere to the unmodified law ('azimah ), this is preferred and better for two 
reasons. 
Firstly, by doing so, he is complying with the obligatory commandment of 
God which has been stated in the following verse : 
" Enjoin what is good and prevent what is evil: And bear with 
patient constancy whate'er betide thee; for this is firmness 
( of purpose) in (the conduct of) affairs. " S: 31- V: 17. 
Secondly, by he insisting on enjoining good or preventing evil without 
fearing the consequences, he may affect and impede those who would do 
wrong or those who would think of doing it in the future. 23 
The second type of literal concession is whatever ruling becomes 
permissible while the cause of the prohibition exists but not the ruling of the 
prohibition. This type is similar to the previous one in every aspect except in 
the ruling of prohibition which does not exist in this type. 24 This can be 
illustrated by the following example. 
The ruling which grants a concession to travellers and sick people to 
break the fast during Ramadin. In this example, the Lawgiver has given 
such people the right to break the fast despite the existence of the cause 
which prohibits breaking the fast, namely witnessing the month of Ramad5n 
the Qur' än stated: 
" So every one of you who is present during that month should 
spend it in fasting " S: 2-v: 185. 
This includes travellers and sick people since their fasting is accepted if 
they do so. However, they have been granted the-concession to postpone the 
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fast till such time as they are no longer travelling or sick as the Qur'än 
stated: 
" But if any one is ill or on a journey, the prescribed period 
should be made up by days later " S: 2 - V: 185. 
Accordingly, travellers and ill persons have the right to choose either to fast 
during Ramadiin or to postpone fasting till it is convenient. 25 
Thus there is no prohibition on breaking the fast for travellers in this 
example since it is up to competent people to choose whether to fast or not. 
However, the prohibition in the concession regarding uttering words of 
disbelief is, according to the Hanafi school, present, and utterance of the 
words of disbelief is prohibited in every situation, nevertheless, saying it 
under duress is permissible, namely the perpetrator's sin is forgiven by 
God. 26 
ii. FIGURATIVE CONCESSION: 
This type of concession is not a real concession since it does not exist 
vis-ä-vis a strict law (`azim ). Nevertheless it is called concession because 
it encompasses a sort of mitigation. 27 This type can be illustrated in the 
following examples. 
1- Rules which were originally legislated in opposition to a general 
maxim, such as those validating contracts which would normally be 
disallowed. Lease and hire (ijärah), advance sale ( salaam), and the order for 
the manufacture of goods (' tisnä' are all exceptional, as the object of the 
contract is nonexistent at the time of contract, but they have been 
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if someone was, for instance, compelled to eat the flesh of a 
dead animal because of extreme starvation, or to drink wine at the point of 
extreme thirst, he is permitted to eat and to drink because of the state of 
necessity which is a valid excuse. The legal decision with regard to dead 
meat and wine is that it is prohibited in case of option, but it is permissible in 
case of necessity, that means that the agent has no option in the case of 
necessity but to eat or to drink, and that if he refused to eat or drink then he 
would die, and as a result he would have committed a sinful act. This 
dispensation was granted to the compelled person in the Qur' än where we 
read 
" He hatb only forbidden to you dead meat, blood and the 
flesh of swine, ... 
But if one is forced by necessity without 
wilful disobedience, nor transgressing due limits, then is he 
without guilt.. " S. 2-V: 173.29 
Thus this is termed as a figurative concession by way of explaining the. 
obligatory nature of the concession in such circumstances. 
D. TYPES OF RUKHSAH ACCORDING TO THE MAJORITY OF 
JURISTS: 
The majority of jurists have divided dispensation (ks) 
according to its legal decision into various types. 
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1- Obligatory concession ( rukhsah wäjibah ). Eating the flesh of a dead 
animal, for instance, is an obligation in the case of extreme starvation which 
would most likely result in death. On the basis of the following verses, 
jurists have reached the decision that it is obligatory . 
" .. Nor kill 
( or destroy ) yourselves... " S. 4 - v: 29. " And 
make not your own hands contribute to ( your) destruction 
S. 2- v. 195. 
They pointed out that if the person involved in such a state of affairs did not 
eat from such flesh, preferring to observe the command that prohibits dead 
meat but not the other command which permits consuming it under a 
compelling necessity, he would be contributing to killing and destroying 
himself since he was able to save himself by complying with what has been 
permitted, namely eating this kind of flesh in such a situation. 
30 
In the same vein , 
it is also an obligation on non-travellers and those 
who are not sick to break the fast during the month of Ramadan if the fast is 
likely to cause harm to the fasting person. 31 
Furthermore, drinking a glass of wine when it is the only available drink 
in order to stop choking is an obligation when the life of the choking person 
is in a real danger. 32 
2- Recommended concession ( rukhsah mandübah. )" This means that it 
is better to act according to such a concession. A good example of such a 
concession is that which is granted the traveller to shorten the prayer of 
four rak'at, 33 or the breaking of the fast during a ak for the traveller 
who finds it hard to continue fasting. 34 
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3- Permissible concession ( rukhsah mubähah ). The obvious example 
for this type is the permissibility of the barter of `ariyyah, namely, the sale 
of fresh dates on the palm in exchange for an inexact quantity of dried dates. 
This transaction of 'arW is a concession and exceptionally permitted by the 
adit which provides that, 
" The Prophet permitted the sale of dates on the palm tree for 
its equivalent in dry dates. " 3s 
This was despite the fact that the rules of usury forbid the exchange of 
similar commodities unless they are in equal quantity. 
Similarly, the permissibility of the contract of salam, that is the contract 
in which the payment is received on the spot whereas the object of the 
contract is delivered at a later date, is an exception to the rule that the sale of 
an object which does not exist at the time of sale is forbidden. 
4- A dispensation other than the more appropriate (rukh; ah khiläf 
al-awlä ). This means that to act according to the rukhsah is permissible but 
is not the best thing to do, such as in the case of the previous example of 
uttering words of disbelieve under compulsion. This is permissible as long 
as faith is rooted in the heart; nevertheless it is better to show strength and 
firmness of faith by refusing to do so. 36 
In another example, it is better for the traveller to fast during Ramadan 
rather than to break his fast if he does not find it hard and fatiguing to fast. 
This is understood from numerous evidences such as this verse " and it is 
better for you that ye fast " S: 2. v: 184.37 
233 
E. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CONCESSION AND 
NECESSITY: 
In the light of the previous discussion, the relationship between 
necessity and concession (rukhýah) will now be examined. It is obvious that 
the two principles are close to each other in terms of sharing certain 
elements which can be noticed in both of them. A contemporary Muslim 
researcher has observed the points of similarity between the two concepts 
and he accurately found that concession ( sa is characterized by the 
following : 
1- Concession ( ukksaahh ) is a legal decision ( hukm shay i ). 
2- Such a legal decision is enacted because of an existing excuse and in order 
to remove certain hardship which would otherwise be inflicted on a 
competent person ( mukallaf ). 
3- Such a decision is exempted from an original and general legal decision. 
4- Such a decision ceases to operate immediately after the excuse which has 
justified it has disappeared. 38 
All these points exist in the case of necessity. So both of them are 
exceptional legal decisions which are excluded from a general decision. And 
such an exception in both of them is in order to avoid hardship for 
competent people ( mukallaf n ), so they are a sort of ease and facility against 
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distress and hardship. And lastly the effect of both of them ceases, once the 
excuse has ceased. 39 
It was previously also made clear that necessity is not just a part of 
rukhsah but it is also the most important part of it, so the Hanafi school 
made necessity the real and literal type of rukhsah. The same is the case for 
the majority of jurists who regard necessity as an obligatory dispensation ( 
rukhsah ). However, if we use necessity in its broad sense, which includes 
need ( ba'ah_ ), most of the cases of concession will be regarded as a type of 
necessity. 
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4. THE LINK BETWEEN NECESSITY AND ISTIHSAN 
IgiWa ( juristic preference) is one of the secondary sources of 
Islamic law. Muslim jurists have debated the nature, scope and validity of 
this source. While al-Shafi'i has totally rejected ist' sän as a form of 
pleasure seeking and arbitrary law-making in religion, t Imam Malik has 
observed that " 's ' s- represents nine-tenths of human knowledge. " 2 
Neither al-Shafi'i nor Malik, in these statements, was talking about the 
'stir hsan which is considered as an independent source of law by the Hanafi, 
Maliki and Hartbali schools. Al-Shafi'i rejected the type of isti sAn which 
involves personal opinion, discretion and inclination by the individual jurist 
which are not in harmony with the Qur'an and the Sunnah. In other words, 
al-Shafi'i held that jurists should rule or give a juristic opinion on the basis 
of nass or on the basis of an ijtihad which relies on an analogy with a nass 
but they should not rule or give a juristic opinion according to their personal 
preference or their whim as is mentioned in the Qur'an, 
" should you dispute over a matter among yourselves, refer it 
to God and his messenger, if you do believe in God and the 
last day " S: 4, v: 59. 
Viewing istihs n as such has been inherited by the adherents of the 
Shäfi`i school. Thus a scholar such as al-Ghazäli suggested three different 
meanings for 'i si and proceeded systematically to reject those which 
incorporated the idea of arbitrary opinion. 3 
The first definition which he claimed was valid proceeds as follows. 
The first thing which comes spontaneously to the understanding is that it is 
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whatever a jurist prefers relying on his reason. He went on to refute this 
definition, although it has not been mentioned anywhere in the treatises 
compiled by the Hanau school. 
The second definition mentioned by al-Ghazäli was that it is an evidence 
arising in the mind of the mujtahid which he can not express nor explain in 
clear terms. This definition was also rejected by al-Ghazäli because that 
which can not be demonstrated might only be part of the imagination. It 
must be tested on the basis of the sources of the law if one is to know whether 
or not it is legitimate. However, this definition also has no place in the 
works of the Hanafi school except in order to refute it. 
Finally, al-Ghazäli accepted the definition which is considered to be the 
authoritative definition within the Hanafi school. That is al-Karkh? 's (d. 340 
A. H ) definition which we shall come to later on. However, al-Ghazäli 
refused to call such a process isti .4 
Although al-Shäfi'i explicitly denounced the use of istihsän, yet he 
himself has been quoted as having used a derivation of istitisän on several 
occasions such as in the ruling in which he said "I prefer ( aubsinu mut'ah ) 
the gift of consolation to be at the level of thirty dirhams. " And "I approve 
( astabsinu) the period of preemption ( shuf'ah) to be three days " 
following the date when the sale of property in question came to the 
knowledge of the claimant. 5 These examples make it clear that the Shäfi'i 
school was, in fact, not entirely opposed to the use of istiän, but merely 
its arbitrary use. The IIanafi school have also denied the accusation of being 
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proponents of using arbitrary opinion in enacting the law. Accordingly, a 
conclusion has been drawn by some scholars such as al-Amidi, a! - Shawkäni 
and al Taftäzäni ( d. 791 A. H ) to the effect that there is no disagreement on 
the essence of istibsAn between the schools, and differences over isti sin 
essentially amount to no more than an argument over words caused 
essentially by attention to the literal meaning of the word isti sän which 
means to approve or to deem something preferable. 6 
THE HANAFI SCHOOL: 
The Shdfi'is' criticism of using istibsAn was particularly directed to 
the Hanafi school as the main adherents of isti sän. They relied on it as a 
viable concept in deducing the law. 
The Hanafis have, on the whole, adopted Abu al-Hasan al-Karkhi's 
definition which says: IstihsAn is the abandonment of an established 
precedent in favour of a different ruling for a reason stronger than the one 
which obtained in that precedent. 7 
It is also said that s ihsä is the stronger of two kinds of qi= 
( analogy ). A. al-Bukhäri commented following this definition saying that 
does not include other varieties which have been explained by al-Sarakhsi in 
his compendium Usul al-Sarakhsi: 
Mhs-aa, according to al-Sarakhsi, is setting aside an established 
analogy in favour of a superior evidence, that is the Qur'än, the Sunnah, 
necessity or a stronger giyas. 8 
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THE MALIKI SCHOOL: 
With regard to Imäm Mälik's remark in which he said: " Istihsän 
represents nine-tenths of human knowledge ", he was apparently, as Abi! 
Zahrah said, including the broad concept of interest ( mastabah ) within the 
term istihsän in that statement. For it is interest ( masla ah ) which 
accounts for the large part of the nine-tenths. This can be clarified when we 
probe deeper into some of the Mäliki definitions and find out what they 
mean by ist ihsan. Al-Lakhmi (d. 478 A. H) defined isti sän as follows: " It 
is an analogy in which the incident ( far' can be attached to two original 
cases (as ); one of them bears great similarity and close resemblance to the 
incident and the other one has little similarity to it. However, we attach the 
incident to the original case which bears little similarity, as we take into 
account current customs, public interest or preventing injuries. "9 
Ibn al-'Arabi defined isti sän in a similar way when he said 
istt ihsAn is to abandon exceptionally what is required by the law because 
applying the existing law would lead to a departure from some of its proper 
objectives. " Accordingly, he has divided isti ä into four divisions: 
* Abandoning an evidence (dam ) on the grounds of consensus ( 4mä' ). 
* Abandoning it on the grounds of custom ('u ). 
* Abandoning it on the grounds of public interest masigbah ). 
* Abandoning it on the grounds of removing hardship and necessity . 
10 
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However, one understands from the definition of other Mäliki scholars 
that istihsiin is not so general as Ibn al-'Arabi described it. Ibn Rushd and 
Ibn al-Anbäd (d. 328 A. H ) confined istihsän to cases where applying 
analogical reasoning (giy ss) is not appropriate. Ist enables jurists, in 
such cases, to escape the rigidity of the rules of 7ix&, when applying 
qi s 
is likely to lead to unfair results and to clash with the higher objectives of 
the Shad' ah, in favour of another ruling based on a more subtle and 
effective meaning (ma'nä munäsib )in the case under discussion. 11 
An example has been given to illustrate this opinion: 
In the law of inheritance, a case known as a'ariyvah or bimäriyvah 
presented the way in which jurists escaped the rigidity of general rules. In 
this case, the deceased woman was survived by her husband, mother, two 
full brothers and two uterine brothers. According to the Islamic law of 
inheritance, the husband takes half of the estate, and the mother is entitled to 
take one-sixth of the estate. The uterine brothers share a third. And 
whatever remains goes to the full brothers as residue because they are 
agnates (`asab ), who are entitled to inherit what has been left after 
giving those who have specific shares their shares as the Prophet Muhammed 
said: 
" Give the farFt'id ( the shares of the inheritance that are 
prescribed in the Qur'än) to those who are entitled to receive 
them; and whatever is left should be given to the closest male 
relative of the deceased. " 12 
In this case nothing remained as the estate had been completely exhausted by 
those who had shares so that nothing remained for the full brothers to take as 
residue. The problem arises as to whether it is fair to exclude full brothers 
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from inheritance when uterine brothers, who only have a relationship with 
the deceased from the mother's side, take the third of the estate thus 
preventing any inheritance by those who have the same relationship on both 
sides. According to what has been narrated the full brothers appealed, 
requesting the Caliph 'Umar to suppose that their father was a stone thrown 
into the ocean. Did not they share the same mother ? As a consequence, 
'Umar entitled the full brothers and the uterine brothers to a share in one- 
third of the estate. This decision from 'Umar was adopted by the Maliki 
school on the grounds of ' ihs- . 
This is because both parties are equal in 
terms of their relationship with the deceased from the mother's side. As to 
their relation from the father's side, it further supports their relationship 
with the deceased. Thus the fact that their relationship with the deceased was 
stronger validated the recourse to ' t' s. It would be unfair, in the 
Mälikis' view, to apply analogical reasoning and accept that they should 
always only inherit as male agnates the residuary. 13 
THE HANBALI SCHOOL : 
The Hanbali school, like the others, has rejected istibs based on the 
whim and the personal inclination and opinion of the mujtahid. 
Nevertheless, they have accepted 'stir hsän based on an evidence from the 
Qur'an or Sunnah. They have defined it as follows: the abandonment of one 
legal decision ( bukni) for another one which is considered better on the 
basis of legitimate evidence (n or consensus ). 14 
Some Hanbali scholars, such as Abü al-Khattäb, defined isti sän in a 
different way because the usage of 'sti si in Ahmad ibn llanbal's argument 
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entails the abandonment of analogy (iä) for stronger evidence such as a 
saying of a Companion. Abü al-Khattäb (d. 432 A. H) said: " Ahmad never 
used the word istihsan except in abandoning analogy for isti , sän 
but not in 
abandoning another proof. " is 
Ahmad ibn Hanbal used ist ihsän in some cases such as : 
In a case concerning one who usurped land and planted it, Ibn Hanbal 
held the opinion that the plants belonged to the landowner but he owes their 
value to the usurper in accordance with istihsän and against reasoning by 
analogy which would give the plants to the planter. He resorted to isß 
because of the saying of the prophet which stated that 
" if anyone sows in other peoples' land without their 
permission , he has no right to any of the crop, 
but he may 
have the value of it. ( i. e. the initial cost of the plants) " 16,17 
In the foregoing example we find Ibn Hanbal abandoned using 
analogy in favour of istihsdn on the basis of the opinion exprssed in the 
saying of the Prophet. 
Jurists have defined two types of istihs- : 
First: The preference for hidden analogy ( ai., yäs ) over a direct one. In 
this type, two procedures of analogical reasoning appear to exist for one 
case. In determining the legal decision to which governs the case, one 
solution may be obvious and easily intelligible by way of analogical 
reasoning. However, close examination and deep reflection make it clear 
that another solution is preferable because some subtle and an effective 
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meaning has been taken into consideration. Thus, there are two giväs, one of 
which is obvious but has a weak effect, and the other is a hidden aim but 
with a strong effect. stihs- requires choosing the hidden giyäs and 
abandoning the direct one. The following example will illustrate this type of 
'stir hsän. According to Hanaft school, the ancillary rights which are attached 
to the cultivated land such as the right of drink (Iiigq al-shurb ), the right to 
cross another's land to reach one's own land (hagq al-tariq) and the right of 
the water to flow across another's land without obstruction ( hagq al-masil ) 
are not included in the contract of sale unless they are specified. The 
question as whether they are included in a wwa ,f of cultivated 
land or not has 
been answered by the Hanafi school as follows: if analogical reasoning is 
applied( giya7s ), they are not included; but by way of isti sän they are. That 
can be explained by saying that: Two analogies can be drawn in this case. 
One of them, which is obvious, is to draw an analogy between the yýc vf and 
the sale contract as both of them result in transferring ownership. However, 
such a giväs would prevent the use of the attached rights since it is a rule of 
the Islamic law of contract, including the contract of sale, that the object of 
the contract must be clearly identified in detail and nothing is included 
therein unless it is specified in the contract. It is clear that such an analogy 
would lead to inequitable results because it would be impossible to benefit 
from the wwa f of cultivated lands without including any attached rights in 
the wag-f. 
Hanafi jurists have thus taken recourse to another analogy, which is a 
hidden analogy, that is to draw a parallel, not with the contract of sale, but 
with the contract of lease ( ijdrah ), since both of them involve a transfer of 
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usufruct (intifä, ). This alternative analogy with the contract of lease would 
successfully solve this problem and enable people to conclude aw. f even if 
the attached rights to the waqf are not specified. This analogical reasoning is 
a hidden analogy which needs deep reflection and thought. However, it has 
a strong effect since the essential purpose of the wwa f is not to transfer the 
ownership but to transfer the right of making use of it, as is the purpose of 
the contract of lease. 18 
The second type of isti hsän is to make an exception to a general rule of 
existing law. The justification for such an exception relies on existing 
evidence which warrant it. This evidence can be from the following: , 
consensus, approved custom, necessity or consideration of public interest 
( maslahah ). 19 
Here are some examples to illustrate this type of istibsän. According 
to a general rule of the Shari, ah law of contract, a contract becomes binding 
upon its conclusion. Nevertheless, when a person buys an object on the 
condition that he may revoke the contract within the next three days or so, he 
can do so and will not be bound by the general rule of contract. This 
exception to the general rule has been validated by way of istibs ýn which is 
based on the Tradition of the Prophet that said: " When you agree on the 
terms of a sale, you may say: It is not binding and I have an option for three 
days. " 20 Such a stipulation is what is known as the option of cancellation 
( khiyär al-faskh ). 21 
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In another example, the general rule is the forbidding of the sale of an 
object which does not exist at the time of sale. However, by way of 'tom' an, 
salam has been excepted on the condition that the time of delivery is 
stipulated and that the parties are able to meet the conditions of their 
agreement. This exception is according to the Tradition of the Prophet that 
said: " The Prophet prohibited the sale of non-existent objects but he 
permitted salam ( advance sale in which the price is determined ). " 22 In 
another badith, the prophet said: " Those who pay in advance for 
anything must do so for a specified measure and weight with a specified 
time fixed. " 23 , 
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To illustrate exceptional istibsAn which is authorised by consensus, 
scholars refer to the contract for the manufacture of goods ( istisn., ). 
Recourse to this form of contract is made when someone places an order 
with a craftsman for certain goods to be made at a price which is determined 
at the time of the contract. stihs' validates this transaction despite the fact 
that the object of the contract is non-existent at the time the order is placed. 
The contract for the manufacture of goods ( isti§nä' ) also serves as an 
example of the istih - which relies on custom ('u ). Since isti§nä' has 
been commonly practiced among people throughout the ages, the scholars 
validated it on the grounds of general custom. 25 
Some classical and contemporary scholars do not consider 
exceptional istihsän as a part of isti sän. They hold that istibs5n founded in 
the Qur'än, the traditions of the Prophet or consensus should not be called 
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istihsän at all. In cases where an existing law or analogy has been left in 
favour of an alternative ruling on the basis of a Tradition of the Prophet, 
there is no need for invoking 'stir hsän in such cases . All that is needed 
is the 
tradition itself. We do not need the word istibsAn to enact the law as long as 
the legal pretext ( ads and consensus) is present. Whenever a ruling for a 
case can be found in the Qur'än or the sunnah, the jurist is obliged to follow 
it and does not have choice of resorting to gi. ýviiss or 
to isti sän. 26 Al-Zargä' 
explains: If the alb. authorizes excepting a case from general rules in favour 
of another rule, this is, in reality, the preference of the Lawgiver ( istibsin 
al-shäri' ), which is not the subject matter of istijsän. It should not be called 
the preference of the jurist ( istih, s n al_fagih) which is the proper subject 
matter of 'stt hsän. 
What is called ist hsda in al-Zargä's opinion is of two types : 
1- Analogical 'stih än (itihsän giväsi ) which consists of a departure 
from one analogical reasoning to another as has been mentioned earlier 
when we explained the preferring of hidden analogy over direct analogy. 
2- stihs- which is founded in necessity ( da na), namely when the 
jurist leaves the existing rule of gi, to another one necessitated by instant 
hardship or the consideration of valid interest. 27 
It is obvious from what has been stated earlier that necessity plays a 
fundamental role in 'sti än whether it has been seen as a departure from 
existing evidence in favour of other evidence or has been seen as a departure 
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from an existing analogy in favour of another analogy. The recognition of 
the role of necessity in istihs- originates from several considerations: 
1- Necessity itself is recognised by the Qur'än and the Traditions of the 
Prophet as a valid justification for abandoning the existing law. Thus to 
prefer a solution based on necessity does not entail the jurist abandoning an 
attachment to the recognised sources of Islamic law. 
2- The objective of using '' týs5g and the objective of recognising 
necessity are the same thing, that is, to remove hardship. Thus the Hanafi 
jurist al-Sarakhsi looked to istiz "hsän as a method of seeking facility and ease 
in legal injunctions. It involves a departure from qiy& in favour of a ruling 
which dispels hardship and brings about ease to the people. Al-Sarakhsi 
explained this by sayin: Avoidance of hardship ( raf' al- harm ) is a 
fundamental principle of religion which is enunciated in the Qur'nn where 
we read in an address to the believers : 
" God intends facility for you and does not want to put 
you in hardship. " s: 2. v: 41. 
Al-Sarakhsi gave an example that shows the link between istilsän and 
necessity. A Muslim woman is asked to cover her body. However, she is 
allowed to unveil part of her body in case of necessity and need such as the 
need to show it to the doctor; and this is by way of istihsän as it seeks facility 
for people. 28 
3- The MAliki Ibn al- 'Arabi defined isti - as was mentioned earlier, 
in a way that may be applied to necessity: he views isti sän as abandoning 
exceptionally what is required by the law. Accordingly, both jstibsin and 
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necessity are exceptions to what has been stated in the law texts. The ruling 
based on necessity is a temporary exception from what is required by the 
text, and "stiff hsän is a permanent or temporary exception from the general 
rules. In addition to that, ', i hs- is not warranted unless analogical 
reasoning leads to bringing about injuries or missing benefit. Necessity is 
not taken into account except in cases when applying the law's text also leads 
to the same thing, namely bringing about injuries or missing benefits. 29 
From another point of view, necessity is a ground which warrants 
resorting to istihsän is warranted. For instance, if a well has been 
contaminated by an impure substance, the question arises as to whether the 
water may be used for ablution or drinking. According to Islamic law water 
must be pure, consequently such polluted water is not suitable for such use. 
In the case of the well, the water can not be purified by eliminating that part 
which is impure, since the water cannot be poured out, and water flowing 
into the well becomes unclean upon contact with the water within. The 
solution dictated by analogical reasoning is not to use such water because 
pure water has come into contact with the impure water. However, the 
solution found through 'sti ä provides that in order to purify the well, a 
certain amount of water, which is determined with reference to the type and 
intensity of the contamination, must be removed. Istitisýn in this case is 
justified by necessity and removing hardship . 
30 
In another example, strict analogical reasoning requires that 
witnesses who appear before the court must in all cases be trustworthy 
('udg ) in order to be admissible, that is upright and irreproachable. The 
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court can never issue a verdict as long as the character and conduct of the 
witnesses is not fully trusted. For judicial decisions must be founded on the 
truth, and this is facilitated by the testimony of just witnesses alone. 
However, such a ruling does not apply so strictly when the judge happens to 
be in a place where upright witnesses cannot be found; then it is his duty, by 
way of istihsän. to admit witnesses who are not totally reliable so that the 
rights of the people may be protected. 31 
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CONCLUSION 
It is clear from what has been stated in the introduction that the principle 
of necessity has never been treated in a separate chapter or work by classical 
jurists. However, discussion of, and materials relevant to, the various aspects 
of necessity can be found scattered in different places and different branches 
of Islamic knowledge. Contemporary jurists have paid attention to this 
principle, but available works are insufficient and have failed to clarify all 
the aspects of necessity. This study was an attempt to make clear the nature 
of this principle. 
This study has shown that classical jurists restricted their definition to 
situations where one feared death if one did not take a prohibited food. 
However they applied it in matters other than that. This difference between 
definition and application may be because classical jurists were only defining 
that kind of necessity which permits prohibited food since it is the sort of 
necessity which has been repeated several times in the Qur'än. On the 
grounds of different verses and Traditions of the Prophet, and in the light 
of the observations of classical jurists as to the causes of necessity, 
contemporary jurists extend the definition of necessity to include cases 
related to the five fundamental benefits ( al-darürivvat al-khans ), namely 
religion, life, intellect, offspring and property. Anything that endangers the 
existence of these benefits which cannot be repelled except by committing an 
illegal act is regarded as causing a state of necessity and will justify 
committing that illegal act. By holding this opinion, contemporary jurists 
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have not come to any new perception of necessity other than that perceived 
by the classical jurists. They merely include the application of necessity by 
the classical jurists within the definition of necessity. 
Maxims of necessity have confirmed the importance of this principle 
in Islamic law. Its importance stems from the high position given to the 
principle of removing hardship and to the other principle concerned with 
repairing injury. The maxims ' hardship begets facility' and ' injury is to be 
repaired ' are the origin of all other maxims related to necessity. If a 
competent person faces a state of necessity, he is facing an unusual hardship 
which entitles him to ease such hardship. It was established that no ordinary 
or bearable hardship warrants breaching the law. However, every case 
should be judged according to its own merits. When a competent person 
facing a state of necessity is also about to receive an injury if he sticks to an 
existing law, such an injury must be removed. 
As a confirmation of these two maxims, the maxims which state 
` necessity permits prohibited matters ' has allowed explicitly prohibited 
matters in a case of necessity. 
However, other maxims have dealt with the limits of such 
permissibility. Such as the maxims which state ' necessity is estimated by the 
extent thereof ', ' necessity does not invalidate the rights of others ', and 
'the lesser of two evils is preferred '; The role of maxims in Islamic law is 
to bring together the different aspects of a legal subject. These maxims, and 
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others, have been shown to have brought together the various aspects of 
necessity and make its limits very clear. 
Classical and contemporary Muslim jurists regard any situation which 
permits breaching an existing law as a state of necessity, whether it was 
caused by an external or an internal factor. In their opinion, starvation and 
illness, which exist without the intervention of other matters, as well as 
compulsion, legitimate defence and change in circumstances, which are 
caused by external factors, may cause a state of necessity. 
Not every compulsion is a cause of necessity. Only complete 
compulsion namely the threat of killing and damaging a limb would cause 
necessity. 
Any aggression against one's life, honour and property causes a state of 
necessity and allows people to defend them . 
However, the act of defence 
must be in proportion to the act of aggression. 
Necessity was invoked in the process of legalizing several matters 
related to illness and associated with modern medical knowledge such as 
medication with unlawful substances and organ transplants. In such matters, 
the principle of necessity proves to have a legislative nature. In other words, 
it is the foremost part of pubic interest (maslahah mursalah ). 
In the realm of contract, j awf'ih is regarded as a cause of necessity 
since it may release a contracting party from his obligation if it was proved 
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that factors outside his control prevented him from fulfilling his obligations. 
Here again, necessity was invoked to legislate new rules regarding the nature 
of contracts in modern times. 
Islamic jurists have stipulated a number of conditions so that invoking 
necessity might not be a matter of dispute. Necessity in this regard is part of 
Islamic law and was recognized as securing a legally recognized interest. 
Thus it should be understood as lying within the boundaries of Islam, and so 
any attempt to use it to permit something which is not compatible with the 
objectives of the Shari'ah is to be considered as a straightforward violation 
of the objective of this principle. This observation leads to the question of 
the genuineness of the state of necessity, which is vital to the recognition of 
necessity, by which is meant that a constraint must be existent in order for 
necessity to be invoked In addition, removing necessity should not result in 
a similar or greater injury. 
The maxim which states that the lesser of two evils is to be preferred is 
the core of the principle of necessity and a condition which indicates that 
removing hardship should not result in a greater injury. So necessity does 
not permit certain acts such as killing others under compulsion or because of 
extreme hunger in order to feed on them. However, necessity does not 
prevent one from killing an aggressor where it is the only means to repel 
his aggression. 
Islamic juridical terms are intimately linked with each other. A 
firm link has been found between public interest ( maslahah mursalah ), 
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concession (rukhsah ), juristic preference ( istihsän) and blocking the 
means ( sadd al-dharäT ), on the one hand, and necessity on the other, 
where jurists have used the same examples to illustrate these various 
juridical terms. In addition, necessity is an essential part of m1a, 
n khsah and 'stiff hsän . 
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